No War, No Peace: Healing the World's Violent Societies

Some of them are experiencing endemic violence that exceed death rates in warfare. These situations can only be improved with better quality ... AboutWhoWeAreBoardofTrusteesSeniorLeadershipOurStoryStaffEmploymentDiversityandInclusionJuniorFellowsProgramAnnualReportContactForResearchForGovernmentForMediaJoinOurEmailListFollowUsTwitterFacebookYouTubeLinkedInInstagramSupportDonateCarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeaceSearchSearchIn:SearchGlobalResourcesResearchAreasProgramsProjectsRegionsBlogsCarnegie.ruCommentaryChinaFinancialMarketsDiwanSadaStrategicEuropePodcastsCarnegieConnectsGrandTamashaTheWorldUnpackedInterpretingIndiaChinaintheWorldPublicationsExpertsEventsAboutUsSupportConnectWithUsShortcutsWhoWeAreBoardofTrusteesSeniorLeadershipOurStoryStaffEmploymentDiversityandInclusionJuniorFellowsProgramAnnualReportCentersCarnegieEuropeCarnegieIndiaCarnegieRussiaEurasiaCarnegieChinaMalcolmH.KerrCarnegieMiddleEastCenterCentersCarnegieEuropeCarnegieIndiaCarnegieRussiaEurasiaCarnegieChinaMalcolmH.KerrCarnegieMiddleEastCenterResearchAreasProgramsProjectsRegionsBlogsPodcastsPublicationsExpertsEventsReturntoThinkPeace:EssaysforanAgeofDisorderNoWar,NoPeace:HealingtheWorld’sViolentSocietiesRachelKleinfeld,  RobertMuggahManysocietiesostensibly“atpeace”arefarfrompeaceful,butexperienceendemicviolence.Anewtoolkitofsolutionsisneededtoreturnviolencetoitsprevioustrajectoryofdecline.PublishedOctober14,2019ResourcesPrintPageSignupforaweeklynewsletterfromtheCarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeaceSignuptoreceiveemailsfromCarnegie! Thankyou!Checkyouremailfordetailsonyourrequest. TableofContentsThePeacemakersof1919aCenturyOnJayWinterTheCallofUnorthodoxDiplomacyBernardBotPeacemakinginanEraofNewWarsMaryKaldorNoWar,NoPeace:HealingtheWorld’sViolentSocietiesRachelKleinfeld,RobertMuggahFromCyberSwordstoPlowsharesGeorgePerkovich,WyattHoffmanLawofWarorPeaceThroughLaw?FrédéricMégretOnPeaceandtheSpacesBetweentheWordsBrendanMcAllisterTableofContentsHardasthisistobelieve,weliveinoneofthemostpeacefulperiodsofhumanhistory.1Homicideshavebeenfallinginmostpartsoftheworldforcenturies.2Despitethehorrorsbeamedacrosstheinternet,violentdeathsfromwarsbetweenstatesareathistoriclows.3CivilwardeathshaveriseninrecentyearsowingtotheconflictsprincipallyinAfghanistan,SouthSudan,Syria,andYemen,buttheyhadfallensofarsincetheendoftheColdWarthattheyarestillafraction(inpercapitaterms)ofwhattheywereatanytimebefore.4Afterrisingforadecadeandahalf,evenviolentextremist–relatedfatalitiesareonthedecline.5 RachelKleinfeld RachelKleinfeldisaseniorfellowintheDemocracy,Conflict,andGovernanceProgram,whereshefocusesonissuesofruleoflaw,security,andgovernanceinpost-conflictcountries,fragilestates,andstatesintransition. More> Thesecomparativelyrecentimprovementsinpeaceandsecuritydidnotoccurspontaneously.TheendoftheColdWargavethemaboost,buttheywerechieflyachievedbyconcertedinvestmentinpoliciesdesignedtopreventandmitigatewarfareandterrorism.Sharpreductionsinviolentcrimewerealsodueinparttoinvestmentsinsmarterpolicingandprevention. Butthereisadarkersidetothestory.6Manysocietiesostensibly“atpeace”arefarfrompeaceful.Someofthemareexperiencingendemicviolencethatexceeddeathratesinwarfare.Thesesituationscanonlybeimprovedwithbetterqualitygovernance,ratherthantraditionalpeaceagreementsandpeacekeepers.Almostnineoutoftenviolentdeathsacrosstheworldtodayoccurinsidecountriesandcitiesthatarenotatwarinthetraditionalsense.7Criminalviolenceperpetratedbydrugcartels,gangs,andmafiagroupsisskyrocketing,especiallyinLatinAmericanandtheCaribbean,causingglobalhomicidestocreepupagain.8Meanwhile,statesecurityforcesarecontinuingtodeploymassviolenceandexcessiveforceagainsttheirownpeople.9 RobertMuggah RobertMuggahisthedirectorofresearchattheIgarapéInstitute,athinktankworkingondata-drivensafetyandjusticeacrossLatinAmericaandAfrica,thatheco-foundedin2011. Thesetwotypesofviolence—organizedcrimeandstaterepression—aremoreintertwinedthaniscommonlyassumed.Politicians,police,judges,andcustomsofficialsoftencooperatewithcartelbossesandgangsinthepursuitofprofitandpower.Bothareskilledathidingtheirviolentactssuchthattheyoftenarenotrecordedinworldwidedatasetsonlethalandnonlethalviolence.Yetitispossiblethatsuchviolencemaybecontributingtoajumpinoverallviolentdeathsworldwide.Suchviolenceisdifficulttodisrupt. Thesechallengesarenotconfinedtopoor,“failed,”or“fragile”states.ComparetheroughlythirtyfragilestateslistedbytheWorldBanktothefiftymostviolentcountriesintheworld,andjustfourappearinbothcompilations.Itismiddle-incomecountriesthatarefastbecomingtheworld’smostviolentplaces.10RelativelywealthySouthAfricahasaviolentdeathratenearlydoublethatofwar-tornSouthSudan.11In2018,morecivilianswerekilledbystateandparamilitaryforcesinthePhilippinesthaninIraq,Somalia,ortheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo—asmanyasinAfghanistan.12Ofthefiftymostviolentcitiesintheworldin2017(basedonmurderratesper100,000),fifteenareinMexico,fourteenareinBrazil,andfourareintheUnitedStates.13Inequality,notpoverty,isstronglycorrelatedwithmurder—andinequalityoftenrisesaspovertyfalls.14 