Negotiation and Bargaining - Oxford Research Encyclopedias

Negotiation and bargaining are common terms for discussions aimed at reaching agreement in interdependent situations, that is, in situations ... Jumpto Content Menu UserAccount PersonalProfile About ToolsandResources Subscribe CustomerServices News OxfordResearchEncyclopedias OxfordResearchEncyclopediaofPsychology OxfordResearchEncyclopedias Psychology Advancedsearch Browse BrowsebySubject    AffectiveScience BiologicalFoundationsofPsychology ClinicalPsychology:DisordersandTherapies CognitivePsychology/Neuroscience DevelopmentalPsychology Educational/SchoolPsychology ForensicPsychology HealthPsychology HistoryandSystemsofPsychology IndividualDifferences MethodsandApproachesinPsychology Neuropsychology OrganizationalandInstitutionalPsychology Personality PsychologyandOtherDisciplines SocialPsychology SportsPsychology BrowseAll Close ViewPDF Highlightsearchterm Save Cite Emailthiscontent ShareLink Copythislink,orclickbelowtoemailittoafriend Emailthiscontent orcopythelinkdirectly: https://oxfordre.com/psychology/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.001.0001/acrefore-9780190236557-e-253 Thelinkwasnotcopied.Yourcurrentbrowsermaynotsupportcopyingviathisbutton. LinkcopiedsuccessfullyCopylink ShareThis Signin ArticleNavigation Signin Youcouldnotbesignedin,pleasecheckandtryagain. Username PleaseenteryourUsername Password PleaseenteryourPassword Forgotpassword? Don'thaveanaccount? SigninviayourInstitution Youcouldnotbesignedin,pleasecheckandtryagain. Signinwithyourlibrarycard Pleaseenteryourlibrarycardnumber Searchwithin... Articlecontents ResearchParadigmsNegotiationPreparationandGoalsTheGoalofNegotiationsPreparingforNegotiationsNegotiationBehaviorandOutcomesDifferentiationbeforeIntegrationOutcomesofNegotiationsCognitionsFixed-PiePerceptionAnchoringEmotionsIntrapersonalEffectsofEmotionsInterpersonalEffectsofEmotionsGenderStereotypeThreatStereotypeReactanceBacklashPowerCultureNegotiationswithinandbetweenGroupsIntergroupNegotiationsMultipartyNegotiationsTeamNegotiationMotivatedInformationProcessingSocialMotivesEpistemicMotivationTimePressureCommunicationMediaConflictIssuesCurrentDevelopmentsInteractionamongGender,Power,andCultureCommunicationProcessesEthicsandDeceptionNeurobiologicalProcessesPersonalityFurtherReadingReferencesRelatedArticles ShowSummaryDetails NegotiationandBargainingNegotiationandBargainingWolfgangSteinelWolfgangSteinelLeidenUniversity,DepartmentofPsychology and FiekeHarinckFiekeHarinckLeidenUniversity,DepartmentofPsychologyhttps://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.253Publishedonline:28September2020SummaryBargainingandnegotiationarethemostconstructivewaystohandleconflict.Economicprosperity,order,harmony,andenduringsocialrelationshipsaremorelikelytobereachedbypartieswhodecidetoworktogethertowardagreementsthatsatisfyeveryone’sintereststhanbypartieswhofightopenly,dominateoneanother,breakoffcontact,ortaketheirdisputetoanauthoritytoresolve.Therearetwomajorresearchparadigms:distributiveandintegrativenegotiation.Distributivenegotiation(“bargaining”)focusesondividingscarceresourcesandisstudiedinsocialdilemmaresearch.Integrativenegotiationfocusesonfindingmutuallybeneficialagreementsandisstudiedindecision-makingnegotiationtaskswithmultipleissues.Negotiationbehaviorcanbecategorizedbyfivedifferentstyles:distributivenegotiationischaracterizedbyforcing,compromising,oryieldingbehaviorinwhicheachpartygivesandtakes;integrativenegotiationischaracterizedbyproblem-solvingbehaviorinwhichpartiessearchformutuallybeneficialagreements.Avoidingisthefifthnegotiationstyle,inwhichpartiesdonotnegotiate.Cognitions(whatpeoplethinkaboutthenegotiation)andemotions(howtheyfeelaboutthenegotiationandtheotherparty)affectnegotiationbehaviorandoutcomes.Mostcognitivebiaseshindertheattainmentofintegrativeagreements.Emotionshaveintrapersonalandinterpersonaleffects,andcanhelporhinderthenegotiation.Aspectsofthesocialcontext,suchasgender,power,culturaldifferences,andgroupconstellations,affectnegotiationbehaviorsandoutcomesaswell.Althoughgenderdifferencesinnegotiationexist,theyaregenerallysmallandareusuallycausedbystereotypicalideasaboutgenderandnegotiation.Powerdifferencesaffectnegotiationinsuchawaythatthemorepowerfulpartyusuallyhasanadvantage.Differentculturalnormsdictatehowpeoplewillbehaveinanegotiation.Aspectsofthesituationalcontextofanegotiationare,forexample,time,communicationmedia,andconflictissues.Communicationmediadifferinwhethertheycontainvisualandacousticchannels,andwhethertheypermitsynchronouscommunication.Therichnessofthecommunicationchannelcanhelpunacquaintednegotiatorstoreachagoodagreement,yetitcanleadnegotiatorswithanegativerelationshipintoaconflictspiral.Conflictissuescanberoughlycategorizedinscarceresources(money,time,land)ontheonehand,andnormsandvaluesontheother.Negotiationismorefeasiblewhendividingscarceresources,andwhennormsandvaluesareatplayinthenegotiation,peoplegenerallyhaveahardertimetofindagreements,sincetheusualgiveandtakeisnolongerfeasible.Areasoffutureresearchincludecommunication,ethics,physiologicalorhormonalcorrelates,orpersonalityfactorsinnegotiations.KeywordsnegotiationbargainingnegotiationstylecognitionemotiongenderpowerculturemultipartynegotiationsmotivatedinformationprocessingSubjectsSocialPsychology Bargainingandnegotiation,the“back-and-forthcommunicationdesignedtoreachanagreementwhenyouandtheothersidehavesomeintereststhataresharedandothersthatareopposed”(Fisher,Ury,&Patton,2012,p.xxv),arethemostconstructivewaystohandleconflict.Economicprosperity,order,harmony,andenduringsocialrelationshipsaremorelikelytobereachedbypartieswhodecidetoworktogethertowardagreementsthatsatisfyeveryone’sintereststhanbypartieswhofightopenly,dominateoneanother,breakoffcontact,ortaketheirdisputetoanauthoritytoresolve(Lewicki,Saunders,&Barry,2021). Negotiationandbargainingarecommontermsfordiscussionsaimedatreachingagreementininterdependentsituations,thatis,insituationswherepartiesneedeachotherinordertoreachtheirgoals.Whilebothtermsareoftenusedinterchangeably,Lewickietal.(2021)distinguishbetweendistributivebargainingandintegrativenegotiation.Distributivereferstosituationswhereafixedamountofaresource(e.g.,moneyortime)isdivided,sothatoneparty’sgainsaretheotherparty’slosses.Insuchwin–losesituations,likehagglingoverthepriceofabicycle,bargainersusuallytakeacompetitiveapproach,tryingtomaximizetheiroutcomes.Integrativereferstosituationswherethegoalsandobjectivesofbothpartiesarenotmutuallyexclusiveorconnectedinawin–losefashion.Insuchmorecomplexsituationsthatusuallyinvolveseveralissues(ratherthanthedistributionofonlyoneresource),interdependentpartiestrytofindmutuallyacceptablesolutionsandmayevensearchforwin–winsolutions,thatis,theycooperatetocreateabetterdealforbothparties(Lewickietal.,2021). Thedistinctionbetweenbargainingandnegotiationreflectstheresearchtradition,wherebargaininghaslargelybeeninvestigatedfromaneconomicperspective,focusingonthedilemmabetweenimmediateself-interestandbenefittoalargercollective.Negotiationhasmostlybeeninvestigatedfromtheperspectiveofsocialpsychology,organizationalbehavior,management,andcommunicationscienceandhasmainlyfocusedontheeffecton,andbehaviorandcognitionofpeopleinrichersocialsituations. ResearchParadigms Negotiationresearchhasappliedvariousparadigms.Game-theoreticapproaches,suchasthePrisoners’Dilemmaandrelatedmatrixgames,inwhichsimultaneouschoicestogetherinfluencetwoparties’outcomes,explorehowpeoplehandletheconflictbetweenimmediateself-interestandlonger-termcollectiveinterests(seeVanLange,Joireman,Parks,&VanDijk,2013,forareview).AparadigmtoinvestigatebehaviorinpurelydistributivesettingsistheUltimatumBargainingGame(Güth,Schmittberger,&Schwarze,1982).Itmodelstheendphaseofanegotiation:oneplayeroffersadivisionofacertainresource(e.g.,€100split50–50),andtheotherplayercaneitheraccept,inwhichcasetheofferiscarriedout,orreject,inwhichcasebothplayersgetnothing.Studiesinultimatumbargaininghaveconsistentlyshownthatevenindistributiveone-shotinteractions,bargainersnotonlytryandmaximizetheirownoutcomes,butarealsodrivenbyother-regardingpreference,canrejectunfairoffers(Güth&Kocher,2014),areconcernedaboutbeingandappearingfair(VanDijk,DeCremer,&Handgraaf,2004),andareaffectedbytheirownandacounterpart’semotions(Lelieveld,VanDijk,VanBeest,&VanKleef,2012). Whileultimatumbargainingisacontext-freesimulationofadistributivenegotiation,integrativenegotiationhaspredominantlybeenstudiedinrichercontextsthatsimulatereal-lifedecision-making.Researchhaslargelyreliedonnegotiationsimulationstoidentifyandanalyzeparticipants’behaviorsandmeasuredeconomicoutcomes(Thompson,1990).Fieldstudiesonnegotiationbehaviorhavebeenconductedtoamuchsmallerextent(Sharma,Bottom,&Elfenbein,2013). Theremainderofthisarticlewillfirstdescribethestrategyandplanningfornegotiations,andthebehaviorandoutcomesofnegotiations.Itwillthencoverresearchonfactorsthataffectbehaviorandoutcomeinintegrativenegotiation,startingwithintrapersonalfactors,suchascognitionsandemotions.Thenaspectsofthesocialcontext,suchasgender,power,culture,andgroupconstellationswillbecovered,beforemovingontoaspectsofthesituationalcontext,suchastime,communicationmedia,andconflictissues,andconcludingwithsomeemerginglinesofresearch. NegotiationPreparationandGoals TheGoalofNegotiations Thegoalofnegotiationsmaybedeal-makingordisputeresolution.Beforeenteringtheactualnegotiation,well-preparednegotiatorsdefinethegoalstheywanttoachieveandthekeyissuestheyneedtoaddressinordertoachievethesegoals(Lewickietal.,2021).Deal-making(e.g.,astudentsellinghisbike)involvestwoormorepartieswhohavesomecommongoals(e.g.,transferringownershipofthebikefromthesellertothebuyer)andsomeincompatiblegoals(receivingahighpricevs.payingalowprice),andtryandnegotiateanagreementthatisbetterforboththanthestatusquo(thesellerkeepingthebike)oranyalternativeagreementswiththirdparties(e.g.,sellingthebiketosomeoneelseorbuyingadifferentbike).Negotiationwiththeaimofdisputeresolution(e.g.,astudentcomplainingaboutthenoiseaflatmatemakes)occurswhenpartieswhoaredependentoneachother(e.g.,becausetheyshareaflat)realizethattheyareblockingeachother’sgoalattainment(preparingforanexamvs.listeningtopunkrock)andnegotiatewhatcanbedonetosolvetheproblem. PreparingforNegotiations