The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows - OpenEdition ...

Over the past twenty years, the unrest in Xinjiang has intensified and Uyghur nationalist feeling has strengthened. This study aims to throw light on the ... Skiptonavigation –Sitemap Perspectiveschinoises ChinaPerspectives HomeIssues49PoliticsTheUyghursinXinjiang–TheMal... Search Contents 492003Varia Politics TheUyghursinXinjiang–TheMalaiseGrows AfterSeptember11th2001,theChineseregimestrovetoincludeitsrepressionofUyghuroppositionwithintheinternationaldynamicofthestruggleagainstIslamicterroristnetworks. RémiCastets https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.648 Outline |Editor'snotes |Text |Notes |References |Abouttheauthor Outline Aturbulenthistoricalandpoliticalcontext TheoriginsofUyghurmalaise:colonisationandsocio-economicstratification EliteexpectationsandnationalismamongtheUyghursofXinjiang ReassertionofidentityandIslamicrevivalamongtheUyghursofXinjiang Theriseandfalloftwoclandestinepoliticalmovementsofsomestature The1990s:theturntowardsrepression Moredisturbancesandmoreradicalisationduringthe1990s ThespreadofradicalIslaminXinjiang TheIslamistfactioninXinjiang:amarginalthreatbutusefultotheChineseregime TheChineseregimeandtheUyghurdilemmaTopofpage Editor'snotes TranslatedfromtheFrenchoriginalbyPhilipLiddell Fulltext PDFSendbye-mail 1Overthepasttwentyyears,theunrestinXinjianghasintensifiedandUyghurnationalistfeelinghasstrengthened.ThisstudyaimstothrowlightonthecausesofthecurrentriseofUyghurnationalismandtheformsithastaken.Weshalldrawattentiontothedeterminingeffectofasocio-politicalcontextdrivenbycoloniallogicsinordertoexplainhowthenationalistideologyhasbeenreinforced,withitsaimofrestoringtotheUyghurs—ormoregenerallytotheTurkic-speakingpopulationofXinjiang—thereinsofpoliticalpowerwithinatrulyautonomousorevenindependententity.WeshallalsounderlinetheimpactofrecentchangeswithinthepoliticalcontextofChinaandCentralAsia1. Aturbulenthistoricalandpoliticalcontext 2Xinjiang(EastTurkistan2),whichwasannexedbyChinainthemid-eighteenthcentury,ismainlypopulatedbyTurkic-speaking3Muslims4,themajorityofwhomareUyghurs5(seeTable1).DespitealongtraditionofexchangeswithChina,thesepeoplearelinked,primarilybytiesofcultureandreligion,totheCentralAsianworld.Probablythisisonereasonwhy,thoughtheyarebecomingincreasinglyintegratedwithChina,theyhaveneververywillinglyacceptedtheideaofsharingacommondestinywiththeChinesepeople.However,lookingbeyondquestionsofculture,otherfactorsatdifferenttimeshavecontributedtoweakeningChinesesovereigntyoverthisregion.Thus,duringthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,drivenbythelocaleliteincontactwithTurkeyandwiththeTatarsofRussia,Pan-Turkistreformism6putdownthefirstideologicalmarkersofwhatweretobecomeXinjiang’santi-colonialmovements7.AtatimewhenChinesepoweratthecentrewasweakeningandthegreatpowers(suchasBritainandRussia)wereattemptingtoexploitthevariouspoliticalfactionstobuilduptheirinfluence,twoindependentrepublicswerefoundedinXinjiang.TheTurkIslamicRepublicofEastTurkistan(TIRET)wasledbytheemirsofKhotanandbyanti-communistPan-TurkistsandwascentredontheregionofKhotanandKashgar(1933and1934)8.Andthen,between1944and1949,theEastTurkistanRepublic(ETR)wassupportedbytheSovietsandbasedinthethreenortherndistrictsofXinjiangalongthefrontierwiththeUSSR9. 3From1949onwards,there-emergenceofanewandstrongcentralisedpowerenabledChinatoreassertsovereigntyovertheregion.ThecommunistregimethenintroducedanationalitiespolicymodelledontheSovietpattern:55nationalminorities(shaoshuminzu),togetherwiththeHan,makeuptheChinesenation.Eversince,forthefirsttimeinChina,thispolicyhasguaranteedtherecognitionofthelinguisticandculturalidentitiesofthenationalminorities,whilegrantingthemcertainadvantages,helpingthemtointegratewithinthenewsystem10. 4Atthesametime,oncetheoppositionofPan-Turkistseparatistsandthelastoftheundergroundrebelshadbeeneradicated,theprovinceofXinjiangwastransformed,in1955,intoanautonomousregion.Butthisautonomywasinrealityonlysymbolic,andcontrastedsharplywiththerealpoliticalautonomythatmanyhadbeenhopingfor.Indeed,theregion’spoliticalsystemremainsunderthecontroloftheCommunistParty,itselfdominatedbytheoriginalHanpopulationofChina’sinterior.Theshortcomingsofthissystembuiltupapowerfulsenseoffrustration,preventingUyghursocietyfromrealisingmanyofitsaspirationsandfromchallengingcertainpoliciesithadoverwhelminglyrejected;ofthese,undoubtedlythemostunpopularwasthecolonisationoftheregion. 5Fromthe1950sonwards,thecommunistregimeencouragedthesettlementofHanpopulationcentresinordertosecure,controlandexploittheregion,whichisrichinhydrocarbons,mineralresourcesandvirginagriculturalland11.Since1949,theregionhasseenamassiveinflowofHanimmigrantsmainlydirectedtherebytheXinjiangProductionandConstructionCorps(XPCC)(Xinjiangshengchanjianchebingtuan).Originally,thisorganisationhadhelpedformersoldiersdemobilisedaftertheCivilWartosettledown,byprovidingsomeadvantagestoitsmembers.Thesecorpsof“peasant-soldiers”senttothemarginsofthecountrytoopenupnewpioneerareasdidnotsurvivetheCulturalRevolution,exceptinXinjiangwheretheywererevitalisedduringthe1980sinordertopursuedemographiccolonisationwhileboostingthemanpowerneededtoprovidesecurityfortheregion.Subsidisedupto80%bythecentralgovernment,theXPCCstodaycontrolnearlyone-thirdofthelocalfarmedlandandproduceaboutaquarteroftheprovincialindustrialoutput12.Duringthe1950s,theXPCCshadaboutahundredthousandmembers;todaytheirnumbersareabove2.4million,ofwhom90%areHan(thatis,one-thirdoftheHanliving“officially”inXinjiang13).ThankstotheXPCCs,andalsotomigratoryinflowsnotdirectlycontrolledbythestate,theHanpopulationhasrisenfrom6.7%oftheregion’spopulationin1949toabout40%today,thatis,morethansevenmillionoutofatotalof18.5millioninhabitants(seeTable1).Butcolonisationhasnotstabilisedtheregion—farfromit.Itssocio-economicrepercussions,togetherwithPeking’sdomineeringattitudetowardstheregionalpoliticalsystem,havegeneratedamalaisethathaslentnewvigourinrecentyearstoUyghurnationalismandseparatism. 6Thisphenomenonhasbeencatalysedatthesametimebychangesinthepoliticalcontextoftheregion.Indeed,thevictoryoftheAfghanmujaheddinovertheRedArmyand,withthebreak-upoftheSovietUnion,theindependenceofthecentralAsianrepublicshavegalvanisedUyghurseparatism.ManyofthemilitantshaveseenintheemergenceofnationalstatesashomelandsfortheotherlargeTurkicpopulationsofCentralAsia(Kazakhstan,Kirghizstan,Uzbekistan,Turkmenistan...),thejustificationoftheirownaspirationstoindependence.Moreover,byreasonoftheculturalandreligioustiesthattheUyghurssharewiththerestofCentralAsia,theseeventshavegiventhemhopesofdrawingnewsupportfrombeyondtheirownborders.Thispotentialityfordestabilisation,theconcomitantswellofunrestinXinjiangandtheriseofIslamism14inCentralAsiaduringthe1990shaveledPekingtoreact. 7China,tornbetweenthenecessityforopeningitsfrontierstoeconomicinflowsandthewishtoisolateUyghuroppositionfromanyexteriorsupportor“subversive”influence,hascombineditspolicyofspeedinguptheregion’seconomicdevelopmentwithstrengtheningitssecuritycollaborationwithitsneighbours,pursuingdemographiccolonisationandstiffeningitsrepressionofthosepoliticalactivitiesthatitconsidersunlawful.But,byfailingtotakeaccountofeitherthedestabilisingimpactofcolonisationonUyghursocietyorthedemandforself-governmentamongthelocalpopulation,thesepoliciescouldnotsolvetherealproblemsbehindthegrowthofunrest. TheoriginsofUyghurmalaise:colonisationandsocio-economicstratification 8Colonisationanditssocio-economicconsequencesaremuchdislikedbytheUyghurs:theyconstitutethemaingrievanceamongtheprotestmovements.Indeed,colonisationtends,throughacomplexprocess,toexcludeXinjiang’snationalminoritiesfromthebenefitsofeconomicadvance.Inattemptingtostabilisetheregion,thecentralstatehasmadesignificantinvestments15thathavecontributedtodevelopingthelocaleconomy.Thisregion,onceamongthepoorestinChina,today,withintheprovincesofChina’s“GreatWest”16,nowboaststhehighestpercapitaGDP;inthesetermsitrankstwelfthamongallChina’sprovinces17.However,theseencouragingmacro-economicfigureshidepronouncedinequalitiesthatapplyalongethniclines.ToUyghureyes,theinvestmentsaredirectedfirsttowardstheareasofcolonisation18,andhavebenefitedtheHancolonistsmostofall.Thus,thepercapitaGDPinHanareasisfarhigherthanthatinareaswheretheUyghursarestillinthemajority(seeTable2).ThelowfigureforGDPperheadintheTarimBasin,wherethree-quartersofXinjiang’sUyghurpopulationisconcentrated,makesitlikelythatasignificantnumberoffamilieshaveincomesbelowtheChinesepovertythresholdandevenfurtherbeneaththethresholdsetbytheinternationalorganisations19. 