Theinternationalcommunityhasfewtoolstoaddressthetwinchallengesofstateandcriminalviolence.Traditionalpeacetreatiesandthedeploymentofblue-helmetedpeacekeepersarenotfitforpurpose.Developmentorganizationshavearoletoplayinreducingcriminalviolence—butitmustbeanexplicitfocus,sincemeasurestoalleviatepovertydon’taffectviolenceperse.15Infact,effortstoreinforcestatecapacitycanmakeviolenceevenworsebyproppingupgovernmentscomplicitintheproblem.Whenpoliticiansareunableorunwillingtostemviolence,internationalleverageisoftenlimited,sincegovernmentscansanctioninternationalorganizationsandagenciesorevicttheirstaff.Anewtoolkitofsolutionsisneededtoreturnviolencetoitsprevioustrajectoryofdecline. WarandTerrorism—ChangingThreats Warhasalwaysconstitutedanexistentialthreattohumanity.Thecivilization-endingpotentialofarmedconflictreacheditsapogeeinthetwentiethcentury.Then,inthelate1940s,somethingremarkablestartedhappening.Theincidenceandseverityofcross-borderandcivilwarsbegantofall.16Halfacenturylater,aftertheColdWarhadended,thenumberofwarswentintofreefall,withmanypeteringoutastheUnitedStatesandRussiawithdrewsupportforcompetingsides.By2018,directdeathsfromcivilandinterstatewarshaddroppedtofewerthan53,000ayear.17(Indirectdeathscausedbyconflict,suchasincreaseddiseaseandmalnutrition,remainhigher.18) TheriskofwarfareisreemergingasU.S.hegemonyweakensandgeopoliticalrivalriesreturn,fuelingregionalproxyconflictssuchasthoseinIraq,Syria,andYemen.Whilethedeadlinessoftoday’swarsremainshistoricallylow,thereareneverthelesstwiceasmanycivilconflictstodayastherewerein2001.Itisasmalluptickafteralongdecline,butitisadisturbingtrend.19 Armedconflictstodayarehardertoextinguishbecauseofthreeparalleltrends.First,whileold-styleinterstatewarsarenowvanishinglyrare,theterm“civilwar”canbeamisnomer.Ofthefifty-twocurrentintra-stateconflictscountedbythePeaceResearchInstituteofOslo(PRIO),externalstatesweresendingtroopstoatleastonesideineighteenofthem.20Theseconflictsfueledbyoutsidestatesaregenerallymoreviolent,longerlasting,andmuchhardertoresolvethantraditionalcivilwars.21(Formore,seetheessaybyMaryKaldorinthiscollection.) Second,thenumberofnonstatearmedgroupsparticipatinginthebloodshedismultiplying.AccordingtotheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),roughlyhalfoftoday’swarsinvolvebetweenthreeandnineopposinggroups.22Inahandful,includingtheongoingconflictsinLibyaandSyria,literallyhundredsofarmedgroupsarefightingoneanother.Warsarehardertoendwhensomanygroupscanspoilthepeace.Third,today’swarriorsareaslikelytobeaffiliatedwithdrugcartels,mafiagroups,andcriminalgangsaswitharmiesororganizedrebelfactions.Inaglobalizedworldwithhighlyconnectedsupplychains,theyoftenactasalloftheabove.TheTalibanisarebelgroupfightingforpoliticalcontrolofAfghanistan.ItisalsoadrugcartelfightingcriminalizedportionsoftheAfghangovernmentforcontroloverdomesticandregionalsmugglingroutes.23Politicians,businessmen,andfighterswhoprofitfromongoingwarmakenegotiatedpeacemorecomplex,andinsomecasesimpossible. Thesetrendsarecompoundedbyalong-ignoredreality.Manycitizenssufferingunderpredatorygovernmentshavenoautomaticloyaltytothestate.Rebelgroups,terroristinsurgents,cartels,andgangssuccessfullylobbyforlegitimacyandpublicsupport—notjustwiththreats,butwithslickdigitalvideosandsocialmediapersuasioncampaigns. Formuchofthetwentiethcentury,terrorismwasviewedasalower-orderconcernbymostgovernments.TheSeptember11al-Qaeda-ledattacksontheUnitedStatescatapultedterrortothetopoftheglobalagenda.Incidentsofterrorismspikedformorethanadecade.Butsince2014,thenumberofattackshasfallenbyasmuchas44percent.24NorthAmericansandEuropeansstillfeelthattheyareonthefrontlinesofterror,yetaccordingtotheGlobalTerrorismIndex,whitenationalistgroupsposeagreaterthreattoU.S.citizensthanpoliticalIslamistgroups.25AsgruesomeattacksinBrussels,Manchester,andParis,suggest,WesternEuropedoesfaceagreaterterroristthreat.Yetin2017,just2percentofallterrorist-relatedattacksoccurredinEurope.Acrossthecontinent,theprobabilityofdyingatthehandsofaterroristwas0.027per100,000—slightlylesslikelythanbeinghitbylightning.26 Thegeographiclocusofextremistviolencehasaltered.Justsevencountriesaccountfor90percentofallterroristattacksandrelateddeaths:Afghanistan,Iraq,Nigeria,Pakistan,Somalia,Syria,andYemen.27Perpetratorsarealsoconcentratedinafewconflictzones.Morethan10,000oftheroughly19,000terroristkillingsin2017wereperpetratedbyjustfourgroups:theself-proclaimedIslamicState,theTaliban,al-Shabaab,andBokoHaram.28Overthepastdecade,theyhavebeenresponsibleforclosetohalfofallterrorist-relateddeaths.Terrorismtodayserveslargelyasabattletacticwithinirregularwarinthedevelopingworld. Theinherentvulnerabilityofsofttargetswillalwaysallowindividualswiththewillandmeanstosowterror.ButthefocusofWesternsecuritypolicyshouldcorrespondmorecloselywiththeactual—ratherthantheperceived—threat.Inparticular,attentionshouldfocusonthepotentialofattackswithbiologicalandchemicalweapons,athreatthathasbecomeplausibleagainaftertheirrepeateduseintheSyrianwar.29 