Negotiatorsareadvisedtodefinetheiralternatives,targets,andlimits,andtoprepareanopeningoffer(Lewickietal.,2021).Figure1showsthekeypointsintheexampleofastudentsellinghisbiketoanotherstudent.Thetargetpointisthepointatwhicheachnegotiatoraspirestoreachasettlement.Forexample,thesellerhopestosellhisbikefor€280,andthebuyerhopestobuyitfor€190.Bymakingopeningoffersbeyondtheirtargets,negotiatorscreateleewayforconcessionswhilepursuingtheirgoal.Inthebikeexample,thesellerhaspreparedanopeningoffer(e.g.,anaskingprice)of€320,whilethebuyerplannedtostartthenegotiationbyofferingtopay€150.Well-preparednegotiatorsdefinetheirlimitsbeforeenteringanegotiationbysettingaresistancepoint,thatis,thepricebelowwhichasettlementisnotacceptable(Lewickietal.,2021).If,forexample,thesellerwouldacceptanypriceabove€200andthebuyeriswillingtopayupto€280,itislikelythattheysettleonapricesomewhereinthisrange.Thiszonebetweenthetwoparties’resistancepointsiscalledzoneofpotentialagreements(ZOPA;Lewickietal.,2021). OpeninnewtabFigure1.OverviewofKeyPointsinNegotiationPreparation(Example). Well-preparednegotiatorsareawareofthealternativetheyhavetoreachingadealintheupcomingnegotiation,inparticularoftheirbestalternativetoanegotiatedagreement(BATNA;Fisheretal.,2012).Asthequalityofanegotiator’sBATNAdefinestheirneedtoreachanagreement,andthustheirdependencyontheircounterpart,attractiveBATNAsincreaseanegotiator’spower. Deal-makinganddisputeresolutiondifferinthewaypartiesaredependentoneachother:indeal-making,bothpartiescanhaveindependentalternativesthattheycanunilaterallydecidetoturntoinsteadofreachingadeal(thebuyermayfindadifferentseller,andthesellermightfindanotherpotentialbuyer).Disputesthatoccurbetweenpartieswhoshareacommonfate,likeflatmates,parentsofachild,co-ownersofacompany,ordifferentethnicorreligiousgroupslivingonthesameterritory,canonlybesolvedbythepartiesworkingtogether.Thealternativetonotsolvingadisputeforbothdisputantsthereforeisconflictescalation(e.g.,sabotagingthestereoinstallation),avictoryforone(andagrudgefortheother)orastalemateinwhichneitherpartyiswillingtoabandontheirposition.Thesealternativesusuallydonotlastortheydamagetherelationshipbetweentheparties. NegotiationBehaviorandOutcomes Negotiationiscommunication.Partiescommunicateeitherdirectly,orthroughagents,andexchangeoffersandcounteroffers,usuallyalongsidearguments,questions,proposals,cooperativestatements,commitments,threats,andsoon.Howpeoplebehaveinnegotiationsisinfluencedbytheirpreferrednegotiationstyle.TheDualConcernModel(Blake&Mouton,1964;Pruitt&Carnevale,1993;Rubin,Pruitt,&Kim,1994)describeshowtwotypesofconcernsjointlydeterminenegotiationstyles.Thesetwoconcerns,whichcanbothrangeinintensityfromlow(i.e.,indifference)tohigh,aretheconcernaboutaparty’sownoutcomeandtheconcernabouttheother’soutcome,asdisplayedinFigure2.Importantly,themodeldoesnotpostulateconcernaboutaparty’sowninterests(alsocalledconcernforselforself-interest)andconcernabouttheother’soutcomes(alsocalledconcernforotherorcooperativeness)asoppositeendsofonescale,butratherastwodimensionsthatcanvaryindependently. OpeninnewtabFigure2.Dual-ConcernModel.Source:BlakeandMouton(1964). Partieswithalowconcernforselfandforotherwillprobablybeavoidingnegotiations,leavingtheotherpartywithoutanagreement.Partieswithahighconcernforselfandalowconcernforotherarelikelytouseforcingbehaviors,whileaimingtoachievetheowngoalsbyimposingasolutionontotheother.Forcing(alsocalledcontending),likeusingthreatsorotherformsofpressure,isdetrimentaltotherelationshipwiththeotherparty,andcanleadpartiesintoaconflictspiral,especiallywhentheyaresimilarlypowerful(Rubinetal.,1994). Partieswithalowconcernforselfandahighconcernforotherarelikelytoengageinyielding.Yielding(alsocalledaccommodating),likemakinglargeconcessionsoracceptingtheotherparty’sdemands,isoftenthestrategyofpartieswhofeelweakerthantheircounterpartorhaveastrongneedforharmony.Thiscanleadintoadynamicofexploitation.Itislesseffectivewhennegotiatingimportantissues,sinceyieldingonimportantissueswillleavetheyieldingpartydissatisfiedwiththeoutcome.Partieswithanintermediateconcernaboutbothparties’outcomesarelikelytousecompromising,a“meet-in-the-middle”approachoftenconsideredademocraticandfairwayofsolvingconflictsbetweenmutuallyexclusivegoals.Partieswhocompromise,however,mightsettleforasimplesolutionandoverlookmorecreativesolutions(Pruitt&Carnevale,1993). ThenegotiationstylesdisplayedinFigure2,onthediagonalfromyieldingviacompromisingtoforcing,entaildistributivebehavior.Distributivebehavioraimstodistributethevalueofadealinawin–losefashion—one’slossesaretheother’sgains.Thesearethebehaviorthatbargainersengageinduringpositionalbargaining—eachsidetakesaposition,arguesforit,andmightmakeconcessionsinordertomovetowardacompromise(Fisheretal.,2012).Thenegotiationstyleproblem-solving,whichislocatedbeyondthisdistributivediagonal,aimsatreachingwin–winagreements.Insteadoffocusingontheirpositions,partieswithahighconcernforselfandforothermayfocusontheirinterests.Interestsaretheunderlyingcausesorreasonswhynegotiatorstakeacertainposition(Fisheretal.,2012).Engaginginintegrativeproblem-solvingbehavior,negotiatorstrytofindsolutionsthatintegratebothparties’interestsandarethusbetterforbothpartiesthanasimplecompromisewouldbe(seethearticle“ConflictManagement”foramoreelaboratedescriptionofthedualconcernmodel). DifferentiationbeforeIntegration Negotiationsoftenfollowadifferentiation-before-integrationpatterninwhichnegotiatingpartiesstartwithdistributive,forcingbehavior,suchasthreateningtheotherpartyorfiercelyarguingfortheirowninterests.Onlyafterrealizingthatthiscompetitivebehaviordoesnotbringthemanyclosertoanagreement,forexamplebecausetheotherpartydoesthesame,theytendtoswitchtomoreintegrativenegotiationandbecomewillingtolookformutuallysatisfactoryagreements(Harinck&DeDreu,2004;Olekalns&Smith,2005;Walton&McKersie,1965).Inlabstudies,suchswitchesfromcompetitivetocooperativenegotiationoftenoccuraftertemporaryimpasses(Harinck&DeDreu,2004)—momentsinanegotiationinwhichpartiestakeatime-outbeforehavingreachedanagreement.Infieldstudies,suchswitcheshavebeendescribedas“ripemoments”(Zartman,1991)or“turningpoints”(Druckman,2001;Druckman&Olekalns,2011). OutcomesofNegotiations Outcomesofnegotiationsareeitheranimpassewhennoagreementisreachedoranagreementthatcanbeeitherdistributive(win–lose)orintegrative(win–win).Outcomescanbemeasuredasobjectiveoreconomicoutcomes—suchasmoneyorpoints—andassubjectiveoutcomes—suchassatisfactionwiththeoutcomeorprocessandwillingnesstointeractinthefuture(Curhan,Elfenbein,&Kilduff,2009).Distributiveagreementsarethosethatdividesomefixedresourcesbetweenpartiesinawin–loseway—oneparty’sgainsaretheotherparty’slosses.Anexamplewouldbeasituationinwhichabuyerandsellerarenegotiatingonlyaboutthepriceofabike.Win–losedoesnotnecessarilyimplyvictoryofonepartyovertheother—asimplecompromise(50–50)wherepartiesmeetinthemiddleoftheirinitialdemandsisanexampleofadistributiveagreementaswell.Distributivenegotiationstylesarelikelytoleadtoimpasseswhenpartiesmatchtheirforcingbehavior,ortodistributiveagreementswhenonepartyyieldstotheforcingoftheotherorwhenbothdecidetocompromiseand“meetinthemiddle.” Integrativeagreementsarethosethatdivideanexpandedsetofresourcesandtherebyincreasethebenefitforbothnegotiators.Contrarytodistributivebargaining,whichisdominatedbyvalue-claimingstrategies,integrativenegotiationoffersthepossibilitytocreatevalue,thatis,tofindsolutionsthatimprovetheoutcomestobothparties(Lewickietal.,2021).Akeyactivityinintegrativenegotiationistogeneratealternativesolutionstotheproblemathand.Onewaytogeneratealternativesolutionsisbyaddingresourcesandnegotiatingaboutmorethaninitiallyplanned,therebymakingadealmoreattractivetobothparties.Figuratively,negotiatorsexpandthepiebeforetheydivideit.Forexample,thesellerofabicyclemightaddagoodbicyclelockthathedoesnotneedanymore,therebymakingabetterdealsellinghisbikeandlock,whilethebuyergetsagoodlockforhisnewbikeandintotalpayslessthanhewouldhavepaidifhehadtobuyanewlockinashop. Anotherwaytogeneratealternativesolutionsisbydiscussingmultipleissuesratherthansingleissues,andbydeterminingwhichissuesaremoreandlessimportant.Forexample,thesellerofthebicyclemightbeareturningexchangestudentwhocannottakethebiketohishomecountry,butheneedstouseituntilthefinaldaysofhisstay.Bynegotiatingthepriceanddeliverydate,buyerandsellermayintegratetheseller’spreferenceforalatedeliverywiththebuyer’spreferenceforalowerprice.Integrativenegotiationstylescanleadtointegrativeagreements;ifnegotiatorstrusteachother,exchangeinformation,andgainanaccurateunderstandingoftheirpreferencesandpriorities,theymightdetectcommoninterests(Rubinetal.,1994)andmutuallybeneficialtrade-offsacrosstopicsthatvaryinimportance(Ritov&Moran,2008),so-calledlogrolling(Thompson&Hastie,1990).Partiescanalsoreachintegrativeagreementsthroughanimplicitwayofexchanginginformation,forexamplebyproposingmultipleequivalentsimultaneousoffers(MESOs;Leonardelli,Gu,McRuer,Medvec,&Galinsky,2019)andlettingtheothersidechoosewhichofferstheyprefer.Forexample,knowingthatarentalbikewouldcost€50aweek,thesellermayproposetwoequallyattractiveoffers—sellingthebikeimmediatelyfor€300,orsellingitinoneweekfor€250.Theprospectivebuyer,providedhehaslittleurgency,mightchoosethelatteroption,therebycreatingvaluefromthedifferentprioritiesthatthetwopartieshave. Animportantabilityofnegotiatorsisperspective-taking,thecognitivecapacitytoconsidertheworldfromanotherindividual’sviewpoint(Galinsky&Mussweiler,2001;Trötschel,Hüffmeier,Loschelder,Schwartz,&Gollwitzer,2011).Perspective-takinghelpsnegotiatorsdetectlogrollingopportunitiesandtherebyexploittheintegrativepotentialofanegotiationsituation(Trötscheletal.,2011). Cognitions