9Atthesametime,thesedifferencesinincomeimposedalongethniclinesunderlieunequalaccesstotheeducationalsystem—which,inturn,servestoreinforcetheeconomicinequalities.Ineffect,theinabilityofthepoorestpeopletofinancetheirchildren’sschoolingperpetuates—evenmorethanlinguistichandicaps20andasometimesdiscriminatoryjob-recruitmentsystem—socio-professionalinequalitiescondemningmuchoftheUyghurpopulationtothelowestrungsofsociety. ThepeoplesofXinjiangZoomOriginal(jpeg,96k) 10Theoretically,theChineseeducationsystemissupposedtomakeiteasierforminoritiestoclimbthesocialscale,bymeansofasystemofquotasanduniversityscholarships.Howeverthepartialwithdrawalofthestatefromfinancingtheeducationsystemhasledtoanincreaseinschoolingcostsandfallingnumbersofscholarships.WiththeliberalisationoftheChineseeconomy,somefinancialsecurityismoreandmorenecessaryinordertopursueone’sstudies.Thepoorestfamiliesdonothavethemeanstoprovideafulleducationfortheirchildren;andtheyhavetorestricttheiryearsatschool.WhileHanfamilies,usuallyurbanandbetteroff,canextendtheirchildren’seducation,andsendthemtothebestestablishments,thechildrenoftheminoritycommunitiesareunabletocompletetheirsecondaryeducation(seeTable3),whichmeanstheyleaveschoolwithfewerqualifications(seeTable4). 11Thesedifferencesineducationalfundingcombinedwithrecruitmentmethodsthatareoftendiscriminatoryintheprivatesector21tendtoperpetuate,overaperiodofseveraldecades,socio-professionalstratification:UyghursarepenalisedincomparisonwiththeHan.ThenationalminoritiesinXinjiangareover-representedatthebottomofthesocio-professionalscaleandtheHanareover-representedatthetop.Thus,whilethenationalminoritiesrepresentednearly54%ofXinjiang’spopulationin1990,theyaccountedformorethan76%ofitsagriculturalworkforce(asagainst69.4%in1982whentheywere52.8%ofthetotalpopulation),lessthan41%ofthoseemployedinliberalandtechnicalprofessionsandlessthan30%ofmanagersandadministrators22. 12Asthenationalminoritiesdescendthesocio-economicscaleinXinjiang,theirlivingstandardsbecomemoreprecariousbecauseChinahasalmostnosocialsecuritysystemwhatever.Accordingtothe1990census,theinfantmortalityrateamongthenationalminoritiesinXinjiangwas3.6timeshigherthanamongtheHanandtheirlifeexpectancywas62.9yearsasagainst71.4fortheHan.Atthesametime,unemploymentamongyoungUyghurshasledtohighercrimeratesanddrug-taking—thoughtheseareculturallyalientothisMuslimsociety.Poverty,andalsotheinequalitiesmentionedabove,giveUyghursthesensethattheyareexcludedfromeconomicgrowthtothebenefitoftheHan.Thestatusof“second-rate”ChinesecitizencontrastswiththepromisesofwealthandequalitymadebytheregimeatthetimeofXinjiang’s“peacefulliberation”,andithasledmanyUyghurstothinkthattheyhavebeenfooledbyPeking’scommunistpretensionsandthat,inreality,theyarelivingundertheyokeofacolonialregime. EliteexpectationsandnationalismamongtheUyghursofXinjiang 13Itissuggested,inthedebateoverthenotionofinternalcolonialism23,thatunderadministrationsthatarecolonialorperceivedassuch,socio-economicstratificationalongethniclinesaroundtheperipheriesofsomestatesislikelytoencourageanincreasingsenseofidentityandtheriseofnationalism.EventhoughthiskindofapproachdoesnotexplainallthefactorsandparadigmsenteringtheequationinthebirthandthegrowinginfluenceofnationalisminXinjiangsincethestartofthetwentiethcentury,itdoeshelpustoseehowsuchinequalitieshavefavouredthestrengtheningofUyghurnationalismoverthepasttwentyyears.Indeed,goingbeyondculturalidentity,socio-economicandpoliticalstratificationinXinjianghasbroughtmanyUyghurstoviewthemselvesasalower-gradecommunity,separatefromthecentralcommunity(thatistosay,theHan)thatdominatestheeconomicandpoliticalsystems.Tothatextent,ithasfavouredtheemergenceofanti-colonialnationalism24,fuelledbythedistinctiveidentityoftheUyghurstolegitimisetheestablishmentofrealself-government(whichwouldatlastservetheinterestsoftheUyghurs—andnotthoseexclusivelyofPekingandtheHan). 14TheUyghurelite,morenumerousanddriventocompetewiththeHan,haveincreasingdifficultyinfittingintothesystem25.ItistruethattheChineseregimedoesattempttoco-optaproportionoftheUyghursintotheadministrationbut,eventhoughnoteworthyeffortshavebeenmadesincethe1950s,itseemsthatovertheselastdecadestheyhavenotbeenenoughtointegrateallthenewUyghureliteinsidethesystem.Inthe1950s,becauseofthesmallnumberofUyghurswhohadbeeneducated,itwasrelativelyeasyforthemtofindpostsonalevelwiththeirexpectations.Overthepasttwentyyears,withtheendofthepolicyofthe“ironricebowl”(tiefanwan)andthearrivalofgreaternumbersofwell-qualifiedUyghursand,inparticular,Haninthejobmarket,theintegrationofsomeeliteUyghurshasbecomemoreproblematical.Thus,manyyoungUyghursofworking-classormiddle-classoriginsreproachtheChineseregimefornotprovidingthemwithjobopportunitiescommensuratewiththeirtrainingand,instead,forfavouringtheappointmentofHantomanagementposts26. 15ThesmallamountofdatarelatingtotheethnicoriginsofsomeoftheXinjiangeliteappearstosupportsuchcontentions.Forexample,in1990,thenationalminoritiesprovidedonly28.8%ofthetotalnumberofmanagersandadministratorsinXinjiang27.Thisstateofaffairsisalsoobservablewithinthepoliticalsystem:officialsdrawnfromthenationalminoritiesarestillunder-representedintheXinjiangCommunistParty.Theyaccountedforonly37.3%ofitsmembersin199728.Moreover,bearinginmindthattheirloyaltytowardsPekingisconsideredsuspect,theyareoftenhelddowninpostswithlittlepowerorpostswheretheycaneasilybecontrolled.Admittedly,thePresidentsofthePeople’sGovernmentoftheXinjiangUyghurAutonomousRegion,ofeachAutonomousPrefectureandofeachAutonomousVillageareelectedonthebasisofthetitularnationalityoftheautonomousadministrativeentity.However,aseverywhereelseinChina,theChineseCommunistParty(CCP)isthecontrollingforcebehindpoliticalinstitutions.AndthemostimportantCCPpostsinXinjiangareheldbyHanloyaltoPekingandnotbymembersofnationalminorities.Forexample,itisrevealingtonotethat,eversince1949,thepostofSecretaryoftheCCPintheXinjiangUyghurAutonomousRegionhasbeenoccupiedinanalmostsystematicwaybyHanChinese. 16Insum,whileaproportionoftheUyghureliteisintegrated,evenverywellintegrated,andhasbeenforseveralgenerations,agrowingnumberofthenewelitefindincreasingdifficultyinfulfillingtheirexpectationsandfeelresentfulofbeingexcluded,evencolonised.Shiftingthisfaultline,wheretheintegrationofUyghurelitesisconcerned,actsasakindofmeasuringinstrumentforUyghurnationalism.Iftheindicatormovestowards“fewerwell-integratedelite”,thenationalistoppositionislikelytoshowitselfmorestructuredandmorevigorous.Today,thefactthatpoorlyintegratedeliteUyghursaremorenumerousthanbeforeexplainstherisingdiscontentamongyoungeducatedpeopleandthestrengtheningoftheirpoliticalopposition.Yet,thefactthataproportionofthemcontinuestobe“wellintegrated”harmsthestructureofUyghurnationalismbypreventingforthepresentthelarge-scalerecruitmentofofficialslikelytoorganisemassmovements. ReassertionofidentityandIslamicrevivalamongtheUyghursofXinjiang 17EversincethedarkdaysoftheCulturalRevolution,therelativeopennessthathasfollowedDengXiaoping’srisetopowerhasleftthewayopentoavastmovementforrevitalisinglocalculture.The1980ssawareturntowardsthetraditionsandthe“imaginedfoundations”ofUyghuridentity.Thisphenomenoninitsmanyformsmanifestsitself,forexample,intheproliferationofbooksandacademicresearchintoUyghurhistoryandculture.Ithasalsotakentheform,asamongtheHui,ofanIslamicrevival29.WhilepublicationsrelatingtoIslamflourished,mosqueswererenovatedandmanynewonesbuilt.Similarly,religiouseducationdevelopedstrongly:Koranicschoolswereopened,attachedtomosquesontheonehandor,ontheother,asprivateschools—usuallyundeclared30.ThisIslamicrevival,observedrightacrossChina,hasneverthelessassumedadistinctivedimensionamongtheUyghurs.Forthemitispartofalogicofreturn(orperceivedreturn)topracticesformerlydiscouragedorrepressed,butitisalsoatthemarginpartofamoremilitantlogicusingIslamasaninstrumentfordistinguishingUyghurvalues31fromthenon-clericalandatheisticvaluespromotedbytheChineseauthorities. Table1 :DemographicstrengthofthemainXinjiangnationalitiesZoomOriginal(jpeg,24k) Source:Fenjindesishinian:1949-1989.Xinjiangfenci(Theadvancing40years.1949-1989.XinjiangVolume),Zhongguotongjichubanshe,Urumchi,1989,p. 332;2002Xinjiangtongjinianjian(XinjiangStatisticalYearbook),Pékin,Zhongguotongjichubanshe,2002,pp. 107,109. 