Withinthecountrieshardesthit,theonlymeaningfulmethodofterrorpreventioninthelongrunistoaddressthefactorsthatgiverisetoitinthefirstplace.Terrorisatacticofwar,butitisaproductofinequitablegovernanceandpoliticalandsocialexclusion.Feelingsofinequality,marginalization,andindignityfeedangerandresentment.Moreover,itisoftenstateviolencethatsetsthistinderalight.AccordingtoaUNstudyinterviewingviolentextremistsacrossNorthAfrica,violentstaterepressiontransformedgrievancesintoterroristviolencein71percentofthecases.30 RisingStateViolence Eversincemodernnation-statesburstontothesceneintheseventeenthcentury,theyhaveviolentlycontrolledtheirpopulations.ThepracticeofgivingstatesapassoncoercionwithintheirborderswascodifiedintheTreatyofWestphaliaof1648,whichendedtheapocalypticbloodshedoftheThirtyYears’WarinEurope.Inthelongrun,thecureturnedouttobemoredeadlythanthedisease,however.R.J.Rummelestimatedthatinthetwentiethcentury,262millionpeoplewerekilledbytheirowngovernments—sixtimesmorethaninallinternationalandcivilwarsoccurringinthatperiod.31InChina,theSovietUnion,andotherCommunist,totalitarianstatessuchasCambodia,between85and110millionpeoplewerekilledbytheirowngovernments.32 Teargas,andplasticpelletgunshotusedbyVenezuela’sNationalPoliceagainstaprotestinAltamira,Caracas.(AndrésE.Azpúrua) AfterthefallofCommunism,humanitariansarguedthatstaterepressioncouldnolongerbetoleratedundertherubricofnationalsovereigntyandnoninterference.Moststatesperpetratingviolenceagainsttheircitizenswerenolongernear-peerrivals,butweakergovernmentsmoresusceptibletoWesternstrong-arming.Rwanda’sgenocideof1994,inwhichpossibly800,000peoplewerekilledinahundreddays,wassohorrificthatanewnorm,the“responsibilitytoprotect,”sanctioninginternationalinterferenceinsituationsofmassviolence,wonwidespreadsupport.33 Yet,despitethenewglobalnormofprotection,stateviolencehascontinued.NorthKoreaisholdingbetween70,000and130,000peopleinconcentrationcampsdeemedbyaHolocaustsurvivortobeasbadasthoseofNaziGermany.34InBrazil,policecommittedmorethan6,100killingsin2018(morethanoneofeverynineviolentdeathsinthecountry)—andoneofthelegislatorswhocondonedthisviolenceisnowpresident.35AmnestyInternationalfoundthatbetween2009and2015,Nigeria’smilitarystarvedortorturedtodeathatleast7,000Nigerians,killed1,200moreinextrajudicialexecutions,andimprisoned20,000.36 Today,statekillingsarepotentiallyamongthelargestsourcesofviolenceagainstcivilians—althoughwithdatasoeasilyhiddenandmanipulated,itishardtobesure.Indeed,fewcountriescollectorcentralizestatisticsonvictimsofstateviolence,muchlessmakethemavailabletothepublic.Atthesametime,new,digitallyenabledformsofstatecontrolareemerging,mostnotablyChina’spracticesofpreemptiveimprisonmentandsuper-chargedsurveillance,employedmostthoroughlyagainstitsMuslimUyghurminority. WhileChina’ssurveillancestatehintsatthefuture,Venezuelaembodiesstateviolencetoday.Venezuelahasoneofthehighestmurderratesintheworld,agrimrecordthatatfirstglanceappearstobetheresultofmurderouscriminalstakingadvantageofanearlyfailedstate.37Infact,Venezuelandrugtraffickingiswellorganizedandmanagedbythegovernmentitself.38Themostvirulentformofviolencetodayistheresultofsuchpartnershipsbetweenstates,theirsecurityforces,andparamilitariesandorganizedcriminals. TheSinisterExpansionofOrganizedCrime Organizedcriminalviolencehasgrowninvirtuallyeverypartoftheworldinrecentyears,whetheritbedrugcartelviolenceinMexico,reprisalkillingsamongpastoralistsandherdersinNigeria,39ganglandmurdersinElSalvador,40orbrutalitybyelection-campaignthugsintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo.41Theactsofbloodshedtheseviolentactorscommitareoftenflagrantandintentionallygorysoastosendamessagetotheirrivals.Manyplacesaresodeadlythattheyfacewarinallbutname. True,organizedcrimetendstostepintothebreachwhereagovernmentisunableorunwillingtoprovidebasicsecurityandjustice.Yetthiskindoforganizedcrimeflourishesmoreoftenwhenastateisnotweak,butcollusive.Such“privilegeviolence”occurswhenpoliticiansandsecurityforcesallowmafias,cartels,andgangsimpunity,inexchangeforcampaigncontributions,bribes,andhelpgettingoutthevoteorrepressingopposingelectorates.42 Theexchangeallowsthesepoliticalelitestoenjoythefruitsofcorruption,privilege,andperks,whilecedingportionsoftheirterritorytocontrolbyviolentcriminals.43InsomeMexicantowns,parallelgovernmentscomposedofcriminalizedpoliticalandadministrativestructureswieldrealcontrolfrombehindthescenes.InBrazil,largeportionsofsomeofthecountry’sbiggestcitiesareunderthecontrolofcompetingdrugtraffickingfactionsandmilitias.Insomeplaces,criminalsandpoliticiansmergeandbecomeoneandthesame.FromLatinAmericatoIndia,violentcriminalshavegainedelectoraloffice,whileothersseektoinfluenceelectionsthroughbuyingandsellingvotes.44 Toallowtheirviolentcompatriotsimpunity,politicianspoliticizeanddeliberatelyweakentheirsecurityservices.Criminalizedpolicebattlewithgangsandcartelsnotoverlawandorder,butovercontrolofturfandillegalproceeds.Ordinarycitizensareforcedtopicksides.Stuckbetweenmassivecriminalviolenceandapredatory,criminalizedstatethattendstopreyonthemarginalized,populationsbecomepolarized,andfragileregimesgetevenmorebrittle.Theseso-calledcrimewarsthuscorrodedemocracy.45 