Cognitions(howpeoplethinkaboutasituation)influencenegotiationbehaviorsandoutcomes.Cognitionshavebeenthefocusofthebehavioraldecisionperspectiveonnegotiationsthatwasdominantinthe1980sand1990s(foranoverview,seeBazerman,Curhan,Moore,&Valley,2000).Twoofthemostprominentbiasesarefixed-pieperceptionsandanchoring. Fixed-PiePerception Afixed-pieperceptionisthecommonassumptionthattheinterestsofthepartiesarediametricallyopposedsuchthat“mygainisyourloss”(Thompson&Hastie,1990).Thisideaisrelatedtotheviewthatnegotiationisapurelydistributivecontestindividingafixedamountofresourcesinwhichthewinnerclaimsalargersharethantheloser.Whenbothpartieshaveafixed-pieperception,theyareunlikelytonoticethattheirprioritiesmaydifferandmightoverlookprofitableopportunitiesforamutuallybeneficialexchangeofconcessions(logrolling;asdescribedinthesection“OutcomesofNegotiations”). Anchoring Anchoringisthetendencytorelyonafirstnumberwhenmakingajudgment.Forexample,theinterestedbuyermightofferahigherpriceif,immediatelybeforenegotiatingthepriceofthesecond-handbike,hesawanadforabikecosting€1,500,thanifhesawabikeofferedfor€100.Theoffermadeforthesecond-handbikeisthusinfluenced(anchored)bypriorinformation.Thisbiasisrelatedtothefirst-offereffect.Innegotiations,thefirstofferfunctionsasananchorpointatwhichthenegotiationstartsandanegotiationagreementisofteninfavorofthefirstpartythatproposesaconcretenumber(Galinsky&Mussweiler,2001;Loschelder,Trötschel,Swaab,Friese,&Galinsky,2016). Emotions Emotions(howpeoplefeelaboutasituation)andtheexpressionthereofhaveaprofoundinfluenceonnegotiationprocessesandoutcomes.Theeffectsofemotionsonthenegotiationprocesscanbeintrapersonal—aperson’smoodoremotioninfluenceshisorherownbehavior.Theseeffectscanalsobeinterpersonal—onepersonwhoexpresseshisorheremotionsaffectsanotherperson’sbehavior(VanKleef,VanDijk,Steinel,Harinck,&VanBeest,2008). IntrapersonalEffectsofEmotions Theintrapersonaleffectsofemotionsarestraightforward.Negotiatorswhoareinabadmood,orwhofeelangryordisappointed,aremorelikelytoengageinforcingbehaviorandlesslikelytoaccommodatetheotherparty.Ontheotherhand,negotiatorswhoareinagoodmoodorfeelhappyaremorelikelytobelenientnegotiationpartnerswhoarewillingtomakeadeal(Allred,Mallozzi,Matsui,&Raia,1997;Friedmanetal.,2004;Kopelman,Rosette,&Thompson,2006;VanKleef&DeDreu,2010;VanKleef,DeDreu,&Manstead,2004). InterpersonalEffectsofEmotions TheinterpersonaleffectsofemotionsinnegotiationsaresummarizedbytheEmotions-As-Social-InformationModel(VanKleef,2009),whichproposesthatanegotiator’semotionsaffectthebehavioroftheircounterpartsviatwodistinctprocesses.Emotionstriggerinferentialprocessesandaffectivereactionsinthetargetsofthoseemotions.Theinferentialprocessmeansthatemotionsgiveinformationabouttheaspirationsofaparty—anangryreactionofacounterpartonaproposalsignalsthatthecounterparthassetambitiouslimits.Asaresult,anangryreactionbypartyAoftentriggersayieldingresponsebypartyB,inordertosatisfypartyAandreachanagreement(Sinaceur&Tiedens,2006;VanKleefetal.,2004).AhappyreactionbypartyA,ontheotherhand,mightindicatetheproposalisneartargetpointofpartyA,andpartyBmayconcludethatnofurtherconcessionsarerequiredinordertoreachanagreement. Emotionsmightalsotriggeranaffectivereactioninthereceiver;anexpressionofangerofpartyAislikelytoengenderanangryreactionbypartyBinreturn,whereasamorehappyreactionwilltriggerahappierresponse.Ingeneral,theinterpersonaleffectofangerisexemplifiedbythefindingthatnegotiatorswhoexpressangerwillgetayieldingresponsefromtheircounterpart,butonlywhentheotherpartyiswillingandabletotaketheemotionsoftheangrypartyintoaccount(Sinaceur&Tiedens,2006;VanKleefetal.,2004).Ontheotherhand,anexpressionofhappinessismetwithamorecompetitiveorlessyieldingresponse.Expressingangerinnegotiationscanbackfire,however(VanKleefetal.,2008).Angerdirectedattheperson,ratherthanataproposal,islikelytoleadtoretaliationratherthanconcessions(Steinel,VanKleef,&Harinck,2008),andthesameeffectoccursforangryexpressionsinvalue-ladenconflict(Harinck&VanKleef,2012);peoplemayovertlyconcedetoacounterpartwhoexpressesanger,buttheymightsubsequentlyretaliatecovertly(Wang,Northcraft,&VanKleef,2012).Similarly,expressingangerhelpspowerfulnegotiatorswhomayreceiveaconciliatoryresponse,butharmspowerlessparties,whoaremorelikelytoreceiveanangry,non-conciliatoryresponse(Overbeck,Neale,&Govan,2010;VanDijk,VanKleef,Steinel,&VanBeest,2008).Also,fakeexpressionsofangeraimedattryingtogettheotherpartytoconcedearemorelikelytoleadtointransigenceratherthantoconciliatorybehaviorinthereceivingparty,duetoreducedtrust(Campagna,Mislin,Kong,&Bottom,2016;Côté,Hideg,&VanKleef,2013). Thecognitionsandemotionsofnegotiationpartiesshowthatnegotiatorsarehumans;theythink,makemistakes,andfeel.Infact,formanypeoplenegotiationscanbequitestressfulduetoeithertheirthoughtsortheirfeelingsaboutthenegotiation.Thenextsection,“Gender,”willaddresssituationalcharacteristicsthatinfluencenegotiationprocesses,behaviors,andoutcomes,focusingonthreemajorsituationalfactors—thegendercompositionofthenegotiatingdyad,thepowerpositionsofthedyadmembers,andtheculturalenvironmentinwhichnegotiationstakeplace. Gender Genderdifferencescanariseinnegotiation,showingageneraladvantageformalenegotiatorsoverfemalenegotiators.Thesedifferencestendtodisappear,however,whennegotiatorsaremoreexperienced,whentherangeofpotentialagreementsisknown,orwhentheynegotiateforsomeoneelse(Mazeietal.,2015).Genderdifferencesinnegotiationcanlargelybeexplainedbystereotypicalthinking.Thestereotypicalideasofaneffectivenegotiator—strong,dominant,assertive,andrational—tendtoalignwithstereotypicalmalecharacteristics,whereasthestereotypicalideasaboutanineffectivenegotiator—weak,submissive,accommodating,andemotional—tendtoalignwithstereotypicalfemalecharacteristics,suggestingthatmalenegotiatorsaremoreeffectivethanfemalenegotiators(Bowles,2012;Kray&Thompson,2005). Thesestereotypicalideascanplayaroleinnegotiationswhennegotiatorsusethemtofigureouthowtobehaveandwhentheywanttopredicthowtheotherpartyislikelytobehave(Bowles,2012;Mazeietal.,2015).Ingeneral,malenegotiatorsareexpectedtobecompetitive,whereasfemalenegotiatorsareexpectedtobemorecooperative.Forexample,peoplearelikelytomakelowerofferstowomenthantomenandexpectwomentobemoreeasilysatisfiedwiththeofferstheyreceive(Ayres&Siegelman,1995;Kray,Locke,&VanZant,2012;Solnick&Schweitzer,1999). StereotypeThreat Stereotypethreatisanimportantcauseforthelowernegotiationoutcomesachievedbyfemalethanbymalenegotiators(Kray,Galinsky,&Thompson,2002;Kray,Thompson,&Galinsky,2001).Peopleexperienceastereotypethreatwhentheyfeeltheirperformanceisevaluatedonataskinadomainforwhichtheyareawareofnegativestereotypesabouttheirgroup’sabilities(Derks,Scheepers,VanLaar,&Ellemers,2011).Forexample,femaleparticipantswhoareevaluatedonamathtestorinanegotiationmightexperiencestereotypethreat,duetothestereotypicalbeliefthatwomenarebadatmathorinnegotiation.Underconditionsinwhichthestereotypethreatisneutralizedbypresentingthenegotiationasalearningtoolratherthanasanassessmenttool,orwhenfemalecharacteristicsarelinkedtonegotiationsuccess,genderdifferencesdiminishordisappear(Krayetal.,2001,2002).Genderdifferencesalsodisappearwhenpeoplenegotiateonbehalfofanotherpersonorparty(Amanatullah&Morris,2010).Inthatsituation,thefemalestereotypesofcaringforothersandthenegotiationaimalign,andmaleandfemalenegotiatorsperformequallywell. StereotypeReactance Severalremediesmitigatethispotentialdisadvantageforfemalenegotiators.First,awarenessofstereotypethreatcanreduceitseffectsbystereotypereactance.Inastudyusingtypicalmathtests,genderdifferencesdisappearedwhenthetestwaspresentedasaproblem-solvingtaskratherthanamathtest,andalsowhenparticipantsreceivedadditionalinformationexplaininghowstereotypethreatcaninterferewithwomen’sperformanceonamathtest(Johns,Schmader,&Martens,2005).Assuch,informingfemalenegotiatorsthatanegotiationmighttriggerastereotypethreatthatmightinterferewiththeirperformancecanhelpneutralizethestereotypethreatanditseffects. Backlash Backlashisthenegativereactionthatfemalenegotiatorsfacewhentheyengageingender-incongruentcompetitivenegotiationbehavior(Kulik&Olekalns,2012).Womencanpreventexpectancyviolationsandthusminimizethelikelihoodofbacklashbygivingexternalattributionsforcompetitivebehaviors(anticipatoryexcusesorjustifications,suchas“mymentoradvisedmeto...”or“myassociationhasreleasedasalarysurvey,andmysalaryseemstobebelowaverage...”)orbystressinggender-normativebehavior,likeusinginclusivelanguage(“Iamsurewecanfindamutuallysatisfactoryagreement”),orinfluencetacticsthatindicatewarmthandcaring(“canyouhelpmeto...”;Kulik&Olekalns,2012). Finally,genderdifferencestendtodiminishwhenclearinstructionstonegotiatesignalthatbehavingcompetitivelyisnotcounter-normative.Attheindividuallevel,forinstance,genderdifferencesdisappearwhenpeopleneedtonegotiateonbehalfofothers,acaseinpointwhennegotiatingissomethingthatapersonissupposedtodo(Bowles,Babcock,&McGinn,2005).Atahigherlevel,organizationscould,forexample,bemoretransparentaboutwhatcanorcannotbenegotiated,theso-calledzonesofnegotiability(Kulik&Olekalns,2012),specifyingwhattermsofemploymentareopenfordiscussion(Bowles,2012).Thebottomlineseemstobethatnormalizingnegotiationsandnegotiatingbehaviorwilldiminishgenderdifferences. Power