18TherevivaloftheUyghurs’Islamiccultureandidentityhasalsoled,duringthe1980s,totheformationofstudentassociationsaimingtopromotetherightsandcultureoftheUyghurs:theTengritakhAssociation(Tianshan),theYouthAssociationofEastTurkistan,theStudents’CulturalandScientificAssociation32…Someofthesestudentassociations,whichreflectthegrowingstrengthofthedemocraticstudentmovementinChinaandchallenge“GreatHanchauvinism”,seemquicklytohaveadoptedamilitantstyle.ThisisconveyedinareportreflectingCCPanxiety: 19Inthethirtyyearsbetween1949and1979,almostnodemonstrationwasheldbytheXinjiangminoritystudentsinXinjiang,butafter1980,studentdemonstrationshavebrokeoutoneafteranother.Thisisanewphenomena.UyghurstudentsfromsevenuniversitiesandcollegesincludingXinjiangUniversityinUrumqidemonstratedonDecember12th1985.TheywereopenlyagainsttheCentralGovernment'sdecision.[...] SomeofthestudentsfromXinjiangUniversitygottogetherandorganizedthiswellplannedandwellorganizedpoliticalincidentforwhichtheXinjiangUniversitybecametheheadquarter.Beforeandafterthatincident,somepro-separatismpostersandflyerswithcontentssuchas:“ChineseoutofXinjiang”,“IndependenceforXinjiang”,“CutofftherailroadfromChinapropertoXinjiang”werediscoveredinUrumqiandotherdistricts.InJune1986,anotherdemonstrationwasorganizedbyastudentassociationinXinjiangUniversity.[...]Usingthe“supportfortheminorityeducation”asacover,theyattackedCentralCommunistParty'sminorityautonomypolicy,damagedthegoodrelationshipamongthenationalities.Theyusedsloganssuchas“NobigChineseNationalism”,“NoChinesepopulationtransfertoXinjiang”,andcreatedaverybadinfluenceinthesociety.33    20Outsidethecampuses,therevivalofthemeshrep34expressesthewishtorevitaliseUyghurcultureandidentity.Atthestartofthe1990s,youngUyghursoftheregionofGhulja(Yining)launchedamovementtore-invigoratethesegatheringswhichhavespreadrapidly.However,themovementhasalsotaken,accordingtotheChineseauthorities,a“counter-revolutionary”turn.Fearingthatitmightbecomeafocusforprotestand“localnationalism”(difangminzuzhuyi),theregionalgovernmentbannedthemeshrepin1995;andthepeoplewhohadlaunchedthemovementwereimprisoned35. Theriseandfalloftwoclandestinepoliticalmovementsofsomestature 21Thisaspirationtogreatermilitancy36hasalsotakentheformofclandestinepoliticalmovements37that,inXinjiangandintheDiaspora38,arefoundedonUyghurnationalismtingedwithPan-Turkism39.Admittedly,thesemovementsarenot“massmovements”—andevenlesssointhepresentclimateofrepression.Uyghurmilitancyisdrivenmostlybyafringegroupofyoungstudentsandintellectuals,purgedregularlybyChineserepression.Upuntilthe1990s,twosuccessiveclandestinegroupsinthetraditionofthepre-1949oppositionalcurrents,bothquitedurable,dominatedtheundergroundpoliticalscene.OfthesetwonationalistPan-Turkistparties,one,socialistandsecular,reliedonSovietaid,andtheothercamefromtheanti-communistandIslamictraditioncentredonthesouthofXinjiang.Bothcouldcalluponabaseofmilitancythatwasrelativelywidecomparedwithpresent-daygroupings(seebelow).AtthesametimetheywerecountingonsignificantundergroundmobilisationtoprepareforageneraluprisinginXinjiang. 22After1949,thefirstbigorganisedclandestinepartywasformedunderthenameoftheEasternTurkistanPeople’sParty(ETPP)(SharkiTurkistanHalkPartisi).MainlydrawinginUyghursbutalsoKazakhs,itwasfoundedinsecret,accordingtotheChineseauthorities,inFebruary1968;but,accordingtothemilitantswhohavenowtakenrefugeabroad,someofitscellshadalreadybeenactiveforseveralyearsbeforehand40.ThiswasaseparatistPan-TurkistpartywithMarxistallegiances.Well-structuredandhierarchic,itswiftlyrecruitedformerofficialsoftheEastTurkistanRepublicaswellasyoungpeoplefromTurkic-speakingminorities.AccordingtotheEastTurkistanNationalCentre,thispartynumberedmorethan60,000membersand178branchesinXinjiang41.Thesefiguresarehardtoverify.However,theETPPisprobablythelargestsecretorganisationevercreatedsincetheliberationofXinjiang.TherisetopowerofthisundergroundpartyseemstohavebeenfavouredmainlybytheexcessesoftheCulturalRevolutionandbythedeteriorationofSino-Sovietrelations.Indeed,theUSSRdidgivehelptotheETPP.AsisconfirmedbyChinesesourcesandthetestimonyofsomeofitsformermilitants,theKGBdevelopeditslinkswiththispartymostlythroughitsagentsactiveinKazakhstanandseemstohaveprovideditwithlogisticalsupportonseveraloccasions: 23TheETPP'sCentralCommitteeandsubcommitteedraftedarticlessuchas“TheDestinyoftheUyghurs”,“EasternTurkestanPeople'sParty'sConstitution”and“EasternTurkestanPeople'sParty'sGeneralPrinciples”.[...] theyallclaim[...]“SeizethepowerwiththehelpoftheSovietUnionandestablishanindependentEasternTurkestanRepublic”[...].SomeofthemevenheldthebannerofMarxismandLeninismandproposed:“WewanttoestablishinganindependentcountryaccordingtotheMarxistprincipleofself-determinationofdifferentpeoples”.[...]Onadozenoccasions,the“ETPP”'sIliCommittee,UrumqiBranch,andAltayBureaualsosenttheirdelegationstoSovietUnionandMongoliaRepublictobegforarmsandtheuseofradiostationsfortheirriotsandaskformilitaryadvisors.TheSovietSpyagencysentagroupoffourteenpeoplewithspiescarryingradiotransmitters,weaponsandfundsfortheiractivities.ThesegroupsarrivedinXinjiangandestablishedcommunicationwiththe“ETPP”ninetimes.42 Table2:Distributionofwealthinthemainsub-regionaladministrativeunitsinXinjiangZoomOriginal(jpeg,36k) Source:2002Xinjiangtongjinianjian,op.cit.,pp. 106,110-115,713,715;2002Zhongguotongjinianjian,op.cit.,p. 51. 24TheETPPfocuseditsactivityonmobilisingTurkic-speakingpopulationsandofficialsinXinjiangwiththeaimofpreparingamassinsurrectionagainstPeking.Atthesametime,ittookupguerrillaactivities(sabotage,skirmisheswiththepoliceandtheChinesearmy…)andwasbehindvariousattemptsatinsurrectionduringthe1960sandthe1970s.Stillquiteactiveduringthe1970s,itwasgraduallyweakenedbythearrestofitsleaders,bythegradualfallingawayofSovietsupportasthetensionbetweenMoscowandPekingrelaxed,andthenbythedeclineofthecommunistideology.Nevertheless,whiletheETPPwasindecline,anewpartyofanti-MarxistoppositionwasdevelopinginsouthernXinjiang. 25AstheSovietUnionlostitsappealamonganti-colonialistMuslimstothebenefitofrevolutionaryIslam,andastherevivalofIslamismwasgatheringpaceinXinjiang,theIslamicPan-TurkictrendcentredonthesouthofXinjiangwasgivenrenewedvigourbynewyoungleaders.Itwasre-organisedaroundtheEastTurkistanIslamicParty(ETIP)(SharkiTurkistanIslamPartisi).ThisPan-TurkicnationalistmovementalsoaimedatrenewingIslamamongtheUyghursanddevelopedfromnetworksofmosquesinsouthernXinjiangduringthe1980s.Accordingtoofficialsources,itapparentlygeneratedoffshootsinnumerouscitiesintheTarimBasin,indeedasfarasGhulja(Yining),TurfanandUrumqi43.ProbablyalsoinspiredbytheAfghans’successagainsttheSoviets,itreallycameintoprominenceinApril1990atthetimeoftheBareninsurrection(nearKashgar).TherisingtooktheformofajihadrecallingthatwhichledtothecreationoftheTurkIslamicRepublicofEastTurkistan(1933-1934)44. 26Theinsurrection,whichlastedforseveraldays,causedseveraldozendeathsontheinsurgents’sideandforcedtheChinesearmytodeploysignificantforcesintheregiontoputdowntherebellion.TheChineseauthoritiesviewtheETIPaspartoftheJihadistcurrentontheothersideofthePamirs;andtheyconsiderthatitgavebirthtomore“radical”groupingssuchasthePartyofAllahandtheIslamicMovementofEastTurkistan.Becauseofthelittleinformationavailableaboutthisorganisation,suchlinksaredifficulttocheckandtodetermineastrueorfalse.However,theslogansproclaimedduringtheinsurrectionsuggestthattheETIPatthistimewasmorearenovatedformoftheIslamicPan-TurkismhistoricallyestablishedinthesouthofXinjiangthanapurereincarnationofradicalIslam: 27He[YusufZeydin,leaderofthelocalbranchoftheETIP]andhisfollowersopenlyshouted:“Downwiththesocialism!”,“InthepastMarxismsuppressedreligion,andnowitisreligion'sturntosuppressMarxism”,“UnitealltheTurkpeoples,longlivethegreatEasternTurkistan!”,“TakeBarin,establishEasternTurkistan”.45 28Thesubsequentrepressionpreventedthepartyfrombeingreconstitutedonsuchwidefoundations,despiteattemptsatthisofsomeofitsmembersintheearly1990s. The1990s:theturntowardsrepression 29Whereasthe1980sareperceivedbymanyUyghursasaperiodofreducedtension,evenofanimprovementintherelationsbetweenUyghursocietyandtheChinesestate,the1990ssawtheemergenceofarepressiveclimatethatengenderedpowerfulfrustrationsandresentment.The1990sincreaseinrepressionisgenerallylinkedwithexacerbatedPartyanxietiesonseverallevels. 