Poorercommunitiesarelefttoprotectthemselves.Thereisatightcorrelationbetweenpeople’sperceptionofinsecurityandexposuretovictimizationandtheirlikelysupportforextralegalmeasurestorestorelawandorder.Whereprivatesecurityistooexpensiveandunavailable,peopletendtoturntovigilantes,gangs,andmafiasthatoffersecurityagainstthepredatorystateandotherviolentgroups—foraprice.Thecocktailoffactorsdrivingterrorism—marginalization,exclusion,andrepression—cansimilarlycompelyoungmentojoincriminalgangs.Finally,asimpunitygrows,ordinarypeopleturntoviolence.Asignificantportionofmurderemergesfrombarfightsanddisputesbetweenneighborsratherthanprofessionalcriminals.46 Theensuingmayhemallowspoliticianstopostureasbeingtoughoncrimewithrepressiveormilitarizedpolicing.Manycitizens,exhaustedbycrimeandviolence,areeasilyseducedbysimplepromisesoflawandorder.Theseso-calledmanoduratacticstendtowinelections.47Theyarealso,oftenunintentionally,emboldenedbyforeignsecurityassistanceandequipment.Butthesepoliciessuperchargecriminalgroups.Zero-tolerancelawscondemnmanyyoungmentolifeinjail,wheretheylearnfromeachother.48Criminalsrespondtobrutalpolicingwithevenmoreviolence.49 Theresultisaself-reinforcingcycleofviolenceamongcriminalgroups,thestate,andregularpeople.Since2015,BrazilhaswitnessedmoreviolentdeathsthaninSyria.50Overthelastfifteenyears,MexicohasexperiencedmoreviolentdeathsthanIraqorAfghanistan.51Publicauthoritiesthereestimatethat40percentofthecountryissubjecttochronicinsecuritywithdisappearancesandpopulationdisplacementatall-timehighs.52 FightingStateViolenceandCrime Theconfluenceofstaterepressionandorganizedcrimeconstitutesawickedproblem.Venezuela(anditspatrons)isnotgoingtoauthorizeUnitedNationspeacekeeperstopatrolthestreetsofCaracas.ChinaandRussiaarenotabouttoallowinternationalobserverstomonitortheirrepression.Questionsofnoninterferenceandstatesovereigntyloomlarge.Anewtoolkitcanhelptofightstateviolenceandcrime.Thesetoolscouldalsohelpinaddressingcontemporaryformsofsplintered,semi-criminalizedwarfare,andtheterrorismemanatingfrompoorgovernanceandstaterepression. Asabeginning,theUnitedNations,WorldBank,andothermultilateralinstitutionsmustbecomelessrisk-averseandsavvierinengagingwithstatesthatpurposefullybrutalizetheircitizens,governinequitably,orpartnerwithcriminals. Theexperienceofstates,orsubstategovernmentsthatarewillingtoimprove,indicatesagreatdealaboutpolicingreformsandothersecurityimprovementsthatcanreduceviolence.53Disruptingtoday’sviolence,however,alsorequiresreducingpolitical,social,andeconomicinequalityandbuildinginclusivedecisionmakingmechanismsacrossdividedsocieties.54Reversinghighlevelsofgenderinequalityandgender-basedviolencecandecreasevulnerabilitytocivilwarandinterstatewar.55Countriesthatoffermoreopportunitiesforpoliticalandeconomicparticipationandencouragesocialmobilityalsotendtoexperiencelessviolence.56 Whentheproblemisagoverningsystemthatreliesonviolencetosustaininequity,straightforwardsolutionstoincreaseinclusivenesswillmeetresistance,however.Technicalsolutionspremisedonstrengtheningaweakbutwell-intentionedgovernmentwon’twork.Somebolderandsmarterinitiativestoaddresstheseissuesofwillarealreadyunderway.Forexample,theWorldBankhasaprogramtomakesecuritysectorbudgetingmoretransparent.Corruptionisnowreceivinggreaterinternationalscrutinyfrompublicandprivateinvestorsalike.Moreworkisneededtorebalancelendingstrategies,includingbyspendinglessontechnicalprogramsthatglossovertheunderlyingproblemandmoreoneffortsthattackletheelitesprofitingfromthestatusquo.57 Internationalandintergovernmentalorganizationsarelimitedintheirabilitytoaffectdomesticpolitics,bothbyinternallegalconstraintsandbecausetheyrelyonthepermissionofgovernmentstooperate.Theseinterventionsfromoutsidearealsonotalong-termsolution:asocialcontractneedstoexistbetweenastateanditspeople,notagovernmentandexternalpowers.Theroleofinternationalactorsmustalwaysbefocusedonempoweringactivecitizens(andcitizenship),whileincentivizingstatestolistentotheirownpeople.Changingtherelationshipbetweenastateanditscitizensiswhatultimatelyreducesstateviolenceandorganizedcrime.Repressivestatesandorganizedcrimethrivewhensocietiesaredividedandfragmented. Successcomesprimarilyfromhelpingthemiddleclassbuildsocialmomentumforpoliticalandeconomicchange.Donorscanfundlocalorganizationsthatcanspreadtrustedinformationwhileavoidingpartisanpitfalls;canbringcitizenstogetheracrosspolarized,dividedcountries;andcansupportafreemediaandinvestigativejournalistswhoinformpeopleaboutwhattheirgovernmentisupto.Informationalone,however,canmerelyangeranddepresspopulationsthatlackameanstoforcechange.Knowledgemustbepairedwithmechanismstoenforceaccountability. Toreducechroniclevelsofviolence,outsideactors—includingpublicandprivatedonors—mustfighttodefendcivilsociety,freespeech,andrightstoassemblyandoppositionvoices.Inmanycountries,oppositioneffortsrelyonlocalbusinesseswillingtofundadvocacythatwouldbuildamorejuststate.58Outsidefundersthatcan’tappropriatelyorlegallyfundadvocacycantargetaidtowardbuildingamiddleclassandaprivatesectorthatcanbeindependentofthegovernment,notreliantongovernmentlargesse. Toeasethepathofactivecitizens,internationalactorsmustalsoavoiddoingharm.Donorfundingcanpropuppredatorygovernmentssothattheydonotneedtoheedthewishesoftheirpopulations.Wherecorruptpoliticiansarefuelingtheviolencetheyclaimtobefighting,foreigngovernmentsshouldwithholdsecurityaidratherthanwastetaxpayerdollars.CentralAmerica’sgangsmetastasizedwhentheUnitedStatesdeportedgangmembersfromLosAngeleswithnosupportforintegratingthemintocountriestheyhadleftastoddlers.TheUnitedStatescontinuestorepeatthatmistaketoday.59 