Ageneraldefinitionofpoweristheabilitytocontrolone’sownandothers’resourcesandoutcomes(Keltner,Gruenfeld,&Anderson,2003).Innegotiation,powerisnegativelyrelatedtodependency:themorepowerfulpartyneedsthenegotiationtoalesserextentthanthelesspowerfulpartyinordertoachievecertainoutcomesortosatisfycertainneeds.Baseduponthisidea,powerinnegotiationresearchismostoftenoperationalizedbygivingpartiesagoodorabadBATNA(Giebels,DeDreu,&VandeVliert,2000;Magee,Galinsky,&Gruenfeld,2007;Mannix&Neale,1993;Wong&Howard,2017,asdescribedinthesection“NegotiationPreparationandGoals”).AgoodBATNAcanbeagoodalternativeofferbyanotherparty(Mageeetal.,2007),theexistenceofanalternativenegotiationparty(Giebelsetal.,2000),ortheexistenceofseveralalternativenegotiationparties(Mannix&Neale,1993).AgoodBATNAleadstomorepowerinthenegotiation;negotiatorswithagoodBATNAarelessdependentonthenegotiationbecausetheycanoptforthealternativetoreachabeneficialoutcome.Othermanipulationsofpowerareroleinstructions(e.g.,bossvs.employee;DeDreu&VanKleef,2004),apowerprimingwritingtask(Mageeetal.,2007),orknowledgeabouttheBATNA(Wong&Howard,2017). Ampleresearchshowsthatequalpowerbetweennegotiationparties—withbothpartieshavingcomparableBATNAs—generallyleadstomoreintegrativeagreementsthanunequalpowerbetweennegotiationparties(Giebelsetal.,2000;Mannix&Neale,1993;Wong&Howard,2017).Otherresearch,however,showsthatpartieswhodifferinpowerachievebettercollectiveoutcomes(Pinkley,Neale,&Bennett,1994;Wei&Luo,2012).Dependingoncircumstances,bothpowerequalityandpowerdifferencescanbeharmful.Powerequalitydecreasesperformanceifitleadstopowerstruggles(Greer&VanKleef,2010),whilepowerdifferencesdecreaseperformancewhenpowerdisparityisnotalignedwithtaskcompetence(Tarakci,Greer,&Groenen,2016),orwhenindividualisticallymotivatedpowerholdersexploitweakercounterparts(Giebelsetal.,2000;VanTol&Steinel,2020).Furthermore,itseemsthatitisnottheasymmetricalBATNAsituationperse,buttheknowledgeaboutBATNAasymmetrythatdrivesthelowerjointoutcomesinunequalpowersituations.Byknowingthepoweradvantage,themorethepowerfulnegotiatortendstofocusonvalueclaiming,whichleadstomorejudgmenterrorsabouttheotherparty,impedingtheirinformationsharingandintheendresultinginlowerjointoutcomes(Wong&Howard,2017).Thesefindingsaresupportedbyearlierresearchshowingthatthepartywhofeelsorismostpowerfulinthenegotiation,isalsomorelikelytoengageinorinitiatenegotiations,makethefirstoffer(leadingtomorefavorableoutcomesforthatparty),andclaimalargershareoftheoutcomes(Mageeetal.,2007;Pinkleyetal.,1994). Interestingly,havingnoBATNAseemstobemorebeneficialthanhavingaweakBATNA,becauseweakBATNAsmayfunctionasanchors,influencingnegotiatorstomakelessambitiousfirstoffersthanthosenegotiatorswhohavenoBATNAatall,whointurnarenotinfluencedbythiskindoflowanchorandfeelmorefreetomakearelativelyhighfirstoffer(Schaerer,Swaab,&Galinsky,2015). Culture Cultureistheuniquecharacterofasocialgroup(Brett,2000),includingculturalvaluesaboutwhatisimportantandculturalnormsabouthowtobehave(Aslanietal.,2016;Brett,2000,2018;Lytle,Brett,Barsness,Tinsley,&Janssens,1995).Negotiationresearchconcerningculturecanbedistinguishedasintraculturalnegotiationresearchorinterculturalnegotiationresearch(Gelfand&Brett,2004;Gunia,Brett,&Gelfand,2016;Liu,Friedman,Barry,Gelfand,&Zhang,2012).Intraculturalresearchfocusesonnegotiationsbetweenpartiesfromthesameculture,andcomparesnegotiationswithinoneculturetonegotiationswithinanotherculture—acomparisonofFrench–FrenchnegotiationsversusU.S.–U.S.negotiations,forexample.Interculturalnegotiationresearchfocusesonnegotiationsbetweenpartiesfromdifferentcultures,suchasFrench–U.S.negotiations.Althoughculturecanbedefinedastheuniquecharacterofasocialgroup,mostnegotiationresearchconcerningculturefocusesondifferentnationalitiesratherthanonspecificsocialgroupswithinorbetweennations. Studiesontheeffectsofcultureonnegotiationallowgeneralassumptionsonhowspecificculturalbackgroundsaffectnegotiators’behavior.However,noteverybodyadherestotheirculturalcharacteristicstothesameextent,andvariationswithinculturesarelarge,thereforepredictionsaboutindividualnegotiatorsrequirecaution(Brett,2000). Culturaldifferencesinhowpeopleexchangeinformationandhowtheydealwithpowerarerelevantfornegotiationprocessesandoutcomes(Hofstede,2011;Torelli&Shavitt,2010).Mostintra-andinterculturalnegotiationresearchfocusesondifferencesconcerninginformationexchangeand/orinfluenceandpowertactics(Adairetal.,2004;Brett&Okumura,1998).Informationcanbeshareddirectlybygivingoraskinginformationaboutpreferencesandpriorities,asintheUnitedStates,orindirectly,byproposalsandcounterproposals,asinAsiancountries.Thereactionstoproposalsandtheproposalsthemselvescanalsogiveinformationaboutaparty’spreferencesandpriorities(Brett,2000;Guniaetal.,2016).Bothtypesofinformationsharingcanleadtointegrativeoutcomes. ResearchhasmainlycomparedWestern(mostlyNorthernAmericannegotiators)toEastAsiancultures(e.g.,ChineseorJapanesenegotiators;Adairetal.,2004;Brett&Okumura,1998;Tinsley,1998;Tinsley&Pillutla,1998).Theseculturesdifferonseveraldimensions,withtheUnitedStatesbeingmoreindividualist,lowcontext,andegalitarian,andEastAsianculturesgenerallybeingmorecollectivistic,highcontext,andhierarchical(Adairetal.,2004).Theseculturaldifferenceshaveseveralconsequences.Forexample,negotiatorsfromlow-contextculturesinwhichcommunicationisexplicitanddirectaremorelikelytousedirectratherthanindirectinformationsharing.Also,partiesfrommoreegalitarianculturesmightpaylessattentiontopowerorstatusdifferencesbetweenthenegotiatingpartiesthancounterpartsfrommorehierarchicalsocieties.Higher-statusnegotiatorsfromthesesocietiesmayinterpretthisasalackofrespectandreactbyusingtheirpowerorcompetitivestrategies. Fromthe2010s,theculturallogicapproach(Leung&Cohen,2011)hasbeenintroducedintothefieldofnegotiations(Aslanietal.,2016;Brett,2018;Guniaetal.,2016;Shafa,Harinck,Ellemers,&Beersma,2015).Thisapproachdistinguishesthreedifferentcultures:dignity,honor,andfacecultures.Indignitycultureseverypersonhasanequalamountofinherentworththatdoesnotdependontheopinionsofothers.MostWesternsocietiesaredignitycultures.Inhonorcultures,ontheotherhand,aperson’sworthdependsontheextenttowhichthepersonadherestothehonorcodeinthatperson’sowneyesandintheeyesofothers.HonorculturesexistintheMiddleEastandinthesouthernUnitedStates.Andfinally,infaceculturestherearestablehierarchiesandpeoplehavefaceaslongastheyfulfilltheirdutiesandobligationsaccompanyingtheirpositioninthehierarchy.FaceculturesarefoundinEastAsia(Leung&Cohen,2011).Thefirstresultsusingthiscategorizationshowthat,inintraculturalnegotiations,partiesindignityculturesusemore(direct)informationsharingandlesscompetitiveinfluencingbehaviorscomparedtohonorandfacecultures.Also,dignityculturesaremorelikelytoreachwin–winagreements,andtoreachamoreequaldivisionofoutcomesbetweenthepartiescomparedtohonorandfacecultures(Aslanietal.,2016). Figure3displaysamodelofinterculturalnegotiation(Brett,2000).Itpositsthatculturalvaluesinfluenceparties’interests,preferences,andpriorities.Assuch,differentculturalvaluescandeterminetheintegrativepotentialinthenegotiationandwhetherandwhereprofitabletrade-offsarepossible.Ontheotherhand,culturalnormsinfluenceparties’negotiationbehaviorsandstrategies,socombinationsofdifferentculturescanleadtospecificinteractionalpatterns.Boththeexistenceofdifferentpreferencesandprioritiesandtheinteractionpatterninfluencethefinaloutcomesoftheinterculturalnegotiation.Culturalintelligence,definedasaperson’scapabilitytosuccessfullyadapttonewculturalsettings,hasbeenshowntoincreaseanegotiator’seffectivenessininterculturalnegotiations(Imai&Gelfand,2010). OpeninnewtabFigure3.HowCultureAffectsNegotiation.Source:Brett(2000). NegotiationswithinandbetweenGroups Muchoftheempiricallaboratoryresearchintonegotiationprocessesandoutcomehasinvestigatedabasicsituationinwhichtwoparties,bothrepresentingtheirowninterests,negotiatewitheachother.Somestudieshaveinvestigatedsituationsthataremoresociallycomplex,forexamplewiththeconflictbeingbetweengroupsratherthanindividuals(i.e.,intergroupnegotiation),sometimeswithindividualsrepresentingtheirconstituentgroup(i.e.,representativenegotiation)orwithseveralnegotiatorsrepresentingeachside(i.e.,teamnegotiation),orwithnegotiationsinvolvingmorethantwoparties(i.e.,multipartynegotiation).Some21st-centurystudieshaveshedlightontheincreasedsocialandproceduralcomplexitiesinthesenegotiationsettings. IntergroupNegotiations Intergroupnegotiationsaretypicallyconductedbyrepresentatives(Walton&McKersie,1965)—negotiatorswhorepresentthegroup,pursuingnotjusttheirownpersonalinterestsbutalsotheinterestsoftheirconstituents.Representativesoftennegotiatemorecompetitivelythanpeoplewhonegotiateontheirownbehalf,astheytendtothinkthattheirconstituencyfavorsacompetitiveapproach(Benton&Druckman,1974).Theextenttowhichrepresentativessticktothegroupnorm(orwhattheythinkthegroupswants)dependsontheirneedtosecuregroupmembership.Representativeswhooccupymarginalpositionsinattractivegroupsseektodemonstratetheirbelongingnesstothegroup,andtheythereforebehavemorecompetitivelytowardanopposingplayerthanrepresentativeswhoholdcentralpositionsintheirgroup(VanKleef,Steinel,VanKnippenberg,Hogg,&Moffitt,2007).Similarly,representativeswithaninsecurepositionintheirgroupfollowthegroupnormmorestrictly—themoresothehighertheirdispositionalneedtobelongtothegroup(Steineletal.,2010).Groupnorms,however,arenotalwaysclear.Constituenciesmayconsistofdifferentindividuals—somearehawks,preferringacompetitivestancetowardtheopposinggroup,whileothersaredoves,favoringcooperationwiththeopponents.Theattention-grabbingpowerofhawkishmessagesrendersevenaminorityofhawksinaconstituencymoreinfluentialthandoves(Aaldering&DeDreu,2012;Steinel,DeDreu,Ouwehand,&Ramirez-Marin,2008).Anotherwayforconstituenciestoinfluencegroupnegotiationsisbyselectingtheirrepresentative,achoicethatgroupsmakedependingonthepurposeofthenegotiation.Whennegotiationsareidentity-related(e.g.,aboutmoralissues),groupsfavorrepresentativeswhorepresenttheirgroupnorms,oraremoreextremethantheirowngroup,andasdistantaspossiblefromtheopposinggroup.Whennegotiationareinstrumental(i.e.,whenattainingafavorableoutcomeiscentral),however,groupsprefernegotiatorswhodeviatefromthegroupnormsinawaythatbringsthemclosertothenormsthattheopposinggroupholds(Teixeira,Demoulin,&Yzerbyt,2010). MultipartyNegotiations