30Nationally,theconservativewingoftheCCPconsideredthattheworstwasavoidedaftertheTiananmeneventsin1989,whereassimilareventstookplaceinconsequenceoncampusesinXinjiang(seeabove).Itconsidersthatanauthoritariancrackdownisessentialtoensurethesurvivaloftheregime.Atthesametime,atthestartofthe1990s,theChineseregimefearedthattheaccessiontoindependenceoftheCentralAsianRepublics,andalsothespreadofradicalIslamintheregion(seebelow),wouldseriouslydestabiliseXinjiangifnothingwasdone.Ontheonehand,theaccessiontoindependenceofotherlargeTurkicpopulationsofCentralAsiawaslikelytolegitimiseandstrengthenUyghurseparatism.Ontheother,theculturallinksthatbindtheUyghurstogetherwiththepeoplesofthenewRepublics,andalsowiththeUyghurDiasporainthesecountries46,allowedPekingtofearthatsolidaritywouldbuildupbetweentheUyghurseparatistsandthesestates(orcertainorganisationspresentontheirsoil).Firstly,someofthem(KazakhstanandKirghizstaninparticular)haveeffectivelyofferedasylumtothenewrefugees,andevenrecognisedorganisationsofthelocalDiasporadefendingtheindependenceofEastTurkistan.PekingthenapplieditselftocuttingoffthemilitantsactiveinXinjiangfromthesepotentialsupportsoutside.Byplayingontheprospectsforsettlingfrontierdisputesandforeconomicco-operation,andbypromotingco-operationinthestruggleagainstseparatismandIslamisminCentralAsiathroughtheShanghaiCo-operationOrganisation(SCO)47,ChinapersuadedtheCentralAsianrepublicstobantheUyghurorganisationspresentontheirterritories,andeventodaytoextraditesomemilitantswhohaverecentlytakenrefugethere48. 31Onthedomesticfront,theChineseregimeconfrontedbytheriseofUyghurnationalismandbyIslamicanti-governmentalsubversionhasprogressivelytighteneditscontroloversocietyandthespacesforexpressingidentityandreligion49topreventthestartofdynamicsthatmighthavemadethesituationuncontrollable.AtthesametimeasrelationsbetweentheChinesestateandUyghursocietywerebecomingstrainedanddisturbances,sometimesviolent,wereontherise(theBareninsurrectionin1990,thedisturbancesofthesummerandautumnof1993overthewholeprovince,andtheriotsofJuly7th1995inKhotan),theChineseregime’sgripwasprogressivelytightened. Table3:Nationalminorities’shareinXinjiang’stotalschoolpopulationin2000ZoomOriginal(jpeg,12k) Source:2002Xinjiangtongjinianjian,op.cit.,pp. 612-613. 32Theturningpointreallycamein1996-1997,followingthelaunchinApril1996ofthegreatnationalcampaignagainstcrime“Strikehard”.ThiscampaignbeganshortlyafteraspecialmeetinginMarch1996onmaintainingstabilityinXinjiang,andsothereitassumedaspecialdimension,beingtargetedatseparatismandillegalreligiousactivities.ThePermanentCommitteeofthePolitburooftheCCPthenissuedanexhaustivelistofstrictdirectivesaimedattighteningcontroloverXinjianganderadicatingpotentiallysubversiveactivities50.Aspartofthesamecampaign,asuccessionofstrong-armpoliceoperationswasmounted(thespecial100-daycrackdownfromJanuarytoMarch1999,the“GeneralCampaignagainstTerrorism”fromApriltoJune1999,thenewcampaign“Strikehard”fromApril2001onwards,thedriveagainstseparatisminOctober2001…).Thisintensecampaignofrepressionledtothousandsofarrestsandalsotoconstanthumanrightsviolationsandtheimproperuseofthedeathpenalty51.Byfencingoff,evenclosingdown,thelastspacesfortheexpressionofidentityorreligion52,theserestrictionsputrelationsbetweenUyghursocietyandtheChineseregimeunderconsiderablestrain.TheygavetheimpressionthattherealtargetoftheChineseregime’sattackswasnotsomuchseparatismorevenIslamismbutUyghuridentityitself53. Moredisturbancesandmoreradicalisationduringthe1990s 33Duringthesameperiod,theintroductionofamarketeconomycombinedwithcompetitionfromever-increasingnumbersofHanplacedthesocialclimateunderstrain.Localpoliticians,inthralltoPeking,areunabletochallengepoliciesimposedfromthecentreandoftenverystronglydisliked(nucleartestsontheLopNorsite,therestrictionofreligiousfreedoms,theenforcementofbirthcontrolwhilecolonistsarefloodingin…);thisfacthasprovokednumerousprotestmovements.Facedwithastrainedsocialandpoliticalclimate,thelocalauthorities(whocannotchallengethepoliciesdictatedbyPeking)haveoftenreactedwithbrutality.Theyhavesometimeshelpedtogiveaninsurrectionaltwisttoprotestmovementsthat,originally,weremerelydirectedagainstunpopularmeasures54.Whilethedisturbancesbecamemorefrequent55inresponsetoexcessiveChineserepression,throughoutthe1990snewgroupingsappearedinXinjiangandtheDiaspora.IntheDiaspora,mostorganisationsbegantofederatearoundtherejectionofviolentactionwhilelobbyingfortheUyghurs’basicrightstobeprotected56;bycontrast,inXinjiang,groupswithasometimesreducedlifeexpectancy,butadoptingmoreradicalmodesofaction,appeared.Theyprotectedthemselvesbykeepingtheirmembershipssmall,orwithdrewfromChina(toCentralAsia,AfghanistanorTurkey). 34Theycarriedoutnumerousguerrillaoperations(sabotage57,arson,attacksonpolicebarracksormilitarybases),andevengraduatedtoactsofterrorism(assassinationsofHanofficialsorUyghurcollaborators,andbombattacks).TheincreasingfrequencyofactsofviolenceandterrorisminXinjiangduringthe1990sdoesnotmeanthatalltheUyghurpoliticalmovementssupportthesemodesofaction.But,justrecently,theChineseauthoritieshavegenerallyharpedonaboutthefrequencyofactsofviolencetogivetheUyghuroppositiontheimageofaprimarilyterroristforce. 35Onlyashortwhileago,theChinesegovernmentwasoptingtohushupthenewsofthesedisturbances.However,followingtheeventsofSeptember11th2001,itdecidedtoputoutinformationaboutthemoreviolentactsandtheterroristattackscarriedoutduringthisperiod.Itattributedsomeofthemtoarmedgroupswho,todate,seemmostlytohavedisappearedorbecomedormant58.TheShockBrigadeoftheIslamicReformistPartyareheldresponsiblefortheattackthat,ontheChineseNewYearinFebruary1992,killedthreepeopleinabusatUrumqi59.TheEastTurkistanDemocraticIslamicPartyisheldtohavecarriedoutthebombattacksinthesouthofXinjiangthatkilledfourvictimsbetweenJuneandSeptember199360.Themostmemorablecrime,thatofFebruary25th1997inUrumqi(onthedayofDengXiaoping’sfuneral),wasattributedtotheEastTurkistanNationalUnityAlliance.Fourbombshadbeenplantedondifferentbusroutes.Theresultingexplosionskillednineandwounded74.Ontheotherhand,theChineseregimedidnotmentioninitsreportthecrimecommittedduringtheannualmeetingoftheNationalPeople’sCongressonMarch7th1997:thebombwentoffinabusinPeking’sXidandistrict(30injuredandtwodead).Responsibilityforthisattack,thefirsttoaffectPekingsince1949,wasclaimedbytheOrganisationforEastTurkistanFreedom(basedinTurkey),buttheChinesegovernmentdeniedthatanyUyghurswereinvolvedinthisattack. ThespreadofradicalIslaminXinjiang 36Atthesametime,connectionshaveapparentlybeenmadebetweensomeUyghurmilitantsandIslamicmovements.Thisphenomenonseemstobelinkedtoseveralfactors.Ontheonehand,thesocio-politicalmodelpromotedbythesemovementsmayhaveseemedapreferablealternativetotheChinesemodelperceivedascolonialandculturallyinvasive.ThedesiretoestablishapoliticalandsocialorderthatwouldputUyghurMuslimsatthecentreofthesystemisverystrong.SomeUyghurmilitantswereprobablyalsoinfluencedbythehopethatbyimposingastrictIslamicframeworktheymightatthesametimefindasolutiontothepresentsocialproblems.Ontheotherhand,bearinginmindthecessationofsupport(activeorpassive)fromtheUSSRandlateroftheCentralAsianrepublicsandtakingaccountalsooftheindifferenceoftheWest61,thevitalnecessityoffindingforeignsupportoverwhichChinesediplomacyhadnoholdalsoplayedanimportantrole.SomeUyghurmovementssawintheIslamiccardameansofplayingonthesolidarityexistingbetweenMuslimswithintheUmmatoattempttowinpoliticalsupport,fallbackbases,eventrainingfacilitiesandfundstofurtherthestruggleagainstChinesepowerinXinjiang. 37Thefirstlinksseemtohavebeenmadeduringthe1980s.Duringthisperiod,manyforeigners(traders,preachers62…)profitedfromtherelativerelaxationofChinesecontroltoproselytisetheircausesinChinaitself63.Atthesametime,withtheopeningoffrontiersandthelooseningofrestrictionsgoverningtheMeccapilgrimage,UyghurstravellingabroadcameintocontactwithproselytisingmovementsworkinginPakistan,CentralAsiaorinsomeArabcountries.Linkswerecreatedinthesecasestoo.Atthesametimealso,astherestrictionsonreligiouseducationinXinjiangwerebeingstrengthened,manyyoungUyghurswentabroad.Throughconnectionsestablishedduringthe1980sorthroughfamilylinksonthespot,theseyoungpeople—andalsoUyghursintheDiaspora—tookreligiouscoursesintheKoranicschoolssometimesattachedtoIslamistmovements. 