Theprivateandsocialsectorsplayanimportant,ifoftenunderappreciated,role.InternationalfinancialhubssuchasDubai,London,NewYork,Shanghai,andSingaporeshouldtightentheregulationsoffinancialsystemsandpropertymarketsthatallowcriminalsandpoliticianstolaunderill-gottengains.60AcademicinstitutionscouldfollowtheleadofMagnitskyActandGlobalMagnitskyActsanctionsanddenyadmissiontothechildrenofleadersguiltyofgrosshumanrightsviolationsandcorruption. Finally,moreresearchisneededintodiplomacyandmediationamongcriminalgroupsandbetweengovernmentsandcriminals.ElSalvador’sfamousgangtruceof2012endedinfailure.61But,inLosAngeles,violencehasnotreboundedafterathirty-yeartrucemodeledontheMiddleEastpeaceprocesshelpedendviolentreprisalsinthe1990s.62Thesenegotiationsareoftensecretandarerarelyevenapparenttoanyoneotherthanthepoliticiansandcriminalsthemselves.Verylittleisknownaboutthecircumstancesthatallowsometosucceed,whileotherscauseonlymorebloodshed.Gainingabetterunderstandingcouldhelpaddressnotonlycriminalviolencebutalsocriminalactorswithinmodernwarfare.63 Theproblemofviolentpredatorygovernmentswon’tbepermanentlysolvedbyagreementssuchasthese.Infact,theycanmakeagoverningorderevenlesslegitimate.Buttheycanbuytime,creatingthebreathingroomnecessarytorebuildthesocialcontractbetweenastateanditscitizens.Whileworkingtoimproveinternalgovernance,othermeasuresareneededtotackleurgentproblemsthatcrossborders.Refugeelawneedsupdatingtohelpthosetryingtosavethemselves.MillionsaretryingtoescapethecriminalviolenceofCentralandLatinAmerica,justasrefugeeshavefledthewartimeviolenceofSyria.Thedifferenceisthatthoseseekingsuccorfromcrimeareoftenstuckinlegallimboafterbeingrefusedasyluminthirdcountries.64InotherwisepeacefulcountriesacrossEuropeandintheUnitedStates,populismisrisingonthebacksofmigrantsfleeingbloodshed,oftennotcausedbywar. Finally,datacollectionmaynotbesexy,butthefightagainstallformsofviolencealsorequiresbetterstatisticsandanalysis.Thereissurprisinglylittleinformationaboutviolenceinsub-SaharanAfrica,wherearoundhalfthestatesdon’treporthomicidenumbers,inauthoritariancountrieswherethenumbersareprobablymanipulated,andinplaceslesscoveredbytheEnglish-speakingpress(whichisgenerallyusedtodetermineconflictcounts).65Supportingbetterdata,whichwouldbecomparableacrosswarandhomicideaswellasacrosscountries,isessentialtolearnwheretheproblemslie,andwhetherinterventionsarehavinganimpact. Decadesago,inthewakeoftheSecondWorldWar,avastintellectual,multinational,andbilateraleffortsucceededincorrallinginterstatewarandreducingcivilwar.Collectiveviolencefellglobally.Nowitisrisingagain,innewformsthatarehardertoeradicate.AccordingtotheWorldHealthOrganization,oneinsixpeopleworldwideisaffectedbyviolencetoday.Itistimefortheinternationalcommunitytodirectitsmanifoldresources,monetaryandintellectual,toupendingtheproblemofourtime:organizedcrimeandcriminallyviolentstates. Notes 1StevenPinker,TheBetterAngelsofOurNature:WhyViolenceHasDeclined(NewYork:VikingPress,2011). 2Forhomicidestatistics,seeManuelEisner,“LongTermHistoricalTrends,”CrimeandJustice30(2003):83–142;ManuelEisner,“Modernization,Self-Control,andLethalViolence:TheLong-termDynamicsofEuropeanHomicideRatesinTheoreticalPerspective,”TheBritishJournalofCriminology41,no.4(September2001):618–38;TedRobertGurr,“HistoricalTrendsinViolentCrime:ACriticalReviewoftheEvidence,”CrimeandJustice3(1981):295–353;andTedRobertGurr,“HistoricalTrendsinViolentCrime:EuropeandtheUnitedStates,”inViolenceinAmerica,Volume1:TheHistoryofCrime,ed.TedRobertGurr(California:SagePublicationsInc.,1989),21–54. 3HumanSecurityReportProject,HumanSecurityReport2009/2010:TheCausesofPeaceandtheShrinkingCostsofWar(NewYork:HumanSecurityReportProject,2011),21. 4NilsPetterGleditsch,etal.,“ArmedConflict1946–2001:ANewDataset,”JournalofPeaceResearch39,no.5(2002):615–37.SeealsoHåvardStrand,“OnsetofArmedConflict:ANewListforthePeriod1946–2004,WithApplications,”underreviewatConflictManagementandPeaceScience(2006). 5NationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START),“GlobalTerrorismDatabase,”2018,https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. 