Multipartynegotiationsdifferfrominteractionsbetweentwonegotiatorsinseveralrespects.Aseverypartybringsgoals,interests,andstrategiestothenegotiationtable,groupnegotiationsaremoredemandingoninformation-processingcapacities(Beersma&DeDreu,2002).Furthermore,teamnegotiationsdifferfromdyadicnegotiations,becausetheyoccurinasocialenvironmentsimilartogroupdecision-making,characterizedbyincreasedsocialcomplexity.Groupdynamicsdependlargelyonthegoalsthatindividualgroupmemberspursue—doeseveryonetrytomaximizetheirindividualoutcomes,ordoesthegroupstrivetomaximizecollectiveoutcomes?Groupswhichpursueacommongoalreachmoreintegrativeagreementsbecausetheytrusteachothermoreandexchangemoreinformationthanteamsofpeoplewhopursuetheirindividualgoals(Weingart,Bennett,&Brett,1993).Finally,theincreasednumberofnegotiatorsresultsinproceduralandstrategiccomplexity.Awaytodealwiththesecomplexitiesisbyinstallingdecisionrulesthatspecifyhowtotransformindividualjudgmentsintoagroupjudgment.Underunanimityrule,everygroupmembercanusetheirvetopowertomakesurethattheirinterestsarerecognizedinanagreement.Undermajorityrule,however,teammemberswhoseinterestsarealignedcanformacoalitionandneglecttheneedsofminoritymemberswithopposedpreferences,whichisparticularlylikelyandharmfultothecollectiveoutcomewhengroupmemberspursuetheirindividualgoalsratherthanpursuingacollectivegoal(Beersma&DeDreu,2002). TeamNegotiation Teamnegotiationbecomesincreasinglycomplexwhenteammembershavedifferentpreferencesandprioritiesonsomeoftheconflictissues.Subgroupformationcanoccurandreducethegroups’abilitytoimplementbeneficialtrade-offs,ifgroupsinteamnegotiationsarenotunitaryteamswhereallmemberssharethesamepreferences,butinsteadsometeammembershavepreferencesthatalignbetterwiththepreferencesof(somemembersof)theopposinggroup(Halevy,2008).Subgroupconflictcanalsohavepositiveeffects,asitchallengesfixed-pieperceptionsandthusincreasesteammembers’motivationtoformanaccurateunderstandingofthesituation(Halevy,2008). MotivatedInformationProcessing SocialMotives Severalofthestudiesmentionedinthesection“MultipartyNegotiations”relatetooneofthestrongestdeterminantsofnegotiationprocessesandoutcome—socialmotives(e.g.,Beersma&DeDreu,2002,DeDreu,Nijstad,&VanKnippenberg,2008;Weingartetal.,1993).Socialmotivesarepreferencesforcertaindistributionsofvaluebetweenoneselfandothers,whichcanberootedinaperson’scharacter(socialvalueorientations;VanLange,Otten,DeBruin,&Joireman,1997)orengenderedexternally.Abonussystembasedonindividualperformance,forexample,wouldgiverisetoindividualisticmotivation,whileabonussystemthatrewardsthecollectiveperformanceofaworkteamwouldspurmoreprosocialmotivation.Pro-selfnegotiatorsaimtomaximizetheirindividualoutcomesandtendtoseenegotiationsascompetitiveinteractionsinwhichpowerandindividualsuccessareimportant.Prosocialnegotiators,ontheotherhand,striveforequalityandhighcollectivegains,andtendtoseenegotiationasacooperativeendeavorinwhichfairnessandmoralityarecentral(DeDreuetal.,2008). EpistemicMotivation TheMotivatedInformation-ProcessinginGroupsModel(DeDreuetal.,2008)statesthatwin–winagreementsaremorelikelywhennegotiatorsareprosociallymotivated,becausethisleadstomoretrust,informationexchange,andproblem-solvingbehavior.Importantly,apartfromaprosocialmotivation,integrativeagreementsalsorequireahighepistemicmotivation,thatis,thedesiretoformanaccurateunderstandingofthesituation.Negotiatorswithahighepistemicmotivationmakeuseoftheinformationtheyexchangeandfindoptionstocreatevalue,forexamplebyexchangingmutuallybeneficialconcessions.Negotiatorswithalowepistemicmotivationmakesuboptimalcompromisesinstead.Epistemicmotivationisfostered,forexample,whennegotiatorsareprocessaccountable—theneedtoexplainorjustifytheirbehaviormotivatesthemtothinkcarefully.Epistemicmotivationisreduced,forexample,whentimepressuremakespeoplepreferrulesofthumbandothermentalshortcutsoveracarefulappraisaloftheavailableinformation. TimePressure Timepressurecanbebeneficialanddetrimentaltonegotiationperformance.Ontheonehand,timepressureimpairsnegotiators’decision-making,becauseitreducesepistemicmotivationandleadstoshallowinformationprocessing(DeDreuetal.,2008).Timepressuremayalsoleadtoimpasses,whennegotiatorshaveinsufficienttimetocraftmutuallyacceptableorevenbeneficialagreements.Ontheotherhand,timepressuremayalsomotivatenegotiatorstoreachadealquickly,increasetheirwillingnesstomakeconcessions,helpovercomepositionalbargaining,andincreasenegotiationefficiency(Moore,2004). Timepressurecanbetheresultoftimecostsorofdeadlines.Timecostsarethecostsofdelayinganagreement,forexamplelegalcostsinadisputeorlossofincomebeforeajointventureisagreedupon.Havinghighertimecoststhanone’sopponent(e.g.,havingamoreexpensivelawyerthantheotherparty)isaweaknessinnegotiations,asthepartywithhightimecostsismoredependentonsettlingtheconflictquickly,whilethepartywithlowtimecostscanaffordtoextendthenegotiationsandwaitforthecounterparttoconcede. Manynegotiatorsmisunderstandtheimplicationofunilateraldeadlinesonthepowerbalancebetweennegotiatorsandseedeadlinesasaweakness,too:negotiatorswhohaveadeadlinethattheiropponentisnotawareoftendtokeepthisdeadlinesecret,beingafraidthattheywouldotherwiserevealtheirweakness.Negotiatorswholearnaboutacounterpart’sdeadlineoftentryandstallthenegotiationinanattempttoreceiveconcessions.Unliketimecosts,however,thedeadlinethatonepartyhasisamutualconstrainttobothparties—ifnodealismadebeforethedeadline,bothpartiesfallbackontheirBATNA.Ifbothnegotiatorsunderstandthatadeadlineisamutualconstraint,thetimepressureresultingfromthedeadlinecanbebeneficial,asnegotiatorsneedtoworkefficientlytowardadeal(Moore,2004). CommunicationMedia Asnegotiatingthroughe-mailorvideoconferencingisbecomingmoreandmorecommon,thequestionofhowcommunicationmedia,andinparticulartherichnessandsynchronyofcommunicationchannels,affectnegotiationprocessesandoutcomesiskey.Thecommunicationorientationmodel(Swaab,Galinsky,Medvec,&Diermeier,2012)positsthatthebenefitofricherchannels(i.e.,thosethatoffersightandsound,ascomparedtoonlytext,andsynchronicityofcommunicationratherthanadelayedback-and-forthmessaging)dependsonthenegotiators’orientationtocooperateornot,suchthatricherchannelsincreasetheachievementofhigh-qualityoutcomesfornegotiatorswithaneutralorientation.Therichnessofchannelsmatterslessfornegotiatorswithacooperativeorientation.Fornegotiatorswithanon-cooperativeorientationrichercommunicationchannelscanevenbedetrimental. Animportantsidenotetoourknowledgeoftheeffectsofcommunicationmediainnegotiation,however,isthattechnologyhasbeenchangingrapidlysince2010—withtheinventionofforward-facingcamerasonsmartphonesandapplicationslikeSkype,negotiatorsnowadaysaremuchmorefamiliarwithvideoconferencingthantheparticipantsofearlierstudies,onwhichmostofourknowledgeisbased.Itisreasonabletoassumethattheutilityofanycommunicationmediumdependsonthefamiliarityandcomfortoftheuser(Parlamis&Geiger,2015). ConflictIssues Animportantmoderatorofnegotiationprocessesandconflictmanagementistheconflictissue—whattheconflictisabout.Researchonconflictissuesgenerallydistinguishesbetweenresource-basedconflictandvalue-basedconflict(Druckman,Broome,&Korper,1988;Druckman,Rozelle,&Zechmeister,1977;Harinck&Ellemers,2014;Harinck,DeDreu,&VanVianen,2000;Stoeckli&Tanner,2014;Wade-Benzonietal.,2002).Resource-basedconflictconcernsconflictaboutscarceresourcessuchastime,money,orterritory.Value-basedconflictconcernsconflictaboutnorms,values,andpersonalopinions,suchaspoliticalpreferencesorrulesofbehavioralconduct—whatismorallygoodorbad,andwhatis(un)acceptablebehavior?Althoughothertypesofconflictcanbedistinguished,suchaspowerstruggles,statusconflict,orinformationalconflict(whoisrightconcerningafactualissue?),mostconflictissueresearchhasfocusedonthetwolargecategoriesofresource-basedandvalue-basedconflict. Conflictissuemattersfornegotiators’behaviors,cognitions,emotions,andperceptions,andfortheoutcomesnegotiatorsachieve.Fornegotiationbehaviorsandoutcomes,itisshownthatvalue-basedconflictsarehardertosolvevianegotiationandoftenleadtolessthanoptimalagreementsthanresource-basedconflicts(Harinck&DeDreu,2004;Harincketal.,2000;Pruitt&Carnevale,1993;Wade-Benzonietal.,2002).Whilescarceresourcescanbedividedbythegiveandtakeoftraditionalnegotiation,peoplehesitatetogiveinononetopicinordertogainonanothertopicwhentheconflictconcernsvalues.Forexample,pro-environmentalistsarenotgoingtoagreeonoildrillinginAlaskainexchangeforaboycottonoildrillinginaNavajoreserve.Those“tabootrade-offs”—tradingoffvalueseitheragainstothervalues,orformoney,suchassellingachild—raisemoraloutrage,andareconsideredunacceptable(Tetlock,Kristel,Elson,Green,&Lerner,2000). Inseveralstudies,negotiationsbetweenparticipantsassumingtheroleofattorneyswereframedasvalue-basedconflict(determiningapenaltythatservesjustice)orresource-basedconflict(determiningapenaltythatservesthepersonalpositionoftheattorney).Inresource-basedconflicts,ascomparedtovalue-basedconflicts,moretrade-offsbetweentopics(logrolling;asdescribedinthesection“OutcomesofNegotiations”)occurredandledtobetternegotiationagreements,includingwin–winagreements(Harinck&DeDreu,2004;Harincketal.,2000).Differenttypesofconflicthavebeenfoundtoaffectthedegreeofnegotiators’satisfactionwithintegrativeagreements.Inresource-basedconflict,negotiatorsweremoresatisfiedwithwin–winagreementsobtainedbytrade-offsthanwithobjectivelyworse50–50compromises.Invalueconflicts,however,negotiatorsweremoresatisfiedwiththe50–50compromisesthanwiththewin–winagreementsthatentailedtrade-offs.Invalue-basednegotiation,peopleseemtoprefercompromiseagreementsinwhichbothpartieshavetogiveinratherthananobjectivelybetteragreementthatwouldincludeavaluetrade-off(Stoeckli&Tanner,2014). Theconflictpatternsdifferbetweenresource-andvalue-basednegotiationsaswell.Inresource-basednegotiations,partiesoftenstartwithastrongfixed-pieperception(Thompson&Hastie,1990)andaconcomitantcompetitivestance.Afterawhile,whentheyrealizethattheymightneedtonegotiatewiththeotherpartyinordertoreachanyagreementatall,theybecomemoreflexibleandlesscompetitiveandstartmakingconcessions.Invalue-basednegotiationsontheotherhand,peopleinitiallyexpectotherpeopletosharetheirideas.Oncetheyrealizetheotherpartydoesnot,theyexpectoppositionandperceivelesscommongroundthanpeopleinresource-basednegotiations(Harinck&DeDreu,2004;Harincketal.,2000),whichresultsinalesscooperativeapproach.Itmatterswhethernegotiationsituationsareframedasresource-orvalue-basedconflicts,becausenegotiatorsperceivelesscommongroundbetweenthemselvesandtheotherparty,andconsideragreementslesslikelyinthevalue-basedconflictscomparedtothe(same-topic)resourceconflicts.Moreover,personalinvolvementandfeelingsofbeingthreatenedarestrongerinvalue-basedthanresource-basedconflicts(Kouzakova,Ellemers,Harinck,&Scheepers,2012;Kouzakova,Harinck,Ellemers,&Scheepers,2014). CurrentDevelopments