ISO 13849-1 Revisions：Safety Knowledge

ISO 13849-1 (Safety of machinery - Safety-related parts of control systems - General ... ISO 13849-1:2006 is a standard that revises ISO 13849-1:1999, ... TOP  >  TheIdeaofPerformanceLevel | ISO13849-1Revisions ISO13849-1Revisions PL(PerformanceLevel) PLParameters BackgroundofRevision OverviewofRevision BackgroundofRevision ISO13849-1(Safetyofmachinery-Safety-relatedpartsofcontrolsystems-Generalprinciplesfordesign),aninternationalstandard,wasrevisedin2006.Asthebackgroundoftherevision,semiconductorpartssuchastransistorsandMOS-FETshavebeenputtouseinthesafetymachinerythatcomposesthesafety-relatedpartsofcontrolsystems,whichrepresentsachangeincontrolmethodsfromcontrolbywayofhardwiringtocontrolbywayofsoftware.Intheconventionalwayofthinkingaboutcategories,safetywasdeterminedaccordingtosystemarchitectures(structures)thatusedmechanicalsafetydevicesandrelayswithforciblyguidedcontacts,soitcouldnotbesaidthatsufficientthoughtwasgiventosafetyattributabletothereliabilityofparts. Underthesecircumstances,attemptsweremadetoregulatemechanicalsafetyaccordingtofunctionsandreliabilityfromaroundtheyear2000. Thiswayofthinkingiscalled“functionalsafety.”ISO13849-1:2006isastandardthatrevisesISO13849-1:1999,whichwasbasedontheconventionalstandardEN954-1,byaddingdetailsfromIEC61508(IEC62061),whichdefinedfunctionalsafety. Download OverviewofRevision ISO13849-1:1999 Safety“Category”wasdefinedinISO13849-1:1999.Itisclassificationofthesafety-relatedpartsofacontrolsysteminrespectoftheirresistancetofaultsandtheirsubsequentbehaviorinthefaultcondition,andwhichisachievedbythestructuralarrangementofthepartsand/orbytheirreliability. ISO13849-1:2006 Performancelevel(PL)wasintroducedinISO13849-1:2006,whichisquantitativelyexpressedasthereliabilityofsafety-relatedpartsofacontrolsystem,includingdiagnosticcoverageorfailurerate. Reference:RequirementsbeforeRevisions ISO13849-1:1999specifiedthedeterminationmethodofcategoryanditsrequirements. Symbol Symboldetails Parameter Shortexplanationontheparameter S Severityofinjury S1 Slight(normallyreversible)injury S2 Serious(normallyirreversible)injuryincludingdeath F Frequencyand/orexposuretimetothehazard F1 Seldomtoquiteoftenexposuretimeisshort F2 Frequenttocontinuousexposuretimeislong P Possibilityofavoidingthehazard P1 Possible P2 Scarcelypossible ExplanationofsymbolsThefollowingisacriteriaforeachparameteraccordingtoAISI/RIAR15.06. S:Inacasewhereitrequiresmorethanfirst-aid,includingabsencefromwork,S2wouldbeassigned. F:Inacasewheretypicalexposuretothehazardmorethanoneperhour,F2wouldbeassigned. P:Inacasewhererobotspeedisgreaterthan250mm/s,P2wouldbeassigned. CategoryrequirementsdefinedbyISO13849-1 Category Summaryofrequirements Systembehavior B Safety-relatedpartsofcontrolsystemsandtheirprotectiveequipmentshallbedesigned,constructed,selected,assembled,andcombinedinaccordancewithrelevantstandardssothattheycanwithstandtheexpectedinfluence. Theoccurrenceofafaultcanleadtothelossofthesafetyfunction. 1 RequirementsofBshallapply. Well-triedcomponentsandwell-triedsafetyprinciplesshallbeused.* Theoccurrenceofafaultcanleadtothelossofthesafetyfunction,buttheprobabilityofoccurrenceislowerthanforcategoryB. 2 RequirementsofBandtheuseofwell-triedsafetyprinciplesshallapply.Thesafetyfunctionshallbecheckedatsuitableintervalsbythemachinecontrolsystem. Theoccurrenceofafaultcanleadtothelossofthesafetyfunctionbetweenthechecks. Thelossofthesafetyfunctionisdetectedbythecheck. 3 RequirementsofBandtheuseofwell-triedsafetyprinciplesshallapply.Safety-relatedpartsshallbedesignedsothat-asinglefaultinanyofthesepartsdoesnotleadtothelossofthesafetyfunctionand-wheneverreasonablypracticable,thesinglefaultisdetected. Whenasinglefaultoccurs,thesafetyfunctionisalwaysperformed.Some,butnotall,faultswillbedetected.Accumulationofundetectedfaultscanleadtothelossofthesafetyfunction. 4 RequirementsofBandtheuseofwell-triedsafetyprinciplesshallapply.Safety-relatedpartsshallbedesignedsothat-asinglefaultinanyofthesepartsdoesnotleadtothelossofthesafetyfunctionand-singlefaultsaredetectedatorbeforethenextdemanduponthesafetyfunction,butthatifthisdetectionisnotpossible,anaccumulationofundetectedfaultsshallnotleadtothelossofthesafetyfunction. Whenthefaultsoccur,thesafetyfunctionisalwaysperformed.Thefaultswillbedetectedintimetopreventthelossofthesafetyfunction. *Well-triedsafetyprinciplesare,forexample,1)avoidanceofcertainfaults(ex.avoidanceshort-circuitbyseparation),2)reducingtheprobabilityoffaults(ex.over-dimensioningorunderratingofcomponents),3)byorientatingthemodeoffault (ex.byensuringanopencircuitintheeventoffault),4)detectfaultsveryearly,and5)restricttheconsequencesofafault(ex.earthingoftheequipment). 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