6SeeRachelKleinfeld,“ReducingAllViolentDeath,Everywhere:WhytheDataMustImprove,”CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,February2,2017,https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/02/reducing-all-violent-deaths-everywhere-why-data-must-improve-pub-67857;andRobertMuggah,“CountingConflictDeaths:OptionsforSDG16.1,BriefingNotetoMembersoftheInter-AgencyandExpertGrouponSDGIndicators,”IgarapéInstitute,October2015,https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/IAEG-Briefing-Note-Counting-Conflict-Deaths-October-2015.pdf. 7MirielleWidmerandIrenePavesi,“MonitoringTrendsinViolentDeaths,”SmallArmsSurvey,no.59(September2016):1–8. 8ClaireMcEvoyandGergelyHideg,GlobalViolentDeaths2017:TimetoDecide(Geneva:SmallArmsSurvey,2017). 9Ofcourse,thereductionofmasskillingsfromtotalitarianstatessuchasthetwentiethcenturyslaughtersinChina,Russia,andCambodiadoesnotmeanstateviolenceeverdisappeared.IncountriessuchasNorthKoreaandRwanda,stateimplementedorstate-directedviolencecontinuedapace. 10RachelKleinfeldandElenaBarham,“ComplicitStatesandtheGoverningStrategyofPrivilegeViolence:WhenWeaknessIsNottheProblem,”AnnualReviewofPoliticalScience21(May2018):215–38. 11AccordingtotheUNODC,Brazil’shomiciderateis36per100,000,SouthSudan’swas13.9accordingtotheUNODCin2012,foraconservativeestimateweaddtothistheestimatesofwardeathsbasedonapopulationofapproximately10.2millionpriortotheconflict,andaviolentdeathrateofapproximately190,000duetowaroverthecourseof7years.SeeFrancescoChecchietal.,“EstimatesofCrisis-AttributableMortalityinSouthSudan,December2013-April2018:AStatisticalAnalysis,”LondonSchoolofHygieneandTropicalMedicine,September2018,https://crises.lshtm.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2018/09/LSHTM_mortality_South_Sudan_report.pdf. 12RoudabehKishiandMelissaPavlik,“ACLED2018:TheYearinReview,”ArmedConflictLocationandEventDataProject,January11,2019,https://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ACLED-2018-The-Year-in-Review_Final_Pub-1-1.pdf. 13ConsejoCiudadanoParaLaSeguridadPúblicayLaJusticiaPenalAC,“Las50ciudadesmásviolentasdelmundo2018”[The50MostViolentCitiesin2018],ConsejoCiudadanoParaLaSeguridadPúblicayLaJusticiaPenalAC,http://seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/files/estudio.pdf.Thelistislimitedtocitiesofmorethan300,000anddoesnotincludewarzones. 14MaiaSzalavitz,“TheSurprisingFactorsDrivingMurderRates:IncomeInequalityandRespect,”Guardian,December8,2017,https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/08/income-inequality-murder-homicide-rates. 15RobertMuggahandClionadhRaleigh,“ViolentDisorderIsontheRise.IsInequalitytoBlame?,”WorldEconomicForumAgenda,January4,2019,https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/violent-disorder-is-on-the-rise-is-inequality-to-blame/. 16Gleditschetal.,“ArmedConflict1946–2001,”andStrand,“OnsetofArmedConflict.” 17TheresePettersson,StinaHogbladh,andMagnusOberg,“OrganizedViolence:1989-2018andPeaceAgreements,”JournalofPeaceResearch56,no.4(2009):589–603.SeealsoHavardStrandetal.,“TrendsinArmedConflict,1946-2018,”ReliefWeb,March2019,https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Strand%2C%20Rustad%2C%20Urdal%2C%20Nyg%C3%A5rd%20-%20Trends%20in%20Armed%20Conflict%2C%201946%E2%80%932018%2C%20Conflict%20Trends%203-2019.pdf. 18McEvoyandHideg,GlobalViolentDeaths2017,10. 19FionaTerryandBrainMcQuinn,“TheRootsofRestraintinWar,”InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,June18,2018,https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/roots-restraint-war#. 20KendraDupuyetal.,“TrendsinArmedConflict,1946-2016,”ETHZürich,June22,2017,http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/a7992888-34fc-44e6-8176-2fcb3aada995/pdf. 21ErikK.JenneandMilosPopovic,“ManagingInternationalizedCivilWars,”OxfordResearchEncyclopediaofPolitics,September2017,https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-573. 22TerryandMcQuinn,“TheRootsofRestraintinWar.” 23RobertPerito,“Afghanistan’sPolice:TheWeakestLinkinSecuritySectorReform,”U.S.InstituteofPeace,August2009,https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_police.pdf.7. 24InstituteforEconomics&Peace,“GlobalTerrorismIndex2018:Measuringtheimpactofterrorism,”InstituteforEconomics&Peace,December2018,http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018.pdf. 25AWashingtonPostanalysisoftheGlobalTerrorismDatabaseatMaryland’sSTARTfoundthatof263terroristsincidentssince2010,ninety-twowerecarriedoutbywhitenationalists,comparedtothirty-eightjihadists.SeeWesleyLowery,KimberlyKindy,andAndrewBaTran,“IntheUnitedStates,Right-WingTerrorismIsOntheRise,”WashingtonPost,November25,2018,https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-the-united-states-right-wing-violence-is-on-the-rise/2018/11/25/61f7f24a-deb4-11e8-85df-7a6b4d25cfbb_story.html.SeealsoInstituteforEconomics&Peace,“IEP’s2018GlobalTerrorismIndex:DeathsFromTerrorismDown44perCentinThreeYears,butTerrorismRemainsWidespread,”InstituteforEconomics&Peace,December5,2018,https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/iep-s-2018-global-terrorism-index-deaths-from-terrorism-down-44-per-cent-in-three-years-but-terrorism-remains-widespread-845356407.html. 26RobertMuggah,“Europe’sTerrorThreatIsReal.ButItsCitiesAreMuchSaferThanYouThink,”WorldEconomicForum,June08,2017,https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/europes-terror-threat-is-real-but-our-cities-are-much-safer-than-you-think/. 