38Thus,inKazakhstanitseemsthatsomeUyghursjoinedtheIslamicRenaissanceParty64.InUzbekistanandinKirghizstansomeofthemjoinedtheIslamicMovementofUzbekistan(IMU)orelseHizb-utTahrir(HT)65.TheotherfavouredplaceforrecruitmentwasPakistan.ChineseresearcherssuggestthatabouttenthousandUyghurswenttoPakistantoreceiveareligiouseducation66.Thisfigureishardtoverify.Nevertheless,someofthemdidindeedfollowprogrammesinfundamentalistKoranicschoolsinPakistan,andwereevenincontactwithvariouslocalIslamistmovements(Jamaat-eIslami67,Jamaatal-Tabligh68…).Throughtheseconnections,someUyghurstookpartinmilitaryoperations.ItseemsthattheHizbul-Mujahidin69andtheSalafistJihadist70movementLashkar-eTaibainparticular71enrolledahandfulofUyghursintheKashmirconflict72.However,mostoftheUyghursinvolvedintheJihadwereinAfghanistan(mainlyintheranksoftheHizb-eIslami,theTalibanandlaterintheranksoftheIMU).QuotingofficialRussiansourcesandChineseexperts,theChinesepresshaspublishedfiguresrangingfromover200Uyghursinthe“binLadencamps”tomorethanathousandhavingreceivedsomemilitarytraininginAfghanistan73.Again,thefiguresaredifficulttocheck.However,afterthefalloftheTaliban,thenewAfghangovernmentclaimsithasonlyascoreofChineseprisoners(whoithaspromisedtohandovertotheChineseauthorities).SoonemaypresumethattheUyghursamountonlytoanegligibleproportionoftheforeignsupportersfightingalongsidelocalradicalmovements. TheIslamistfactioninXinjiang:amarginalthreatbutusefultotheChineseregime 39Duringthe1990s,someoftheseyoungUyghursformedintheirturnasmallnumberofIslamist(orIslamicnationalist)groupswhich,accordingtoPeking,havelinkswithSalafistJihadistnetworksbasedintheregion.Becausewehavelittlereliableinformationabouttheseultra-clandestineorganisations,itisverydifficulttobespecificabouttheirideology.Forthemostpart,theybeginwithanucleusofUyghurswhohaveoftenreceivedIslamictrainingabroadandaresometimestrainedincombatandtheuseofexplosives;aroundthemaregroupedthemilitantstheythemselveshaverecruitedlocally.However,thefactthattheydonotrecruitfromtheHuiandthattheirdiscourselaysgreateremphasisonliberatingEastTurkistanthanoncreatinganIslamicstate(oronreturningtoapurifiedformofIslam)suggeststhattheiragendaisstillmainlynationalist74. 40Withouthavingcarriedoutamassiverecruitment,thesegroupshaveconcentratedonenrollingyoungpeoplefromtheurbanworkingclass,mainlyfromsouthernXinjiang.Admittedly,thesubstratumofurbanyouth,disconnectedwithIslaminitstraditionalSufiform75,providesareservoirofpeoplethatcouldfeedthedevelopmentofthesegroups.However,althoughonemayrecentlyobservethegrowingpoweroftheneo-fundamentalistHizbut-Tahrirgroup76,theIslamistgroupsinXinjianghavelostmuchoftheirmembershipandhavebeenofficiallydismantledbytheChinesepolice.Inreality,ChinesesecurityfocuseditsattentionfirstlyontheEastTurkistanIslamicPartyofAllah(whosenamerecallsHezbollah).Foundedin1993accordingtosomesourcesandin1997accordingtoothers77,themembershipofthisorganisationcampaigningforthecreationofanIslamicstatenumberedfromonehundredtofifteenhundred.AccordingtotheChineseauthorities,itsmembersattackedindividualsassociatedwiththeChinesegovernment.Awaveofarrestsattheendofthe1990sseemstohaveuncoveredpreparationsforbombingattacks.Intheend,accordingtotheChinesepress,thePartyofAllahwasdismantledafewyearsago. Table4:DifferencesinqualificationsbetweenHanandnon-HanlabourinXinjiangin1990ZoomOriginal(jpeg,21k) Source:Compilationbasedondatafromthefourthcensuscarriedoutin1990(EmilyHannum&YuXie,op.cit.,p. 329). 41Yet,aftertheeventsofSeptember11th2001,themarginalexistenceofthiskindofgroupwasusedbytheChineseregimetoattempttoincludethewholesalerepressionoftheUyghuroppositionwithintheinternationaldynamicofthestruggleagainstIslamistterroristnetworks78.WhiletheChineseForeignAffairsMinisterdeclaredinNovember2001attheUNthat“theterroristforcesofEastTurkistanaretrained,equippedandfinancedbyinternationalterroristorganisations”,inJanuary2002theStateCouncilpublishedanambiguousreportlayingstressonthesupposedlinksbetweenal-QaedaandtheUyghuroppositiongroupedunderthefalselyunifyinglabelofDongtu79.Infact,thereisnostructurethatcontrolsalltheUyghurmovementsinXinjiangandabroad;andthevastmajorityofthemhavenoconnection,eitherideologicalororganisational,withradicalIslam.Yet,bystressingthesupposedlinksofthePartyofAllahandtheEastTurkistanIslamicMovement(ETIM)withal-Qaeda,thisreporttendstolumptogetherdisparateelementsofthiskind.AccordingtothethesisproposedbytheStateCouncil,membersofthesegroupsreceivedtraininginAfghanistan.TheleadersoftheETIM(agroupthatuntilthenwasalmostunknown)areallegedtohavemetbinLadenatthestartof1999andinFebruary2001;andheisallegedtohaveagreedtoprovidethemwith“fabuloussums”80.Itispossiblethatthesemovements,andparticularlytheETIM,mighthavehadcontactswiththebinLadennetworkandmoreprobablywiththeIslamicMovementofUzbekistan81.ButtheChinesedeclarationsthatattempttoshowparticularlycloserelationshipsflyinthefaceofbinLaden’ssilenceonEastTurkistan. 42Forhispart,theleaderoftheETIM,HasanMahsum,assuredRadioFreeAsiaonJanuary22nd2002thathisultimateaimwastheliberationofXinjiang;andhedeniedanyorganiclinkwithal-Qaeda.Evenso,theChineselobbyingdidbearfruit.ItenabledChinatopersuadetheUSgovernment,attheendofAugust2002,andthentheUNSecurityCounciltoincludeonthelistofgroupingslinkedtoal-QaedatheEastTurkistanIslamicMovement;itwasgivenanextendeddescriptionunderatriplename:theEastTurkistanIslamicMovement,theEastTurkistanIslamicPartyofAllahandtheEastTurkistanIslamicParty82. TheChineseregimeandtheUyghurdilemma 43TheconsequencesofthepoliciespursuedbytheChineseregimerevealthepoliticalimpasseithasrunintobyattackingtheexpressionsofUyghurmalaisewithoutattackingitsrealcauses.MaoZedong,goingbackonhispromises,quicklyoptedforrepressiontoputanendtodemandsforself-government,whichhadbeenmadeasearlyasthe1950s.TheChineseregimethenoutlawedanykindofprotestagainstthepoliciesimposedonXinjiang;italsoclosedupmostofthespacesinwhichthecultureandthereligiousconvictionsoftheUyghurscouldbeexpressed.Inthiswayitfedfrustrationsthatwerealsoexacerbatedbycolonisationandthesocio-economicstratificationthatitledto.When,toreducetension,theregimepartiallyre-openedthesespaces,there-openingsimplyallowedthepowerofUyghurnationalismtogrow.AndsincePekingclosedthespacesandrevertedtorepression,allhopesofself-government,evenofdialoguewiththeChineseauthorities,haveflownoutofthewindow.Nowthatrelationshavecompletelybrokendown,actsofviolencehavereplacedpeacefuldemonstrationsastheexpressionoftheUyghurmalaise.IsolatedastheyhavebeenbyskilfulChinesediplomacy,whatremainsoftheUyghuroppositioninXinjiangisnowopentoallkindsofextremism. Topofpage Notes 1 Thisstudyisbasedmainlyondatagatheredbytheauthorsincetheendofthe1990sinXinjiangandwithintheUyghurDiaspora. 2 SharkiTurkistaninUyghur. 3 Historically,thesecommunitiessharedthevariousecologicalnichesinthearea.TheoasestothesouthoftheTianshanmountains,thatistosaytheoasesoftheTarim,TurfanandKumul(Hami)BasinsaretraditionallypopulatedbysedentaryUyghurs.TheTianshanchainandthesteppestothenortharehometotheKazakhandKirghiznomads.TotheseTurkic-speakingpopulationsareaddedthenomadicMongolstothenorthandeast,aTajikcommunityinthePamirsandafewUzbekandTatartradersinthelargeoases.FollowingtheconquestoftheregionbytheQing,Han,Manchurianpopulationdemobilisedorsenttheretoensurecontrolofthenorthoftheprovince,andChineseMuslims(Hui)cametosettle. 4 TheseTurkic-speakingpopulationshaveincommontobeSunnimuslimsoftheHanafiriteandtopractiseanIslaminfluencedbySufism.OnlytheTajiksoftheChinesePamirsdepartfromthisrule.TheyareIranian-speaking,andarepartoftheIsmaelianbranchofShiism. 5 Untilthetwentiethcentury,thesepopulations,fragmentedbydifferencesofidentityandbypoliticalandreligiousrivalriesbetweenoases,referredtotheirgeographicorigin(theiroasisoforigin)toidentifythemselves.ThetermUyghurreferstotheTurkicpeoplewho,intheMiddleAges,developedabrilliantcivilisationintheeastofXinjiang.Thisethnonym,havingdisappearedsinceIslamisation,wasrevivedbyRussianethnologists;itwasbroughtbackintoserviceduringthe1930sbySovietadvisorsofShengShicaitodesignatetheTurkic-speakingsedentaryMuslimcommunitiesspeakingtheTurkidialectoftheXinjiangoases.SeeDruGladney,“TheEthnogenesisoftheUighur”,CentralAsianSurvey,Vol. 9,No. 1,1990,pp. 1-28;AbdurahmanAbdullah,Tashkentchilair(ThosewhohavestudiedinTashkent),XinjiangRenminchubanshe,2002. 