Researchinnegotiationandbargainingisthrivingnotonlyin(social)psychology,butalsoinmanagementandcommunicationscienceand(experimental)economics,andisbecominginterdisciplinary.Globalizationanddigitalizationhaveconnectedpeopleallovertheworldmorethaneverbefore.Inordertohandleconflict,solveurgentglobalproblems(likeclimatechangeormigration),andcreatecollaborationandbusinessopportunities,ourconnectedworldrequiresanunderstandingofconflictwithinandacrossdifferentcultures. InteractionamongGender,Power,andCulture Moreresearchintodignity,honor,andfaceculturesandintotheinteractionamongpower,gender,andcultureisneeded.Commendably,inthe2000s,moreandmoreresearchinvestigatingtheinteractionbetweengender,power,andculturehasbeenconducted.Evidencehasaccumulatedthatgenderdifferencescanbepowerdifferencesindisguise(Galinsky,2018),powerdifferencesmayplayoutverydifferentlydependingonthecultureinwhichthenegotiationtakesplace,andgenderroles(includingacceptableandunacceptablebehaviors)maydifferacrosscultures.Therearesomestudiesinvestigatingcombinationsofpowerandgender(Hong&VanderWijst,2013;Nelson,Bronstein,Shacham,&Ben-Ari,2015),powerandculture(Kopelman,Hardin,Myers,&Tost,2016),orgenderandculture(Elgoibar,Munduate,Medina,&Euwema,2014),butamoreelaborateandsystematicinvestigationofthesecombinationsinintra-andinterculturalnegotiationresearchisneededinourcurrentlyincreasinglydiversifyingsocieties,inwhichmenandwomenfromallovertheworldneedtowork,andthusnegotiate,witheachother. CommunicationProcesses Otheremergingtopicsofresearchrelatetocommunicationprocessesduringconflictandnegotiation,includingsilences(JaredCurhan,YeriCho,TengZhang,&YuYang,inHartetal.,2019),oraskingquestionsinnegotiations,inparticularthewillingnesstoasksensitivequestions(EinavHart&EricVanEpps,inHartetal.,2019)ortheeffectofdeflectingdirectquestions.Deflectingadirectquestionthatapersondoesnotwanttoanswer(“Whatdidyouearninyourlatestjob?”)withacounter-question(“Wouldyouliketooffermeajobthen?”)hasbeenfoundtobebetterforinterpersonalandeconomicoutcomesthanrefusingtoanswerthequestionorgivinganevasiveanswer(Bitterly&Schweitzer,2020).Theuseofhumorinnegotiationsisalsounderinvestigation.Humorcandecreasethecredibilityofaperson’sstatementsordisclosures,whichhasimplicationsastowhenapersonshouldorshouldnotusehumorinnegotiations(Bitterly&Schweitzer,2019). EthicsandDeception Ethicalquestionsthatariseinnegotiationaremostlyrelatedtotruth-tellinganddeception(Lewickietal.,2021;Robinson,Lewicki&Donahue,2000).Deceptionisthetopicofagrowingbodyofresearch.Earlierstudiesfocusedontheantecedentsofdeceptionandfoundthatnegotiatorsaremorelikelytodeceivewhenstakesarehigh(Tenbrunsel,1998),whentheyknowthattheothernegotiatorlacksinformation(Croson,Boles,&Murnighan,2003),whentheyaimtomaximizetheirindividualratherthanthecollectivegains(O’Connor&Carnevale,1997),whentheyexpecttheircounterparttobecompetitiveratherthancooperative(Steinel&DeDreu,2004),orwhenthecounterpartisastrangerratherthanafriend(Schweitzer&Croson,1999)orangryratherthanhappy(VanDijketal.,2008).Researchfocusisshiftingtowardprocessesandconsequencesofvarioustypesofdeception,suchasinformationaloremotionaldeception,and,dependingonwhetherthedeceptionisdetected,itsconsequencesforthedeceiver,thetarget,andthirdparties(Gaspar,Methasani,&Schweitzer,2019). NeurobiologicalProcesses Neurobiologicalprocessesarealsoincreasinglybecomingafocusofresearch.Negotiationbehaviorandoutcomesareinfluencedbyhormonessuchasoxytocin(e.g.,DeDreuetal.,2010)orcortisol(e.g.,Akinola,Fridman,Mor,Morris,&Crum,2016;DeDreu&Gross,2019;Harinck,Kouzakova,Ellemers,&Scheepers,2018).Increasedcortisollevelscanbebeneficialforoutcomesinsalarynegotiation,butonlywhenpeopleexperiencetheirhigherlevelsofarousal(duetohigherlevelsofcortisol)asbeneficial;otherwise,theyaredetrimental(Akinolaetal.,2016).Otherresearchhasfocusedonbrainactivity(e.g.,Weiland,Hewig,Hecht,Mussel,&Miltner,2012)andotherphysiologicalactivitysuchaspupildilatation(DeDreu&Gross,2019).Untilnow,mostofthisresearchhasbeendoneinrelativelycontent-freeexperimentalgamesettings(DeDreu&Gross,2019),butgraduallysimilarmeasurementsaregettingintroducedinmorenaturalisticnegotiationexperiments(Akinolaetal.,2016;Harincketal.,2018). Personality Personalityeffectsaremakingacomebackontheresearchagenda.Asexperimentshaverevealedlittleornoeffectsofvariousaspectsofpersonalityonnegotiationbehavior,“manyauthorshavereachedtheconclusionthatsimpleindividualdifferencesofferlimitedpotentialforpredictingnegotiationoutcomes”(Bazermanetal.,2000,p.281).In2013,thiswidelyheldirrelevanceconsensuswaschallengedbyameta-analysisthatrevealedthatpersonalitytraitsdidpredictvariousnegotiationoutcomemeasures(Sharmaetal.,2013).Forexample,cognitiveabilitypredictsnegotiationoutcomes,andextraversionandagreeablenesspredictsubjectiveoutcomes.Theeffectsofpersonalityfactorsonnegotiationbehaviorandoutcomesarestrongerinfieldsettingsthaninlaboratoryexperiments,asinthelattercasebehavioraloptionsarerestrictedduetothestrongdemandcharacteristicsofthesituationandafocusonshort-termeconomicoutcomesininteractionsbetweenunacquaintedexperimentalparticipants.Personalityismorelikelytoaffectbehaviorinnegotiationsituationsthatarenotaffectedbytheclearlydefinednormscommontolaboratorystudies,suggestingthattheirrelevanceconsensuswasaresultoflimiteddata(Sharmaetal.,2013).Moreresearchintonegotiationinnaturalisticsettingswillhelpusunderstandhowpersonalityandsituationalfactorsinteracttopredictnegotiationandbargainingbehavior.Brett’s(2000)model,presentedinFigure3,withtheterms“culture”replacedby“personality,”couldserveasguidingframeworkforthisre-emerginglineofresearch. Negotiationandbargainingarethrivingresearchareas.Theincreasingglobalizationandconcomitantsocietaldevelopmentssteerresearchintonewdirectionsofcultureandgender,whileatthesametimetechnologicaldevelopmentsenableresearcherstoinvestigatenegotiationbehaviorandcommunicationinmoreadvancedandsophisticatedways.Thefindingsandadvicethatresultfromthisresearchwillhelppeopleacrosstheworldtodealeffectivelywiththeirdifferencesandenablethemtocreatesolutionsandagreementsthatareprofitableforallpartiesinvolved.FurtherReadingGalinsky,A.D.,&Schweitzer,M.(2015).Friendandfoe:Whentocooperate,whentocompete,andhowtosucceedatboth.NewYork,NY:PenguinRandomHouse.Gelfand,M.J.(2018).Rulemakers,rulebreakers:Howtightandloosecultureswireourworld.NewYork,NY:Scribner.Malhotra,D.(2016).Negotiatingtheimpossible:Howtobreakdeadlocksandresolveuglyconflicts(withoutmoneyormuscle).Oakland,CA:Berrett-Koehler.VanKleef,G.A.(2016).Theinterpersonaldynamicsofemotion:Towardanintegrativetheoryofemotionsassocialinformation.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress.ReferencesAaldering,H.,&DeDreu,C.K.W.(2012).Whyhawksflyhigherthandoves:Intragroupconflictinrepresentativenegotiation.GroupProcessesandIntergroupRelations,15,713–724.Adair,W.,Brett,J.,Lempereur,A.,Okumura,T.,Shikhirev,P.,Tinsley,C.,&Lytle,A.(2004).Cultureandnegotiationstrategy.NegotiationJournal,20,87–111.Akinola,M.,Fridman,I.,Mor,S.,Morris,M.W.,&Crum,A.J.(2016).Adaptiveappraisalsofanxietymoderatetheassociationbetweencortisolreactivityandperformanceinsalarynegotiations.PLoSONE,11(12),e0167977.Allred,K.G.,Mallozzi,J.S.,Matsui,F.,&Raia,C.P.(1997).Theinfluenceofangerandcompassiononnegotiationperformance.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,70,175–187.Amanatullah,E.,&Morris,M.W.(2010).Negotiatinggenderroles:Genderdifferencesinassertivenegotiatingaremediatedbywomen’sfearofbacklashandattenuatedwhennegotiatingonbehalfofothers.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,98,256–267.Aslani,S.,Ramirez-Marin,J.,Brett,J.,Yao,J.,Semnani-Azad,Z.,Zhang,Z.,&Adair,W.(2016).Dignity,face,andhonorcultures:Astudyofnegotiationstrategyandoutcomesinthreecultures.JournalofOrganizationalBehavior,37,1178–1201.Ayres,I.,&Siegelman,P.(1995).Raceandgenderdiscriminationinbargainingforanewcar.AmericanEconomicReview,85,304–321.Bazerman,M.H.,Curhan,J.R.,Moore,D.A.,&Valley,K.L.(2000).Negotiation.AnnualReviewofPsychology,51,279–314.Beersma,B.,&DeDreu,C.K.W.(2002).Integrativeanddistributivenegotiationinsmallgroups:Effectsoftaskstructure,decisionrule,andsocialmotive.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,87,227–252.Benton,A.A.,&Druckman,D.(1974).Constituent’sbargainingorientationandintergroupnegotiations.JournalofAppliedSocialPsychology,4,141–150.Bitterly,T.,&Schweitzer,M.(2019).Theimpressionmanagementbenefitsofhumorousself-disclosures:Howhumorinfluencesperceptionsofveracity.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,151,73–89.Bitterly,T.,&Schweitzer,M.(2020).Theeconomicandinterpersonalconsequencesofdeflectingdirectquestions.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,118(5),945–990.Blake,R.R.,&Mouton,J.S.(1964).ThemanagerialGRID.Houston,TX:Gulf.Bowles,H.R.