27InstituteforEconomics&Peace,“GlobalTerrorismIndex2018,”http://globalterrorismindex.org/. 28Ibid. 29WillS.Hylton,“HowReadyAreWeforBioterrorism?,”NewYorkTimes,October26,2011,https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/magazine/how-ready-are-we-for-bioterrorism.html?auth=login-email. 30UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),“JourneytoExtremisminAfrica:Drivers,Incentives,andtheTippingPointforRecruitment,”UNDP,2017,https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf. 31R.J.Rummel,“Freedom,Democracy,Peace:Power,Democide,andWar,”UniversityofHawaii,http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/. 32Ibid. 33SeeUnitedNations,“ResponsibilitytoProtect,”UnitedNations,https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml. 34InternationalBarAssociation,“NorthKorea:InquiryFindsKimJong-unShouldBeInvestigatedandProsecutedforCrimesAgainstHumanity,”InternationalBarAssociation,December12,2017,https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=8ae0f29d-4283-4151-a573-a66b2c1ab480. 35CésarMuñozAcebes,“‘GoodCopsAreAfraid:’TheTollofUncheckedPoliceViolenceinRiodeJaneiro,”HumanRightsWatch,July7,2016,https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/07/good-cops-are-afraid/toll-unchecked-police-violence-rio-de-janeiro. 36“StarsonTheirShoulders,BloodonTheirHands:WarCrimesCommittedbytheNigerianMilitary,”AmnestyInternational,2015,https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4416572015ENGLISH.PDF. 37JuanCarlosGarzonandRobertMuggah,“Venezuela’sRagingHomicideEpidemicIsGoingUnrecorded,”LosAngelesTimes,March31,2017,https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-garzon-muggah-venezuela-violent-crime-statistics-20170331-story.html. 38InsightCrime:VenezuelaInvestigativeUnit,“DrugTraffickingWithintheVenezuelanRegime:The‘CarteloftheSuns,’”InsightCrime,May17,2018,https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/drug-trafficking-venezuelan-regime-cartel-of-the-sun/.Illegalgoldminingisalsounderthepurviewofthestate. 39RobertMuggahandJoséLuengoCabrera,“TheSahelIsEngulfedinViolence.ClimateChange,FoodInsecurityandExtremistsAreLargelytoBlame,”WorldEconomicForumAgenda,January23,2019,https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/all-the-warning-signs-are-showing-in-the-sahel-we-must-act-now/ 40RobertMuggah,“It’sOfficial:SanSalvadoristheMurderCapitaloftheWorld,”LosAngelesTimes,March2,2016,https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0302-muggah-el-salvador-crime-20160302-story.html. 41RobertMuggah,“IsKabilaUsingEthnicViolencetoDelayElections?,”ForeignPolicy,November27,2018,https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/27/is-kabila-using-ethnic-violence-to-stay-in-power/. 42RachelKleinfeld,ASavageOrder:HowtheWorld’sDeadliestCountriesCanForgeaPathtoSecurity(NewYork:PantheonBooks,2018). 43SeeMuggahandRaleigh,“ViolentDisorderIsontheRise.” 44MilanVaishnav,WhenCrimePays(NewHaven,Conn.YaleUniversityPress,2017).SeealsoJohnP.Sullivan,JosédeArimatéiadaCruzandRobertJ.Bunker,“ThirdGenerationGangsStrategicNoteNo.9,”SmallWarsJournal,https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-9. 45RobertMuggahandJohnSullivan,“TheComingCrimeWars,”ForeignPolicy,September21,2018,https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/21/the-coming-crime-wars/. 46Kleinfeld,ASavageOrder,86–96. 47RobertMuggah,“ReviewingtheCostsandBenefitsofManoDuraVersusCrimePreventionintheAmericas,”inThePalgraveHandbookofContemporaryInternationalPoliticalEconomy,ed.TimothyShaw,LauraMahrenbach,RenuModiandXuYi-chong(London:Palgrave,2018),465–83. 48YusufAhmedad,AlyssaDougherty,RachelKleinfeldandAlejandroPonce,“ReducingViolenceandImprovingtheRuleofLaw:OrganizedCrime,MarginalizedCommunities,andthePoliticalMachine,”CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,September24,2014,https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/24/reducing-violence-and-improving-rule-of-law-organized-crime-marginalized-communities-and-political-machine-pub-57704. 49RobertMuggah,“Brazil’sPrisonMassacresSendaDireMessage,”NPR,May28,2019,https://www.npr.org/2019/05/28/727667809/opinion-brazils-gruesome-prison-massacres-send-a-dire-message.SeealsoRobertMuggahandIlonaSzabo,“Brazil’sDeadlyPrisonSystem,”NewYorkTimes,January4,2017,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/opinion/brazils-deadly-prison-system.html. 50DatadrawnfromtheBrazilianForumofPublicSafety(63,880),theSyrianObservatoryofHumanRights(39,000).SeeRobertMuggah,“Brazil’sMurderRateFinallyFell—andbyaLot,”ForeignPolicy,April22,2019,https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/22/brazils-murder-rate-finally-fell-and-by-a-lot/. 