6 Pan-Turkism,whichwaspartlyconfusedwithJadidisminCentralAsia,developedinthe1880samongtheTatarsofRussia.ThisreformmovementaimedtorestorepoliticalinfluencetotheMuslimTurkishpeoplesandtoawakentheirnationalconsciousnessbymodernisingthem(educationalreforms,theologicalreforms…)ThoughitcannotbeonthescaleoftheTurkishworldasawhole,Pan-Turkism,closelymingledwithUyghurnationalism,helpstounitethevariousTurkic-speakingpopulationsofEastTurkistanbehindthesamepoliticalproject. 7 MasamiHamada,“LatransmissiondumouvementnationalisteauTurkestanoriental(Xinjiang)”,CentralAsianSurvey,Vol. 9,No. 1,1990,pp. 29-48;JustinRudelson,OasisIdentities:UyghurNationalismAlongChina’sSilkRoad,NewYork,ColumbiaUniversityPress,1997,pp. 55-57. 8 AndrewD.Forbes,WarlordsandMuslimsinChineseCentralAsia,APoliticalHistoryofRepublicanXinjiang1911-1949,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,1986,pp. 63-121. 9 LindaBenson,TheIliRebellion:TheMoslemChallengetoChineseAuthorityinXinjiang,1944-1949,NewYork,Armonk,Sharpe,1990;DavidWang,UndertheSovietShadow:TheYiningIncident;EthnicConflictsandInternationalRivalryinXinjiang,1944-1949,HongKong,ChineseUniversityPress,1999. 10 BarrySautman,“PreferentialPoliciesforEthnicMinoritiesinChina:theCaseofXinjiang”,NationalismandEthnicMinorities,Vol. 4,No. 1/2,spring/summer1998,pp. 86-113. 11 Thiscolonisationpolicy,forexample,hasjustbeenopenlyencouragedanewbythePermanentCommitteeofthePolitburooftheCCPonMarch19th1996:itsconfidentialsessionwasdevotedtomaintainingstabilityinXinjiang(“GuanyuweihuXinjiangwendingdehuiyijiyao,zhongyangzhengzhijuweiyuanhui”AnEnglishversionofthistexthasbeenpublishedbyHumanRightsWatch). 12 JamesD.Seymour,“Xinjiang’sProductionandConstructionCorpsandtheSinificationofEasternTurkestan”,InnerAsia,Vol. 2,No. 2,2000,pp. 171-94;NicolasBecquelin,“ChineseholdonXinjiang:StrengthsandLimits”,inFrançoisGodemented.,LaChineetsonOccident.ChinaanditsWesternFrontier,LesCahiersdel’Asie,IFRI,Paris,2002,pp. 62-66;Xinjiangshengchanjianshebingtuantongjinianjian,(StatisticalYearbookoftheProductionandConstructionCorpsinXinjiang),Peking,Zhongguotongjichubanshe,1999. 13 ItishardtocalculatetherealnumberofHanlivinginXinjiangbecausetheChineseauthorities,intheirstatistics,onlydeclarecommunitiesunderthejurisdictionofregionalauthoritiesandnotthoseunderthejurisdictionofthecentralauthorities. 14 ByIslamism,weshallunderstandanymovementledbyintellectualsbenefitingfromamoderneducationwhoseaimis“tobuild,startingwiththepowerofthestate,aglobalpoliticalsystemwhichwouldmanageallaspectsofthesocietyandtheeconomy,foundingitsauthorityonlyonIslamandrejectinganypoliticalpluralism”,(OlivierRoy,Généalogiedel’islamisme,Hachette,Paris,2002,p. 10). 15 Bearinginmindthestructuraldeficitoftheautonomousregion’sfinances(about50%oftheregionalbudgetattheendofthe1990s),Xinjiangismainlydependantonfundingfromcentralgovernment(seeNicolasBecquelin,“Xinjianginthenineties”,ChinaJournal,No. 44,July2000,pp. 71-74). 16 InJanuary2000,Pekinglaunchedthecampaignitcalled“OpeninguptheGreatWest”(Xibudakaifa)inordertoreducethedevelopmentgapbetweentheEastandtheWestofChina.ItaimsinparticulartoencourageinvestmentinthewholeareamadeupoftheXinjiangUyghurAutonomousRegion,theAutonomousRegionsofTibet,ofNingxia,ofGuangxi,ofInnerMongolia,theprovincesofQinghai,Gansu,Shaanxi,Sichuan,Yunnan,GuizhouandthemunicipalityofChongqing.Althoughtheeffectivenessoftheproposedmeasuresisdoubtful,theXinjiangauthoritiesreferfrequentlytothemtoassuretheautochthonouspopulationsthattheyhavenotbeenabandonedandthatallmeasuresarebeingtakentoimprovetheirlivingconditions.Onthecampaignandwhatisatstake,seeDavidS.G.Goodman,“ThepoliticsoftheWest:equality,nation-buildingandcolonisation”,inLaChineetsonOccident.ChinaanditsWesternFrontier,IFRI,LesCahiersd’Asie,Paris,2001,pp. 23-55. 17 2002Zhongguotongjinianjian(StatisticalYearbookofChina),Peking,Zhongguotongjichubanshe,2002,p. 51. 18 ThemainpioneerareaswereopenedupalongtheHami-Turfan-Urumqi-Changji-Shiheziline,andalongalinepushingoutwestwards(Yanji-Korla-Luntai-Aksu...).Extendingthetransportinfrastructuresmainlyfavouredcolonisationbymakingzonesthatwereformerlyremotemoreaccessibletothecolonists.Inthe1950s,onlyKumul(Hami)waslinkedtotherestoftheChineserailwaynetwork.Urumqiwaslinkedupin1960.TheTurfan-Korlasectionwascompletedin1984,connectingUrumqitotheKazakhfrontierwasachievedintheearly1990sandtheKorla-Aksu-Kashgarsectionin1999.Thecross-desertroadlinkingKhotantoKorlawasfinishedin1995.Thus,sincethenorthoftheTarimBasinwasgivenitsraillinktotheChinesenetworkandsinceKhotanwaslinkedbyroadtothenorthoftheTarimBasin,thehistoricalcentresofUyghurpopulation,onceisolated,havebeenreceivingasteadyinfluxofcolonists. 19 Thethresholdsetbytheinternationalorganisationsisaboutadollarperday(thatis,about3,000 yuanperyear). 20 InXinjiang,bearinginmindtheomnipresenceofputonghuaintheadministrationandtheeconomy,itisessentialtomasteritinordertorisetopostsofresponsibility.YoungUyghurpupilshaveachoicebetweenattending“Uyghurclasses”whereteachingisconductedmainlyinUyghurand“Chineseclasses”whereteachingisconductedinMandarin(Chinese).TheUyghurelite(oftenmasteringMandarinbythemselves)frequentlysendtheirchildrentotheChineseclassestoensureforthembetterchancesofprofessionalsuccess.However,bearinginmindtherisksoflosingone’sownculturethatthischoiceincursforsomepeople,bearinginmindthefairlystrictcompartmentalisationofHanandUyghurhousing,andalsobecauseintheremoteruralUyghurareastheseChineseclassesarenotavailable,mostUyghurfamiliessendtheirchildrentothe“Uyghurclasses”nearwheretheylive.Thus,manyyoungpeople,despitetheexistenceofChineselessonsandclassestaughtinChineseinthe“Uyghurclasses”,donotmasterChinesebythetimetheyleave. 21 ThecontinuousinfluxoftheHanproducesonthelabourmarketsignificanttensionsthatareaggravatedbythefactthattheeconomyisdominatedbytheHan.SinceHanpeopleprefertobesurroundedbyHanpeople,thejobsthattheycreategotothemandnottotheUyghurs.This“preferentialjobrecruitment”ismainlyobservableintheprivatesectorwherethereisnoencouragementforemployerstorecruitfromthenationalminorities.ManyUyghursspeakresentfullyofthiskindofdiscriminationinthelabourmarketandcomplainthat,withequalorsuperiorskills,theycannotcompetewiththeHanortheHui(Interviews,Xinjiang,1999-2002). 22 EmilyHannumandYuXie,“EthnicstratificationinNorthwestChina:occupationaldifferencesbetweenHanChineseandnationalminoritiesinXinjiang,1982-1990”,Demography,Vol. 35,No. 3,1998,p. 328. 23 SeeMichaelHechter,InternalColonialism:TheCelticFringeinBritishNationalDevelopment,1536-1966,London,RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1975.WhetherXinjiangfulfilsthehalf-dozencriteriathatqualifyaterritoryasaninteriorcolonyisthesubjectofmuchdebate.However,inouropinion,whethertheperipheralcommunityconsidersitselftobecolonisedismoreimportantthanvalidatingthesecriteria,whenitcomestounderstandinghowthesesituationsofstratification(perceivedorreal)canleadtoethnicnationalism. 24 Interviews,1999-2002.Seeforexample,EastTurkistanInformationCenter(ETIC),“SherqiyTurkistandaBashbalasiHitayKoçmenliri”(TheChineseMigrantsinEastTurkistan),www.uygur.org. 25 Interviews,Xinjiang,1999-2002. 26 Ibid. 27 Cfnote 22. 28 ColinMackerras,“Xinjiangandthecausesofseparatism”,CentralAsianSurvey,Vol. 20,No. 3,2001,p. 290. 29 SeeElizabethAllès,LeïlaChérif-Chebbi&Constance-HélèneHalfon,“L’islamchinois,unitéetfragmentation”,Archivesdesciencessocialesdesreligions,n° 115,2001,pp. 15-47. 30 OnreligiouseducationinChina,seeElisabethAllès,“MuslimReligiousEducationinChina”,ChinaPerspectives,No. 45,January-February2003,pp. 21-29. 31 AsPierreBourdieuhasunderlinedinhisanalysisoftherelationshipbetweenthehabitusandclassconflicts,thehabitusisgovernedbyrelationalinfluences.Aboveall,itispublic,inthatitismeanttocarrymeaninginotherpeople’seyes.Inthisregard,thestudyoftheevolutionoftheUyghurhabitusgivesusextensiveinformationonthenatureoftherelationsbetweentheUyghursandtheChinesecentre. 32 ArtoushKumul,“LeséparatismeouïghourauXXesiècle”,CEMOTI,n° 25,January-June1998,p. 88. 33 ZhangYumo,“TheAnti-SeparatismStruggleanditsHistoricalLessonssincetheLiberationofXinjiang”inYangFarenetal.,Fanyisilanzhuyi,fantujuezhuyiyanjiu(StudyonPan-IslamismandPan-Turkism),1994,adocumenttranslatedandpublishedinEnglishonthewebsiteoftheUyghurAmericanAssociation,www.uyghuramerican.org/researchanalysis/trans.html. 34 Themeshreparegatheringsatthelocallevel,favouringthecommunicationoftraditionalUyghurculture.Thismovementforrevitalisingtraditionalculturewasintendedalsotostemthelossof“moralvalues”amongyoungUyghurs(theweakeningofintergenerationalsolidarity,criminalbehaviour,consumptionofdrugsandalcohol...). 