(2012).Psychologicalperspectivesongenderinnegotiation.HKSFacultyResearchWorkingPaperSeriesRWP12-046,JohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernment,HarvardUniversity,MA.Bowles,H.R.,Babcock,L.,&McGinn,K.L.(2005).Constraintsandtriggers:Situationalmechanicsofgenderinnegotiation.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,89,951–965.Brett,J.(2000).Cultureandnegotiation.InternationalJournalofPsychology,35,97–104.Brett,J.(2018).Interculturalchallengesinmanagingworkplaceconflict:Acallforresearch.CrossCultural&StrategicManagement,25,32–52.Brett,J.M.,&Okumura,T.(1998).Inter-andintraculturalnegotiation:USandJapanesenegotiators.AcademyofManagementJournal,41,495–510.Campagna,R.L.,Mislin,A.A.,Kong,D.T.,&Bottom,W.P.(2016).Strategicconsequencesofemotionalrepresentationinnegotiation:Theblowbackeffect.JournalofAppliedPsychology,101,605–624.Côté,S.,Hideg,I.,&VanKleef,G.A.(2013).Theconsequencesoffakingangerinnegotiations.JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,49,453–469.Croson,R.T.A.,Boles,T.L.,&Murnighan,J.K.(2003).Cheaptalkinbargainingexperiments:Lyingandthreatsinultimatumgames.JournalofEconomicBehavior&Organization,51,143–159.Curhan,J.,Elfenbein,H.,&Kilduff,G.(2009).Gettingoffontherightfoot:Subjectivevalueversuseconomicvalueinpredictinglongitudinaljoboutcomesfromjoboffernegotiations.JournalofAppliedPsychology,94,524–534.DeDreu,C.K.W.,Greer,L.L.,Handgraaf,M.J.J.,Shalvi,S.,VanKleef,G.A.,Baas,M.,...Feith,S.W.W.(2010).Theneuropeptideoxytocinregulatesparochialaltruisminintergroupconflictamonghumans.Science,328,1408–1411.DeDreu,C.K.W.,&Gross,J.(2019).Revisitingtheformandfunctionofconflict:Neurobiological,psychological,andculturalmechanismsforattackanddefensewithinandbetweengroups.BehavioralandBrainSciences,42,E116.DeDreu,C.K.W.,Nijstad,B.A.,&VanKnippenberg,D.(2008).Motivatedinformationprocessingingroupjudgmentanddecision-making.PersonalityandSocialPsychologyReview,12,22–49.DeDreu,C.K.W.,&VanKleef,G.A.(2004).Theinfluenceofpowerontheinformationsearch,impressionformation,anddemandsinnegotiation.JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,40(3),303–319.Derks,B.,Scheepers,D.,VanLaar,C.,&Ellemers,N.(2011).Thethreatvs.challengeofcarparkingforwomen:Howself-andgroupaffirmationaffectcardiovascularresponses.JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,47,178–183.Druckman,D.(2001).Turningpointsininternationalnegotiation:Acomparativeanalysis.JournalofConflictResolution,45,519–544.Druckman,D.,Broome,B.J.,&Korper,S.H.(1988).Valuedifferencesandconflictresolution:Facilitationordelinking?JournalofConflictResolution,32,489–510.Druckman,D.,&Olekalns,M.(2011).Turningpointsinnegotiation.NegotiationandConflictManagementResearch,4,1–7.Druckman,D.,Rozelle,R.,&Zechmeister,K.(1977).Conflictofinterestandvaluedissensus:Twoperspectives.InD.Druckman(Ed.),Negotiations:Social-psychologicalperspectives(pp.105–131).BeverleyHills,CA:SAGE.Elgoibar,P.,Munduate,L.,Medina,F.J.,&Euwema,M.C.(2014).Dowomenaccommodatemorethanmen?GenderdifferencesinperceivedsocialsupportandnegotiationbehaviorbySpanishandDutchworkerrepresentatives.SexRoles,70,538–553.Fisher,R.,Ury,W.,&Patton,B.(2012).Gettingtoyes:Negotiatinganagreementwithoutgivingin(3rded.).NewYork,NY:RandomHouse.Friedman,R.A.,Brett,J.M.,Anderson,C.,Olekalns,M.,Goates,N.,&Lisco,C.C.(2004).Thepositiveandnegativeeffectsofangerondisputeresolution:Evidencefromelectronicallymediateddisputes.JournalofAppliedPsychology,89,369–376.Galinsky,A.(2018).Aregenderdifferencesjustpowerdifferencesindisguise?.IdeasandInsights,ColumbiaBusinessSchool,March13.Galinsky,A.D.,&Mussweiler,T.(2001).Firstoffersasanchors:Theroleofperspective-takingandnegotiatorfocus.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,81,657–669.Gaspar,J.P.,Mathasani,R.,&Schweitzer,M.(2019).Fiftyshadesofdeception:Characteristicsandconsequencesoflyinginnegotiations.AcademyofManagementPerspectives,33(1),62–81.Gelfand,M.,&Brett,J.(2004).Thehandbookofnegotiationandculture.Stanford,CA:StanfordBusinessBooks.Giebels,E.,DeDreu,C.K.W.,&VandeVliert,E.(2000).Interdependenceinnegotiation:Effectsofexitoptionsandsocialmotiveondistributiveandintegrativenegotiation.EuropeanJournalofSocialPsychology,30,255–272.Greer,L.L.,&VanKleef,G.A.(2010).Equalityversusdifferentiation:Theeffectsofpowerdispersionongroupinteraction.JournalofAppliedPsychology,95,1032–1044.Gunia,B.C.,Brett,J.M.,&Gelfand,M.J.(2016).Thescienceofcultureandnegotiation.CurrentOpinioninPsychology,8,78–83.Güth,W.,&Kocher,M.G.(2014).Morethanthirtyyearsofultimatumbargainingexperiments:Motives,variations,andasurveyoftherecentliterature.JournalofEconomicBehavior&Organization,108,396–409.Güth,W.,Schmittberger,R.,&Schwarze,B.(1982).Anexperimentalanalysisofultimatumbargaining.JournalofEconomicBehaviorandOrganization,3,367–388.Halevy,N.(2008).Teamnegotiation:Social,epistemic,economic,andpsychologicalconsequencesofsubgroupconflict.PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,34,1687–1702.Harinck,F.,&DeDreu,C.K.W.(2004).Negotiatinginterestsorvaluesandreachingintegrativeagreements:Theimportanceoftimepressureandtemporaryimpasses.EuropeanJournalofSocialPsychology,34,595–611.Harinck,F.,DeDreu,C.K.W.,&VanVianen,A.E.M.(2000).Theimpactofconflictissuesonfixed-pieperceptions,problemsolving,andintegrativeoutcomesinnegotiation.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,81,329–358.Harinck,F.,&Ellemers,N.(2014).Howconflictissueschangethenatureoftheconflictgame.InC.K.W.DeDreu(Ed.),Socialconflictwithinandbetweengroups(pp.19–36).EastSussex,UK:PsychologyPress.Harinck,F.,Kouzakova,M.,Ellemers,N.,&Scheepers,D.(2018).Copingwithconflict:Testosteroneandcortisolchangesinmendealingwithdisagreementaboutvaluesvs.resources.NegotiationandConflictManagementResearch,11,265–277.Harinck,F.,&VanKleef,G.A.(2012).Behardontheinterestsandsoftonthevalues:Conflictissuemoderatestheeffectsofangerinnegotiations.BritishJournalofSocialPsychology,51,741–752.Hart,E.,Chaudhry,S.J.,Curhan,J.R.,Greer,L.L.,Roberts,A.,Cho,Y.,...Zhang,T.(2019).Wordswillneverhurtme?Managingconflictthroughcommunication.AcademyofManagementAnnualMeetingProceedings,2019(1).Hofstede,G.(2011).Dimensionalizingcultures:TheHofstedeModelincontext.OnlineReadingsinPsychologyandCulture,2(1).Hong,A.P.C.I.,&VanderWijst,P.J.(2013).Womeninnegotiation:Effectsofgenderandpoweronnegotiationbehavior.NegotiationandConflictManagementResearch,6,273–284.Imai,L.,&Gelfand,M.J.(2010).Theculturallyintelligentnegotiator:Theimpactofculturalintelligence(CQ)onnegotiationsequencesandoutcomes.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,112,83–98.Johns,M.,Schmader,T.,&Martens,A.(2005).Knowingishalfthebattle:Teachingstereotypethreatasameansofimprovingwomen’smathperformance.PsychologicalScience,16,175–179.Keltner,D.,Gruenfeld,D.H.,&Anderson,C.(2003).Power,approach,andinhibition.PsychologicalReview,110,265–284.Kopelman,S.,Hardin,A.E.,Myers,C.G.,&Tost,L.P.(2016).Cooperationinmulticulturalnegotiations:Howtheculturesofpeoplewithlowandhighpowerinteract.JournalofAppliedPsychology,101,721–730.Kopelman,S.,Rosette,A.S.,&Thompson,L.(2006).ThethreefacesofEve:Strategicdisplaysofpositive,negativeandneutralemotionsinnegotiations.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,99,81–101.Kouzakova,M.,Ellemers,N.,Harinck,F.,&Scheepers,D.(2012).Theimplicationsofvalueconflict:Howdisagreementonvaluesaffectsself-involvementandperceivedcommonground.PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,38,798–807.Kouzakova,M.,Harinck,F.,Ellemers,N.,&Scheepers,D.(2014).Attheheartofaconflict:Cardiovascularandmotivationalresponsestomoralconflictsandresourceconflicts.SocialPsychologicalandPersonalityScience,5,35–42.Kray,L.J.,Galinsky,A.D.,&Thompson,L.L.(2002).Reversingthegendergapinnegotiations:Anexplorationofstereotyperegeneration.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,87,386–410.Kray,L.J.,Locke,C.C.,&VanZant,A.B.(2012).Femininecharmanexperimentalanalysisofitscostsandbenefitsinnegotiations.PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,38,1343–1357.Kray,L.J.,&Thompson,L.L.(2005).Genderstereotypesandnegotiationperformance:Anexaminationoftheoryandresearch.ResearchinOrganizationalBehavior,26,103–182.Kray,L.J.,Thompson,L.L.,&Galinsky,A.(2001).Battleofthesexes:Genderstereotypeconfirmationandreactanceinnegotiations.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,80,942–958.Kulik,C.,&Olekalns,M.(2012).Negotiatingthegenderdivide.JournalofManagement,38,1387–1415.Lelieveld,G.-J.,VanDijk,E.,VanBeest,I.,&VanKleef,G.A.(2012).Whyangeranddisappointmentaffectother’sbargainingbehaviordifferently:Themoderatingroleofpowerandthemediatingroleofreciprocalandcomplementaryemotions.PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,38,1209–1221.Leonardelli,G.J.,Gu,J.,McRuer,G.,Medvec,V.H.,&Galinsky,A.D.(2019).Multipleequivalentsimultaneousoffers(MESOs)reducethenegotiatordilemma:Howachoiceoffirstoffersincreaseseconomicandrelationaloutcomes.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,152,64–82.Leung,A.K.Y.,&Cohen,D.(2011).Within-andbetween-culturevariation:Individualdifferencesandtheculturallogicsofhonor,face,anddignitycultures.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,100,507–526.Lewicki,R.J.,Saunders,D.M.,&Barry,B.(2021).Essentialsofnegotiation(7thed.).NewYork,NY:McGraw-Hill.Liu,L.A.,Friedman,R.,Barry,B.,Gelfand,M.J.,&Zhang,Z.X.(2012).Thedynamicsofconsensusbuildinginintraculturalandinterculturalnegotiations.AdministrativeScienceQuarterly,57,269–304.Loschelder,D.D.,Trötschel,R.,Swaab,R.I.,Friese,M.,&Galinsky,A.D.(2016).Theinformation-anchoringmodeloffirstoffers:Whenmovingfirsthelpsversushurtsnegotiators.JournalofAppliedPsychology,101,995–1012.Lytle,A.L.,Brett,J.M.,Barsness,Z.I.,Tinsley,C.H.,&Janssens,M.(1995).Aparadigmforconfirmatorycross-culturalresearchinorganizationalbehavior.InL.L.Cummings&B.M.Staw(Eds.),Researchinorganizationalbehavior,Vol.17(pp.167–214).Greenwich,CT:JAIPress.Magee,J.C.,Galinsky,A.D.,&Gruenfeld,D.H.