51AfghanistanandIraqfiguresaredrawnfromtheCostsofWarProjectattheBrownUniversityWatsonInstituteforInternationalandPublicAffairs,whichestimatedthedeathtolloftheIraqwar(2003–2018)tobefrom267,792to295,170andcalculatedthedeathtolloftheAfghanistanwar(2001–2018)tobe147,124asofNovember2018.Bycomparison,accordingtotheIgarapeInstitute’shomicidemonitor(whichutilizesstatisticsfromtheMexicangovernment),therewere33,341homicidesin2018and310,834from2003to2018.SeeNetaC.Crawford,“HumanCostofthePost-9/11Wars:LethalityandtheNeedforTransparency,”CostsofWar,November2018,https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/Human%20Costs%2C%20Nov%208%202018%20CoW.pdf.SeealsoIgarapéInstitute,HomicideMonitor,V1,distributedbyIgarapéInstitute,https://homicide.igarape.org.br/. 52TomPhillips,“Mexico:40%ofCountryIsParalyzedbyViolence,SaysChiefofStaff,”Guardian,July10,2018,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/10/mexico-amlo-gangs-violence-land-paralyzed. 53ThomasAbt,BleedingOut:TheDevastatingConsequencesofUrbanViolenceandaBoldNewPlanforPeaceintheStreets(NewYork:BasicBooks,2019). 54FacundoAlvaredoetal.,“WorldInequalityReport2018:ExecutiveSummary,”WorldInequalityLab,2018,https://wir2018.wid.world/. 55MarianneDahl,“GlobalWomen,PeaceandSecurity,”PRIO,May2017,https://www.prio.org/Projects/Project/?x=1767. 56KariPaasonenandHenrikUrdal,“YouthBulges,ExclusionandInstability:TheRoleofYouthintheArabSpring,”PRIO,2016,https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=9105.Opportunitiesforyouthislikelyaninterdependentvariable,servingasbothcauseandeffect,inwhichcaseitmaybealaggingindicatorofasystemofgovernancethatismovingawayfromPrivilegeViolence. 57SeeRobertMuggahandClionadhRaleigh,“ViolentDisorderIsontheRise.” 58LeonardoArriola,Multi-EthnicCoalitionsinAfrica:BusinessFinancingofOppositionElectionCampaigns(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012). 59AnaArana,“HowtheStreetGangsTookCentralAmerica,”ForeignAffairs84,no.3(May–June2005):98–99. 60MatthaBusby,“FirstEverUKUnexplainedWealthOrderIssued,”OrganizedCrimeandCorruptionReportingProject,March2,2018,https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/7724-first-ever-uk-unexplained-wealth-order-issued. 61SinisaVukovicandEricRahman,“TheGangTruceinElSalvador,”OxfordResearchGroup,April18,2018,https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-gang-truce-in-el-salvador.SeealsoRobertMuggah,AmiCarpenter,andTopherMcDougal,“TheInconvenientTruthAboutGangTrucesintheAmericas”,InSightCrime,December5,2013,https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/the-inconvenient-truth-about-gang-truces-in-the-americas/. 62AndreaFord,“Ex-GangMembersLooktoMideastforaPeacePlan:Truce:GroupUses1949Cease-FireAgreementBetweenEgyptandIsraelastheBasisforanAgreementAmongL.A’sBloodsandCrips,”LosAngelesTimes,June17,1992,https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-06-17-me-438-story.html;“TruceThatEnded30YearsofLAGangWarfare,”BBCNews,April15,2015,https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-32250743/truce-that-ended-30-years-of-la-gang-warfare. 63AfascinatingexampleofwhatworkscomesfromEcuador,which“legalizedgangs”inrecentyears.SeeDavidBrothertonandRafaelGude,“SocialInclusionFromBelow:ThePerspectivesofStreetGangsandTheirPossibleEffectsonDecliningHomicideRatesinEcuador,”IADB,March2018),https://webimages.iadb.org/publications/2019-01/Social-Inclusion-from-Below-The-Perspectives-of-Street-Gangs-and-Their-Possible-Effects-on-Declining-Homicide-Rates-in-Ecuador.pdf. 64KatieBennerandCaitlinDickerson,“SessionsSaysDomesticandGangViolenceAreNotGroundsforAsylum,”NewYorkTimes,June11,2018,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/politics/sessions-domestic-violence-asylum.html. 65Kleinfeld,“ReducingallViolentDeaths,Everywhere.”SeealsoAlexandraLysovaandNikolayShchitov,“WhatIsRussia’sRealHomicideRate?StatisticalReconstructionandthe‘DecivilizingProcess,’”TheoreticalCriminology19,no.2(2015):257–77. TableofContentsThePeacemakersof1919aCenturyOnJayWinterTheCallofUnorthodoxDiplomacyBernardBotPeacemakinginanEraofNewWarsMaryKaldorNoWar,NoPeace:HealingtheWorld’sViolentSocietiesRachelKleinfeld,RobertMuggahFromCyberSwordstoPlowsharesGeorgePerkovich,WyattHoffmanLawofWarorPeaceThroughLaw?FrédéricMégretOnPeaceandtheSpacesBetweentheWordsBrendanMcAllisterEndofdocumentCarnegiedoesnottakeinstitutionalpositionsonpublicpolicyissues;theviewsrepresentedhereinarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsofCarnegie,itsstaff,oritstrustees.RelatedanalysisfromCarnegieToJoinRussiaorNottoJoin?AllChangeintheDonbasRepublicsKonstantinSkorkinPutinisBankingonEurope’sDivisionsOverRussiaJudyDempseyWhatHasStoppedEUEnlargementintheWesternBalkans?DimitarBechevDoestheEUNeedTreatyChange?StefanLehnePopularArticlesFeaturedTheWorldUnpackedUncoveringXinjiang'sMassSurveillanceJune16,2022VictoryatSeaWithPaulKennedyJune02,2022ShowingUpintheIndianOceanMay19,2022TheWorldUnpackedisabiweeklyforeignpolicypodcastthatbreaksdownthehottestglobalissuesoftodaywithexperts,journalists,andpolicymakerswhocanexplainwhatishappening,whyitmatters,andwherewegofromhere.Byusingthiswebsite,youagreetoourcookiepolicy. 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