35 AmnestyInternational,“People’sRepublicofChina:GrossViolationsofHumanRightsintheXinjiangAutonomousRegion”,April1st1999,pp. 18-19. 36 OntheriseofmilitantnationalismamongyoungUyghurs,seealsothestudybyJoanneSmith,“FourGenerationsofUyghurs:theShifttowardsEthno-politicalIdeologiesamongXinjiang’sYouth”,InnerAsia,Vol. 2,No. 2,2000,pp. 195-224. 37 Althoughthisstudysetsoutinparticulartolookatthepoliticalmanifestationsofthe“Uyghurmalaise”itisimportanttonotethatthismalaisealsofeedsa“sub-politicalresistance”anchoredmainlyinthedailylifeoftheUyghurs.Onthisquestion,seeGardnerBovington,“TheNot-So-SilentMajority:UyghurResistancetoHanRuleinXinjiang”,ModernChina,Vol. 28,No. 1,January2002,pp. 39-78. 38 ThisstudyislimitedtoactivemovementsinXinjiang.OnpoliticalgroupingsintheDiaspora,seeFrédérique-JeanneBesson,“LesOuïghoursdeladiaspora”,Cahiersd’étudessurlaMéditerranéeorientaleetlemondeturco-iranien(CEMOTI),n° 25,July-December1998,pp.161-192. 39 Cfnote6.Onthispoint,overandabovethedebateaboutemancipationandthemeanstoachieveit,theaccentisplacedeitheronthestrugglefortherecognitionofthesovereignrightsoftheUyghurnation,orelseontheneedtodefendtheinterestsofthevariousTurkic-speakingpopulationswithinthecontextofaPan-TurkicprojectonthescaleofXinjiang:bothviewsareairedinthedebateamongthedifferentnationalistmovementsoverhowtheregionshouldbenamed:Uyghuristanintheformerview,EastTurkistanforthelatter.See,onthequestion,ETIC,“SherqiyTurkistanmu?Uyghuristanmu?”(EastTurkistan?Uyghuristan?). 40 Interviews,UyghurDiaspora2002.AccordingtoArtoushKumul,itwasalreadyactiveinthelate1950s(seeArtoushKumul,op.cit.,p. 85). 41 TaipeiTimes,October11th1999. 42 ZhangYumo,op.cit. 43 Ibid. 44 Cfnote 8. 45 Ibid. 46 ThemainpartoftheUyghurDiasporahassoughtrefugeinCentralAsiawhereitnumbersaccordingtothe1989censusinKazakhstan180,000 people(500,000accordingtoUyghurassociations),40,000 peopleinKirghizstan(250,000accordingtotheassociations),5,000inTurkmenistan(20,000fortheassociations)andatotalthatishardtocalculateinUzbekistan(manyUyghurshavingregisteredthemselvesasUzbeks).TherestoftheDiasporaissettledinTurkey(about10,000 people)and,insmallernumbers,inGermany,Australia,SaudiArabia,Sweden,Canada,theUS,IndiaandPakistan. 47 ThenewnamefortheformerShanghaiGroupcreatedin1996,theSCOincludesRussia,China,Kazakhstan,Kirghizstan,TadjikistanandUzbekistan. 48 Thus,forexample,thegovernmentofKazakhstan,whichhadofficiallyrecognisedorganisationsseekingindependencethatwereoperatingwithinitsterritory(TheUnitedNationalRevolutionaryFrontofEastTurkistan,theOrganisationfortheLiberationofUyghuristanandtheUnionofUyghurPeoples)endedupbybanningthemin1995underpressurefromtheChinesegovernment.OntherepressionoftheUyghurmilitantsinCentralAsia,seeETIC,“SherqiyTurkistanning2002-yiliYanwardin–MayghiçeBolghanArliqtikiInsanHeqliriWeziyitiHeqqideTeyarlanghanMehsusDokilat”(SpecialreportonthestateofhumanrightsinEastTurkistanovertheperiodJanuary-May2002),May1st2002,pp. 7-8. 49 ControloverillegalreligiousactivitieswastightenedbymeansofregulationssuchasTemporaryRegulationsonControllingReligiousMeetingsintheXinjiangUyghurAutonomousRegionin1988andRegulationsonReligiousActivitiesintheXinjiangUyghurAutonomousRegionin1995. 50 Thislist,commonlycalledSecretDocumentNo. 7,stresses,forexample,theneedtopurgetheCommunistPartyandthelocaladministrationoftheirleastreliableelements,tostrengthenpropagandaagainstseparatism,totightencontroloverthepeopleofXinjiang,toencouragetheinfluxofofficialsandHancolonistswithintheXinjiangConstructionandProductionCorpsinordertocontroltheregion,tocontrolstrictlythebuildingofnewmosques,togiveleadingpositionsinthemosquesandreligiousorganisationstopeoplewholovetheir“mothercountry”,toregisterallpeoplewhohavebeentrainedinreligiousschoolswithoutpermissionandtokeepthemundersurveillance,totake“strongmeasurestopreventreligionfrominterferinginsocialandpoliticalaffairs…”See“GuanyuweihuXinjiangwendingdehuiyijiyao,zhongyangzhengzhijuweiyuanhui”,op.cit. 51 InXinjiang,theeverydayuseoftorture,ill-treatmentandexecutionsfollowingsummarytrialscontrastwiththerelativemildnessoftherepressiveapparatusintheinteriorofChinaitself.AccordingtoareportbyAmnestyInternational,betweenApril1997and1999,aminimumof190executionswererecorded(AmnestyInternational,“People’sRepublicofChina”:GrossViolationsofHumanRightsintheXinjiangAutonomousRegion”,op.cit.).ForMarieHolzman,theproportionofUyghursamongChinesecitizenscondemnedtodeathistentimeshigherthantheirshareoftheChinesepopulation(apersonalcommunication).ThisrepressivedownturnwasitselfexacerbatedbytheseriouseventsthattookplaceinFebruary1997.OnFebruary5thand6ththatyear,violentriotingbrokeoutinGhulja(Yining).Itwasbrutallyputdown.Thepolicecrackdownandthewidespreadarreststhatfollowedinstilledaclimateofterrorthatleftitsmarkonpeople’sminds.Despiteanofficialfigureofninekilledandahundredwounded,theprobabledeathtollamongtheriotersreachedseveraldozen. 52 Manybookssuspectedofspreading“unhealthy”ideasarethusremovedfromtheshelvesandevenpubliclyburnedonoccasion(thebest-knowncaseisthatofTurghunAlmas’sbooksonthehistoryoftheUyghurs).UyghursworkingintheadministrationaswellasthosewhoarestudentsarestronglyadvisednottopractiseIslamonpainofdisciplinarymeasuresagainstthemorevenbeingthrownoutoftheiruniversitiesorlosingtheirjobs.Theclosureofmosquesorillegalreligiousschoolsareroutinelymentionedinthepress,andtheimamsandpreachersinvolvedsufferheavypenalties.InMarch2001,theChineseregimelaunchedamuchdislikedcampaigncalled“thepatrioticre-educationofimams”.Theimamsarethusobligedtoattendpatrioticeducationclasses(attheriskoflosingtheirauthorizationtopractise)whilenumerousrestrictionshavebeenimposedonreligiouseducationintheregion(forexample,intherestofChina,theimamsarefairlyfreetogivereligiousinstructiontoanindefinitenumberofstudentsinschoolsattachedtothemosques;butinXinjiang,theymaynotgiveinstructiontomorethanoneortwopupilseach). 53 See,forexample,ETIC,“HitayHokumitiSherqiyTurkistandaYurguziwatqanBir–BirigeZirDiniySiyasetliriArqiliqOziningAsasiQanuniniAyaq–AstiQilmaqta”(TheChinesegovernmentviolatesitsownconstitutioninthecontradictoryreligiouscampaignsthatitwagesinEastTurkistan). 54 Forexample,theeventsatKhotaninJuly1995areconnectedtothesuccessivearrestsofseveralcharismaticimams.TheuprisinginGhuljainFebruary1997seemstohavefollowedseveralunpopularmeasuresamongwhichwasthebanningofthemeshrepandthearrestofaprayergroupduringRamadan. 55 OnthedisturbancesthathaverockedXinjiangoverthelasttwoyears,MichaelDillon,“Xinjiang:Ethnicity,Separatism,andControlinChineseCentralAsia”,DurhamEastAsianPapers,No. 1,1995,pp. 17-31. 56 AscoreofUyghurorganisationshavetakenasteptowardscoordinatingtheiractivitiesbycreatingtheEastTurkistanNationalCongress(ETNC)anditspermanentofficeinMunichinOctober1999.ThestatutesandaimsoftheETNCmaybeconsultedonthewebsite:www.eastturkistan.com 57 Chinesemilitaryinfrastructure,therailwaylinesthatbringtheHancolonistsintoXinjiangandthepipelinesthatexportlocalhydrocarbonstotherestofChinaarefavouredtargetsfortheseactsofsabotage. 58 ForanexhaustivelistoftheviolentactsattributedbytheChineseregimetotheseparatistsinXinjiang,see“Truenatureof‘EastTurkestan’forces”,ChinaDaily,January22nd2002. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 FormanyUyghurmilitants,theabsenceofsupportfromtheWestandparticularlyfromtheUnitedStatestendstodrivesomeofthemintothearmsoftheIslamists(Interviews,1999-2002). 62 ComingmainlyfromPakistan. 63 BearinginmindthefriendlyrelationsthatChinaandPakistanstrivetomaintain,thesubjectisstilltaboo;butthecomingsandgoingsofPakistanipreachersfollowingtheopeningoftheKarakorumroadtocross-bordertradehaveseriouslyirritatedtheChineseauthorities.Asasignofprotest,ChinacloseditsfrontierwithPakistanbetween1992and1994.Afewmonthsafteritwasreopened,Chinaarrestednearly450 Pakistaniswhohadcommitted“illegalactions”inXinjiang.TheChinesediplomatsrefusedtoconfirmthatsomeofthemhadbeenarrestedforreligiousorpoliticalproselytisingbutthissilenceseemstosuggestthiswasthecase(NawaiWaqt,June4th1996).SeveralPakistanitraderswhoregularlypassthroughKashgarhaveindicatedtomethattheyhavestoppedattendingthemosqueto“keepoutoftroublewiththeChineseauthorities”. 