(2007).Power,propensitytonegotiateandmovingfirstincompetitiveinteractions.PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,33,200–212.Mannix,E.A.,&Neale,M.A.(1993).Powerimbalanceandthepatternofexchangeindyadicnegotiation.GroupDecisionandNegotiation,2,119–133.Mazei,J.,Hüffmeier,J.,Freund,P.,Stuhlmacher,A.,Bilke,L.,&Hertel,G.(2015).Ameta-analysisongenderdifferencesinnegotiationoutcomesandtheirmoderators.PsychologicalBulletin,141,85–104.Moore,D.A.(2004).Theunexpectedbenefitsoffinaldeadlinesinnegotiation.JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,40(1),121–127.Nelson,N.,Bronstein,I.,Shacham,R.,&Ben-Ari,R.(2015).Thepowertooblige:Power,gender,negotiationbehaviors,andtheirconsequences.NegotiationandConflictManagementResearch,8,1–24.O’Connor,K.M.,&Carnevale,P.J.(1997).Anastybuteffectivenegotiationstrategy:Misrepresentationofacommon-valueissue.PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,23,504–515.Olekalns,M.,&Smith,P.L.(2005).Momentsintime:Metacognition,trustandoutcomesindyadicnegotiations.PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,31,1696–1707.Overbeck,J.R.,Neale,M.A.,&Govan,C.L.(2010).Ifeel,thereforeyouact:Intrapersonalandinterpersonaleffectsofemotiononnegotiationasafunctionofsocialpower.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,112,126–139.Parlamis,J.D.,&Geiger,I.(2015).Mindthemedium:Aqualitativeanalysisofemailnegotiation.GroupDecisionandNegotiation,24,359–381.Pinkley,R.L.,Neale,M.A.,&Bennett,R.J.(1994).Theimpactofalternativestosettlementindyadicnegotiation.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,57(1),97–116.Pruitt,D.G.,&Carnevale,P.J.(1993).Negotiationinsocialconflict.Buckingham,UK:OpenUniversityPress.Ritov,I.,&Moran,S.(2008).Missedopportunityforcreatingvalueinnegotiations:Reluctancetomakingintegrativegambitoffers.JournalofBehavioralDecisionMaking,21,337–351.Robinson,R.J.,Lewicki,R.J.,&Donahue,E.M.(2000).Extendingandtestingafivefactormodelofethicalandunethicalbargainingtactics:IntroducingtheSINSscale.JournalofOrganizationalBehavior,21,649–664.Rubin,J.,Pruitt,D.G.,&Kim,S.(1994).Socialconflict:Escalation,stalemate,andsettlement(2nded.).NewYork,NY:McGraw-Hill.Schaerer,M.,Swaab,R.I.,&Galinsky,A.D.(2015).Anchorsweighmorethanpower:Whyabsolutepowerlessnessliberatesnegotiatorstoachievebetteroutcomes.PsychologicalScience,26,170–181.Schweitzer,M.E.,&Croson,R.(1999).Curtailingdeception:Theimpactofdirectquestionsonliesandomissions.InternationalJournalofConflictManagement,10,225–248.Shafa,S.,Harinck,F.,Ellemers,N.,&Beersma,B.(2015).Regulatinghonorinthefaceofinsults.InternationalJournalofInterculturalRelations,47,158–174.Sharma,S.,Bottom,W.P.,&Elfenbein,H.A.(2013).Ontheroleofpersonality,cognitiveability,andemotionalintelligenceinpredictingnegotiationoutcomes:Ameta-analysis.OrganizationalPsychologyReview,3,293–336.Sinaceur,M.,&Tiedens,L.Z.(2006).Getmadandgetmorethaneven:Whenandwhyangerexpressioniseffectiveinnegotiations.JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,42,314–322.Solnick,S.J.,&Schweitzer,M.E.(1999).Theinfluenceofphysicalattractivenessandgenderonultimatumgamedecisions.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,79,199–215.Steinel,W.,&DeDreu,C.K.W.(2004).Socialmotivesandstrategicmisrepresentationinsocialdecision-making.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,86,419–434.Steinel,W.,DeDreu,C.K.W.,Ouwehand,E.,&Ramirez-Marin,J.Y.(2008).Whenconstituenciesspeakinmultipletongues:Therelativepersuasivenessofhawkishminoritiesinrepresentativenegotiation.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,109,67–78.Steinel,W.,VanKleef,G.A.,&Harinck,F.(2008).Areyoutalkingtome?!Separatingthepeoplefromtheproblemwhenexpressingemotionsinnegotiation.JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,44,362–369.Steinel,W.,VanKleef,G.A.,VanKnippenberg,D.,Hogg,M.A.,Homan,A.C.,&Moffitt,G.(2010).Howintragroupdynamicsaffectbehaviorinintergroupconflict:Theroleofgroupnorms,prototypicality,andneedtobelong.GroupProcessesandIntergroupRelations,13(6),779–794.Stoeckli,P.L.,&Tanner,C.(2014).Areintegrativeordistributiveoutcomesmoresatisfactory?Theeffectsofinterest-versusvalue-basedissuesonnegotiatorsatisfaction.EuropeanJournalofSocialPsychology,44,202–208.Swaab,R.I.,Galinsky,A.D.,Medvec,V.,&Diermeier,D.A.(2012).TheCommunicationOrientationModel:Explainingthediverseeffectsofsight,sound,andsynchronicityonnegotiationandgroupdecision-makingoutcomes.PersonalityandSocialPsychologyReview,16,25–53.Tarakci,M.,Greer,L.L.,&Groenen,P.J.F.(2016).Whendoespowerdisparityhelporhurtgroupperformance?JournalofAppliedPsychology,101,415–429.Teixeira,C.P.,Demoulin,S.,Yzerbyt,V.Y.(2010).Choosingthebestmeanstoanend:Theinfluenceofingroupgoalsontheselectionofrepresentativesinintergroupnegotiations.JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,47,228–234.Tenbrunsel,A.E.(1998).Misrepresentationandexpectationsofmisrepresentationinanethicaldilemma:Theroleofincentivesandtemptation.AcademyofManagementJournal,41,330–339.Tetlock,P.E.,Kristel,O.V.,Elson,B.,Green,M.,&Lerner,J.(2000).Thepsychologyoftheunthinkable:Tabootrade-offs,forbiddenbaserates,andhereticalcounterfactuals.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,78,853–870.Thompson,L.(1990).Negotiationbehaviorandoutcomes:Empiricalevidenceandtheoreticalissues.PsychologicalBulletin,108,515–532.Thompson,L.,&Hastie,R.(1990).Socialperceptioninnegotiation.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,47,98–123.Tinsley,C.(1998).ModelsofconflictresolutioninJapanese,GermanandAmericancultures.JournalofAppliedPsychology,83,316–323.Tinsley,C.,&Pillutla,M.(1998).NegotiatingintheUnitedStatesandHongKong.JournalofBusinessStudies,29,711–728.Torelli,C.J.,&Shavitt,S.(2010).Theimpactofpoweroninformationprocessingdependsonculturalorientation.JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,47,959–967.Trötschel,R.,Hüffmeier,J.,Loschelder,D.D.,Schwartz,K.,&Gollwitzer,P.M.(2011).Perspectivetakingasameanstoovercomemotivationalbarriersinnegotiations:Whenputtingoneselfintotheopponent’sshoeshelpstowalktowardagreements.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,101,771–790.VanDijk,E.,DeCremer,D.,&Handgraaf,M.J.J.(2004).Socialvalueorientationsandthestrategicuseoffairnessinultimatumbargaining.JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,40,697–707.VanDijk,E.,VanKleef,G.A.,Steinel,W.,&VanBeest,I.(2008).Asocialfunctionalapproachtoemotionsinbargaining:Whencommunicatingangerpaysandwhenitbackfires.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,94,600–614.VanKleef,G.A.(2009).Howemotionsregulatesociallife:TheEmotionsasSocialInformation(EASI)Model.CurrentDirectionsinPsychologicalScience,18,184–188.VanKleef,G.A.,&DeDreu,C.K.W.(2010).Longer-termconsequencesofangerexpressioninnegotiation:Retaliationorspillover?JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,46,753–760.VanKleef,G.A.,DeDreu,C.K.W.,&Manstead,A.S.R.(2004).Theinterpersonaleffectsofemotionsinnegotiations:Amotivatedinformationprocessingapproach.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,87,510–528.VanKleef,G.A.,Steinel,W.,VanKnippenberg,D.A.,Hogg,M.,&Moffitt,A.(2007).Groupmemberprototypicalityandintergroupnegotiation:Howone’sstandinginthegroupaffectsnegotiationbehaviour.BritishJournalofSocialPsychology,46,129–152.VanKleef,G.A.,VanDijk,E.,Steinel,W.,Harinck,F.,&VanBeest,I.(2008).Angerinsocialconflict:Cross-situationalcomparisonsandsuggestionsforthefuture.GroupDecisionandNegotiation,17,13–30.VanLange,P.A.M.,Joireman,J.A.,Parks,C.D.,&VanDijk,E.(2013).Thepsychologyofsocialdilemmas:Areview.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,120,125–141.VanLange,P.A.M.,Otten,W.,DeBruin,E.M.N.,&Joireman,J.A.(1997).Developmentofprosocial,individualistic,andcompetitiveorientations:Theoryandpreliminaryevidence.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,73,733–746.VanTol,J.S.,&Steinel,W.(2020).DictatorsintheAlohaBeachClub:Theeffectofasymmetricpowerdispersionandsocialmotivesongroupnegotiation.Manuscriptsubmittedforpublication.Wade-Benzoni,K.A.,Hoffman,A.J.,Thompson,L.L.,Moore,D.A.,Gillespie,J.J.,&Bazerman,M.H.(2002).Barrierstoresolutioninideologicallybasednegotiations:Theroleofvaluesandinstitutions.AcademyofManagementReview,27,41–57.Walton,R.E.,&McKersie,R.B.(1965).Abehavioraltheoryoflabornegotiations.NewYork,NY:McGraw-Hill.Wang,L.,Northcraft,G.B.,&VanKleef,G.A.(2012).Beyondnegotiatedoutcomes:Thehiddencostsofangerexpressionindyadicnegotiation.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,119,54–63.Wei,Q.,&Luo,X.(2012).Theimpactofpowerdifferentialandsocialmotivationonnegotiationbehaviorandoutcome.PublicPersonnelManagement,41,47–58.Weiland,S.,Hewig,J.,Hecht,H.,Mussel,P.,&Miltner,W.H.R.(2012).Neuralcorrelatesoffairbehaviorininterpersonalbargaining.SocialNeuroscience,7,537–551.Weingart,L.R.,Bennett,R.I.,&Brett,J.M.(1993).Theimpactofconsiderationofissuesandmotivationalorientationongroupnegotiationprocessandoutcome.JournalofAppliedPsychology,78,504–517.Wong,R.S.,&Howard,S.(2017).Blindedbypower:Untanglingmixedresultsregardingpowerandefficiencyinnegotiation.GroupDecisionMaking,26,215–245.Zartman,I.W.(1991).Regionalconflictresolution.InV.A.Kremenyuk(Ed.),Internationalnegotiation(pp.302–314).SanFrancisco,CA:Jossey-Bass.RelatedArticlesOrganizationalBehaviorSocialPsychologyandLanguageGroupDecision-Making OxfordUniversityPress Copyright©OxfordUniversityPress 2022. PrintedfromOxfordResearchEncyclopedias,Psychology.Underthetermsofthelicenceagreement,anindividualusermayprintoutasinglearticleforpersonaluse(fordetailsseePrivacyPolicyandLegalNotice). date:08July2022 CookiePolicy PrivacyPolicy LegalNotice Credits Accessibility [165.22.106.144] 165.22.106.144 Signintoannotate Close EditAnnotation Characterlimit500/500 Delete Cancel Save @! Characterlimit500/500 Close Save