64 StéphaneDudoignon,“Islamd’Europe?Islamd’Asie?EnEurasiecentrale(Russie,Caucase,Asiecentrale”inL’IslamenAsie,duCaucaseàlaChine,editedbyAndréeFeillard,Paris,LaDocumentationfrançaise,p.67. 65 TheHTisaneo-fundamentalistorganization.UnliketheJihadistpartieswhoseprimaryaimistoseizepoliticalpowerbyforce,thisorganizationfocusesitsactiononthere-IslamizationofMuslimpeoplebeforeconcentratingontakingpowerbyforce.OriginatinginJordan,ithasspreadacrosstheMuslimworldandparticularlyinUzbekistanwhereithasbecome,togetherwiththeIslamicMovementofUzbekistan,thebêtenoireofPresidentKarimov.SeeAhmedRashid,Asiecentrale,champdeguerres.CinqRépubliquesfaceàl’islamradical,AutrementFrontières,Paris,2002,pp. 106-123.ThisorganisationhasbeenoperatingforawhileinXinjiang.AfewUyghursrecruitedinUzbekistanandinKirghizstanwentbacktoXinjiangtoformcellsthathavespreadinthelate1990s(Interviews,2002). 66 InternationalHeraldTribune,October15th2001. 67 InDecember1995,aboutahundredUyghurs,mostlyfinancedbytheJamaat-eIslami,tookacourseattheSayedMawdudiInstituteatLahoreorinotherKoranicschoolsinPakistan(TheHerald,December1995). 68 In1997,thisneo-fundamendalistorganisationdeclaredthatitwascarryingout“missionaryactivities”ontheothersideoftheChinesefrontier(AsiaTimes,February12th1997). 69 ThisguerrillamovementactiveinKashmirislinkedtotheJamaat-eIslamiandtotheAfghanHizb-eIslami. 70 InfluencedbySalafism,thesemovements“demandareturntostrictIslam,freeofanylocalcustomsorcultures”and“callforJihadtorecover‘occupied’Muslimlands,andeventofightagainstMuslimregimesthattheyconsiderastraitors”(MariamAbouZahab&OlivierRoy,Réseauxislamiques.Laconnexionafghano-pakistanaise,collectionCERI/Autrement,Paris,2002,p. 5). 71 Ontheseorganisations,seeMariamAbouZahab&OlivierRoy,op.cit. 72 AccordingtoIndianofficials,threeUyghurswerecapturedduringbattlesinKashmirtwoyearsago. 73 “Jiangduyuqianrenladanyingshouxun”(MorethanathousandindependencecampaignersfromXinjiangweregiventraininginbinLaden’scamps),Mingbao,November3rd2001. 74 Interviews,2002. 75 TheUyghurscontinuetopracticeaformofIslamthatisstillstronglyinfluencedbySufismandthecultofsaints.Apartfromthosewhohavegoneabroadorfromsomeyoungurbans(whoareoftendisconnectedfromSufinetworks),thepeopleofXinjiangarestillgenerallyresistanttotheradicalversionsofIslamandoftenshowthemselvestobeverycriticalofsuchpractices. 76 ThepresentrisetopoweroftheHTinXinjiangprobablyarisesfromitspoliticalmethods,whicharepeaceful(whichgivesitamore“respectable”image)andultra-secret(itsmilitantsarelessexposedtoChineserepressionthantheywouldbebytheviolentactsofJihadistgroups.).Italsoacceptsputtingstressontheimprovementoftheindividualandachievingwell-beinginthelightofapurifiedformofIslam.Indeed,inadditiontoitspoliticalprojectofjoiningagreatcaliphate(andthusitsaimofwinningfreedomfromtheChinese“yoke”),theaccentitputsontheindividualreligiousdimensionisconsideredbyitsadherents(oftenyoungurbandropouts)asthemeansofendingthesocialproblemswhichaffectUyghursociety(thecollapseofsocialsolidarity,criminality,drug-taking…) 77 Zhongguoxinwenshe,July7th2000;SouthChinaMorningPost,“VictoryclaimedagainstMuslimsRebels”,January13th2001. 78 See“Uygurs‘partofworldproblem’”,SouthChinaMorningPost,November16th2001,“BinLaden’sNetwork:AChineseView”,People’sDaily,November16th2001;“Guowuyuan:Ladanchucipeixunxindu)”(StateCouncil:binLadenfinancesthetrainingofXinjiang’sindependenceactivists)”,Mingpao,January22nd2002 ,ChinaDaily,January22nd2002 (op.cit.) 79 DongtucorrespondstotheabbreviatedforminChineseofEastTurkistan. 80 SeeChinaDaily,op.cit.ThereportpublishedbytheStateCouncilaccusestheETIMofhavingsetupcellsinXinjiangfortrainingpeoplehowtohandleexplosivesandforhavingcreatedsignificantcachesofarmsandbomb-makingproducts. 81 Thefactthattheseorganisationshaveverysimilarnames,addedtothepresenceofUyghursamongtheIMUfighterstakenprisonerinnorthernAfghanistan,supportthisidea. 82 Infact,theAmericandecisionprobablyhadlesstodowiththestruggleagainstinternationalterrorismthanwithAmericananxietiesaboutChina’sexportsoftechnologiesconsideredtobe“sensitive”.Formanyanalysts,addingtheETIMtothisnotoriousblacklisthadtheprincipalaimofsatisfyingChinasoastoinducePekingtostopitsmissilesalestopotentiallyaggressivecountries(atthesametime,Chinahasindeeddrawnupnewregulationsgoverningitsmissileexports)(Xinhua,August26th2002).Topofpage Listofillustrations Title ThepeoplesofXinjiang URL http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/docannexe/image/648/img-1.jpg File image/jpeg,96k Title Table1 :DemographicstrengthofthemainXinjiangnationalities Caption Source:Fenjindesishinian:1949-1989.Xinjiangfenci(Theadvancing40years.1949-1989.XinjiangVolume),Zhongguotongjichubanshe,Urumchi,1989,p. 332;2002Xinjiangtongjinianjian(XinjiangStatisticalYearbook),Pékin,Zhongguotongjichubanshe,2002,pp. 107,109. URL http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/docannexe/image/648/img-2.jpg File image/jpeg,24k Title Table2:Distributionofwealthinthemainsub-regionaladministrativeunitsinXinjiang Caption Source:2002Xinjiangtongjinianjian,op.cit.,pp. 106,110-115,713,715;2002Zhongguotongjinianjian,op.cit.,p. 51. URL http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/docannexe/image/648/img-3.jpg File image/jpeg,36k Title Table3:Nationalminorities’shareinXinjiang’stotalschoolpopulationin2000 Caption Source:2002Xinjiangtongjinianjian,op.cit.,pp. 612-613. URL http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/docannexe/image/648/img-4.jpg File image/jpeg,12k Title Table4:DifferencesinqualificationsbetweenHanandnon-HanlabourinXinjiangin1990 Caption Source:Compilationbasedondatafromthefourthcensuscarriedoutin1990(EmilyHannum&YuXie,op.cit.,p. 329). URL http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/docannexe/image/648/img-5.jpg File image/jpeg,21k Topofpage References Electronicreference RémiCastets,« TheUyghursinXinjiang–TheMalaiseGrows »,ChinaPerspectives[Online],49 | september-october2003,Onlinesince17January2007,connectionon03March2022.URL :http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/648 ;DOI :https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.648Topofpage Abouttheauthor RémiCastets Bythisauthor JérômeDoyon,Négocierlaplacedel'islamchinois.LesassociationsislamiquesdeNankinàl'èredesréformes(NegotiatingthePlaceofChineseIslam:IslamicAssociationsinNanjingduringtheReformEra)[Fulltext] Paris,L'Harmattan,2014,249pp. PublishedinChinaPerspectives,2015/3 | 2015 S.FrederickStarr(ed.),Xinjiang.China'sMuslimBorderland[Fulltext] London,Armonk,NY,M.E.Sharpe,2004,506p. PublishedinChinaPerspectives,65 | may-june2006 MichaelDillon,Xinjiang―China’sMuslimFarNorthWest[Fulltext] London,NewYork,RoutledgeCurzon,2004,201p. PublishedinChinaPerspectives,60 | july-august2005 AndréeFeillarded.,L’IslamenAsie,duCaucaseàlaChine[Fulltext] Paris,Ladocumentationfrançaise,2001,248pp. PublishedinChinaPerspectives,45 | january-february2003 Topofpage Copyright ©AllrightsreservedTopofpage Contents Browse Index Authors Indexbykeyword Subjectindex Presentation ChinaPerspectives Editorialboard Subscription/Order Latestissues 20211 |2 |3 |4 Fulltextissues 20201 |2 |3 |4 20191 |2 |3 |4 20181-2 |3 |4 20171 |2 |3 |4 20161 |2 |3 |4 20151 |2 |3 |4 20141 |2 |3 |4 20131 |2 |3 |4 20121 |2 |3 |4 20111 |2 |3 |4 20101 |2 |3 |4 20091 |2 |3 |4 20081 |2 |3 |4 20071 |2 |3 |4 200663 |64 |65 |66 |67 |68 200557 |58 |59 |60 |61 |62 200451 |52 |53 |54 |55 |56 200345 |46 |47 |48 |49 |50 Allissues Information Contacts Credits Publishingpolicies Followus RSSfeed Newsletters OpenEditionNewsletter Incollaborationwith ElectronicISSN1996-4617 Readdetailedpresentation  Sitemap –Contacts –Credits –Syndication PrivacyPolicy –AboutCookies OpenEditionJournalsmember –PublishedwithLodel –Administrationonly SearchOpenEditionSearch YouwillberedirectedtoOpenEditionSearch InAllOpenEdition OnChinaPerspectives Search English Français Español Share Facebook Twitter Google+ "> Home Catalogueof574journalsOpenEditionSearch AllOpenEdition English Français EspañolAdigitalresourcesportalforthehumanitiesandsocialsciencesOpenEditionOurplatformsOpenEditionBooksOpenEditionJournalsHypothesesCalendaLibrariesandinstitutionsOpenEditionFreemiumOurservicesOpenEditionSearchNewsletterFollowus OpenEditionBooks Calenda Hypothèses OpenEditionJournals OpenEdition OpenEditionSearch